A federal judge from the District of South Carolina has adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted summary judgment to a municipality, which was sued by its former recreation director, an African American, for alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
The court found specifically that plaintiff, Jimmy A. Reed, failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.
Reed was hired as the Recreation Director of the Town of Williston in 2003. He was terminated in May 2007. Reed filed the lawsuit on July 8, 2008 against the Town and several individual defendants. Besides the federal claim, he also alleged a violation of state law.
In describing the events leading up to the litigation, the court noted that Reed received regular appraisals, which had contained an average evaluation at best. Further complicating the matter, there had been complaints from parents, some of which were African American.
The last evaluation given to Reed before his termination was delivered in narrative form. Reed’s supervisor wrote as follows:
“Usually I evaluate Jimmy Reed’s job performance using the standard performance evaluation form. I have chosen to do a very basic evaluation report for Jimmy this year. The problems in the Recreation Department are well known to anyone involved in the program, and Jimmy is certainly aware of them. … I have received several complaints from parents and coaches. Several baseball coaches are very upset, and some are saying that they will not return next year unless changes are made. At least one sponsor is threatening to leave the program. Some parents are saying that they will pull their children form [sic] the program if things are not resolved. Those parents and coaches that have complained put the blame for the problems squarely on Jimmy’s shoulders. Some want Jimmy to be removed from his position as Recreation Director.”
“… I cannot prove or disprove the validity of these complaints at this point, but I do know that the large number of complaints, and the intensity of the complaints, is telling. There is no doubt in my mind that there are major problems that must be addressed if Jimmy is to be effective as Recreation Director. I have also counseled Jimmy about his failure to obtain purchase orders before ordering supplies, uniforms, etc. I have indicated to Jimmy that a signed purchase order must be obtained prior to making purchases. Jimmy has indicated that he understands this policy and will abide by it.”
In the spring of 2007, the Town Council decided to terminate Reed. He was ultimately replaced by a white male. Reed ultimately sued, and the defendant moved for summary judgment.
The court noted that “under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md. Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, then a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997). If the employer satisfies its burden of production, then the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent and that its proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007).”
Further, “to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, the plaintiff must show that: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was terminated; 3) at the time of his termination he was performing at a level that met his employer’s legitimate job expectations; and 4) that the position remained open to or was filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class. Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 609 (4th Cir. 1999). The parties agree that the plaintiff has established the first two elements of a prima facie case.”
The third prong, however, was an issue for the plaintiff.
“The Town has presented significant evidence that the plaintiff was not meeting its legitimate job expectations. The plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance evaluation in 2006 was also based upon two written complaints from Town citizens, one of whom was black. The plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether he was meeting the legitimate job expectations of his employer at the time of his termination. The plaintiff therefore, has not met the met the third prong of a prima facie case for discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework.”
The court went on to write that “even if the court were to find that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination, he would not prevail,” since he did not establish that the reason proffered by the defendants was pretextual.”
Jimmy A. Reed v. Town of Williston, et al.; D.S.C.; C.A. No. 1:08-cv-02451-MBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31704; 3/31/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff): James Lewis Cromer, LEAD ATTORNEY, Columbia, SC; Tandi D Ross, Cromer and Mabry, Columbia, SC. (for defendants) D L Dirk Aydlette, III, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gignilliat Savitz and Bettis, Columbia, SC.
