A Texas state appeals court has affirmed a lower court’s finding dismissing the claim of an assistant coach, who sued the head coach after the head coach, while demonstrating a drill, lost his grip on a bat, striking the assistant coach.
Plaintiff Robin Chrismon and defendant Harold J. Brown were both volunteer coaches on a 12-and-under girls softball team, sanctioned by the co-defendant Amateur Softball Association of America. On January 2002, while acting in that capacity, Chrismon was injured when a bat being swung by Brown slipped from his hand and struck Robin in the face.
Chrismon sued Brown and the association, alleging negligence, gross negligence and assault. Brown countered with a motion for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense of immunity under the Charitable Immunity and Liability Act of 1987. The association filed motions for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that there was no evidence as to: (1) a legal duty, (2) a breach of duty, and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach.
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing all of the Chrismons’ claims, spawning the instant appeal.
“In reviewing the trial court’s summary judgment as to the allegation that the softball association is vicariously liable for the head coach’s alleged acts or omissions, we must determine what duties, if any, one sports participant owes to another sports participant, which is an issue of first impression in this court,” wrote the appeals court.
“We hold that (1) a sports participant owes no negligence duty to another sports participant regarding risks inherent in the sport in question; (2) a sports participant owes a negligence duty to another sports participant regarding risks that are not inherent in that sport; and (3) regardless of whether the risk is inherent, a sports participant owes a duty not to cause injury to another sports participant by gross negligence or intentional conduct.
“In response to the softball association’s no-evidence ground, the plaintiff/assistant coach did not produce evidence showing that the risk in question was not inherent in the sport in which she was engaged when she was injured. The summary-judgment evidence did not raise a fact issue as to whether the head coach engaged in gross negligence or intentional conduct. Therefore, this court affirms the trial court’s summary judgment as to the assistant coach’s vicarious-liability claims against the softball association.
“We also conclude the trial court correctly granted (1) the head coach’s motion for summary judgment in which he asserted immunity under the Charitable Immunity and Liability Act of 1987, and (2) the softball association’s motion for summary judgment in which it sought dismissal of all direct-liability claims against it and all claims asserted by the assistant coach’s husband. Though this is the first case in which this court has adopted and applied the inherent-risk doctrine, under Texas Supreme Court precedent, we do not have the power to reverse the trial court’s error-free judgment and remand in the interest of justice. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.”
Robin Chrismon et al v. Harold J. Brown et al; Tex.Ct.App., 14th Dist.; NO. 14-05-00822-CV; Tex. App. LEXIS 7745; 9/27/07
Attorneys of Record: (for appellants) John H. Boswell, Houston, TX. (for appellees) Scott Gary Hunziker, The Woodlands, TX; Terry Fitzgerald, The Woodlands, TX.
