A federal judge from the Western District of Tennessee had dismissed a football coach’s claim that his employment contract was not renewed because the school’s principal is African American and he is white.
In so ruling, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that a similarly-situated coach, who was African American, received preferential treatment.
Plaintiff Wayne Randall was a tenured teacher with Memphis City Schools (MCS), a defendant in the case, and a football coach at East High School. Defendant Fred Curry was appointed the principal of East in June 2005.
When Curry became principal at East, he perceived the school to be in a crisis situation, suffering from a lack of discipline and poor morale among the staff and students. He told the plaintiff and others in the athletic department that he expected the student athletes to comply with the dress code and set an example for other students as far as behavior and grades went.
Curry was not happy with the football program. He had concerns about the plaintiff spending money for the football program that had not yet been allocated. Curry’s concerns and his refusal to purchase equipment led to conflict with the plaintiff. He was also upset that the plaintiff used profanity toward his players. Curry told Randall not to use profanity with the football team.
Third, the plaintiff reportedly violated Memphis Interscholastic Athletic Association (MIAA) rules by scouting an opposing team and allowing his assistant coach to film one of the opposing team’s games. Curry reprimanded him for his conduct in the situation. He was also advised that MCS policy gave principals discretion to choose their football coaches, who are given year-to-year contracts, terminable at the end of any school year. On March 10, 2006, Curry informed Randall that his contract as a football coach at East would not be renewed for the 2006-2007 school year.
During the 2006-2007 school year, Curry relieved Reginald Mosby, the head basketball coach at East, from his coaching duties. Curry’s reasons for terminating Mosby were substantially the same as his reasons for not renewing the plaintiff’s coaching contract. Mosby is an African-American male.
The plaintiff sued, alleging a series of federal and state law claims based on his dismissal as head football coach at East High School: violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Teachers Tenure Act. Most relevant here was the alleged violation of § 1981 against defendant MCS and Curry, in his official capacity.
Addressing the claim against the school district first, the court relied on Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), a Supreme Court that held that § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors. “Just as in the case at bar, the Jett case involved the reassignment of a white football coach and schoolteacher on the recommendation of an African-American principal. “The Supreme Court dismissed the coach’s race discrimination claim under § 1981 against the school district, holding that state actors such as a school district may not be sued directly under § 1981,” wrote the court. “Thus, the plaintiff’s § 1981 claims against defendant MCS must be dismissed.”
Turning to the plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination against Curry, the court wrote that “a plaintiff must make the showings required under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework. If the plaintiff can make out his prima facie case, ‘the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.’ If the defendant can meet his burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext.”
The court continued: “For cases of reverse discrimination, a plaintiff must prove (1) background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for his job and performed it satisfactorily; (3) despite his qualifications and performance, the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the defendant treated differently employees who were similarly situated but were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class.”
The plaintiff proved the first three prongs of the framework.
As for the fourth and final element he failed to show that Curry treated a similarly situated employee outside of the plaintiff’s protected class more favorably. It was not enough that Randall was ultimately replaced by an African American. “The Sixth Circuit has explained this element in a Title VII reverse discrimination case: ‘in order for employees to be considered similarly-situated the plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation are nearly identical to those of the minority employees who[m] he alleges were treated more favorably.’”
While the court was receptive to the plaintiff’s argument that he was being fired, the contract of the basketball coach, albeit temporarily, was being renewed.
“However, the plaintiff has failed to show that he and the basketball coach were similarly situated in that they engaged in the same or similar conduct. The stated reasons for the plaintiff’s dismissal were the lack of discipline and academic achievement among East football players; the plaintiff’s use of profanity with players captured by a television news camera; smoking on campus after repeated warnings; his violation of MIAA rules about taping opponents; and his management of the football team’s budget, which ran a deficit of $15,800 the year prior to plaintiff’s dismissal as coach.”
The court contrasted that behavior with that of the basketball coach, whose actions were milder in nature.
“There is no evidence that the boys basketball coach was ever disciplined for violating MIAA rules or clashed with Curry over a deficit as large as $15,800 in the basketball team’s budget during the 2005-2006 school year,” wrote the court. “Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff cannot show that a similarly-situated employee received more favorable discipline from Curry for the same or similar conduct.”
The court added that even had the plaintiff met his initial burden, it would have granted summary judgment since the “plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that Curry’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for relieving the plaintiff of his coaching responsibilities at East were pretext for discrimination. To make such a showing, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant’s stated reasons had no basis in fact, (2) the stated reasons were not the actual reasons, or (3) the stated reasons were insufficient to explain the defendant’s actions.” The “plaintiff cannot make any of these showings.”
Wayne Randall v. Memphis City Schools, et al., W.D.Tenn.; No. 09-2267-STA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115607; 10/29/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Michael R. Lipscomb, LEAD ATTORNEY, Hot Springs, AR. (for defendants) Lewis Clayton Culpepper, III, Michael R. Marshall, LEAD ATTORNEYS, EVANS & PETREE, PC, Memphis, TN.
