The Supreme Court of South Carolina has affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a plaintiff, who attended a minor league hockey game and was struck in the face by a puck while standing behind the goal, assumed the risk of injury.
Craig Hurst entered the Florence City-County Civic Center on January 11, 2002. On his way to his seat, Hurst paused and observed pre-game warmups from behind the goal. The court noted that “the ice rink at the Civic Center was encircled by dasher boards and a protective Plexiglas wall, which was attached to the top of the dasher boards.”
Nevertheless, he was struck by the puck and ultimately sued the club, the league, the civic center and the city, among others.
After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted summary judgment, having “determined the risk of pucks leaving the ice rink and entering the spectator area is well-known, obvious, and inherent to the game of hockey.”
The plaintiff appealed. For him to succeed, the court wrote that he would have to prove “the following elements: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach of duty. Steinke v. S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 387, 520 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1999). The court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the law recognizes a particular duty. If there is no duty, then the defendant in a negligence action is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 387, 520 S.E.2d at 149.
“Primary implied assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes those risks that are inherent in a particular activity. Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 81, 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998) (emphasis in original).
“Under the doctrine of implied primary assumption of risk, Respondents’ duty of care did not encompass the risk involved. The risk of a hockey spectator being struck by a flying puck is inherent to the game of hockey and is also a common, expected, and frequent risk of hockey. See generally Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 684 (5th ed. 1984) (‘[T]hose who participate or sit as spectators at sports . . . may be taken to assume the known risks of being hurt by . . . hockey pucks. . . .’). Respondents did not have a duty to protect Appellant, a spectator, from inherent risks of the game of hockey. n2 See also Nemarnik v. Los Angeles Kings Hockey Club, L.P., 103 Cal. App. 4th 631, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 (Ct. App. 2002) (hockey arena owners and operators, hockey league, and professional ice hockey team did not owe a duty to spectator to eliminate the inherent risk of injury from flying pucks); Modec, 29 N.W.2d at 456-57 (spectator at hockey game assumes risk of injury from inherent risks of game); Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club Inc., 245 A.D. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (hockey rink operators did not owe a duty to protect a spectator from flying pucks, which is a risk incidental to the activity); Pestalozzi, 576 A.2d at 74-75 (same); Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977) (spectator at a hockey game assumed risk of injury from flying pucks); see generally W.E. Shipley, Liability for Injury to One Attending Hockey Game or Exhibition, 14 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1967) (collecting cases that involve the issue of whether a hockey arena owner or operator owes a duty to protect hockey spectators from flying pucks).”
Craig A. Hurst, Appellant, v. East Coast Hockey League, Inc.; S.Ct.S.C.; Opinion No. 26222, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 366; 11/13/06
Attorneys of Record: (for Appellant) Stephen J. Wukela, of Florence. (for Respondents)
Robert T. King, of Willcox, Buyck & Williams, of Florence.
