A federal judge from the Southern District of Indiana has affirmed its earlier ruling that allowed a student athlete’s Title IX claim to continue against a school district, which allegedly scheduled more boys’ basketball games on the weekend than girls’ games. However, the court, in reversing itself, reinstated the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the school district.
The Indiana High School Athletic Association emerged unscathed as the judge declined to alter its ruling that the association was not a proper defendant.
Amber Parker coached the Franklin County High School (FCHS) girls’ basketball team from 2007-09. Parker’s 16-year-old daughter, J.L.P., played on the FCHS team. Parker brought the suit on J.L.P.’s behalf, alleging that the school defendants and the Indiana High School Athletic Association violated both Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by scheduling girls’ basketball games on non-preferred dates and times. Specifically, Parker claimed that the defendants assigned boys’ basketball teams to play on Friday and Saturday evenings more frequently than the defendants assigned girls’ basketball teams to play at those preferred times. The IHSAA, which regulates and supervises interscholastic athletic competitions among its member schools, became aware of this discriminatory scheduling practice in 1997 but did nothing to ameliorate the situation.
On Dec. 2, 2009, the court turned to the Title IX and § 1983 claims brought against the school defendants. The court ruled that the school defendants could be sued under Title IX. However, the court determined that the plaintiff could not sue the school defendants under § 1983. Both the plaintiff and the school defendants sought reconsideration of the § 1983 portion of the court’s ruling.
In addition, the school defendants asked the court to “reconsider that portion of its entry relating to the Title IX claims presented against the non-Franklin school defendants.”
Similarly, Parker asked the Court to reconsider the portion of its ruling that dismissed her Title IX claim against the IHSAA.
Given recent case law, the court decided that reconsideration of its § 1983 decision was “appropriate”
Next, it turned to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the non-Franklin County school defendants. “The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that all of the school defendants ‘sponsor and administer high school amateur athletic programs, including girls’ and boys’ high school basketball teams and competitions,’” wrote the court, citing the complaint. “The school defendants work with the IHSAA to ‘determine the schedules for girls’ and boys’ high school basketball programs, including the days of the week and the time of day the games are played.’ Preferred Friday and Saturday night games are ‘assigned by the [School Defendants and the IHSAA] to the boys’ high school basketball programs far more frequently than to the girls’ high school basketball programs.’
“Although the school defendants claim that these facts do not satisfy the plaintiff’s pleading obligations under Twombly, the court disagrees. There is a plausible set of facts that support the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the non-Franklin County School defendants.
The court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that its previous decision “expands Title IX” and “runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s various decisions noting the relatively limited scope of Title IX.” In their argument, the defendants took issue with the court’s conclusion that because they “are recipients of Title IX funds, (they) therefore … are appropriate defendants to this suit.” Specifically, they claimed the court ignored “the second step in the analysis, which is to determine whether the putative plaintiffs are ‘beneficiaries’ of each individual school’s programs and activities.”
The court, upon reconsideration, wrote that “there are two problems with this argument.
“First, the Seventh Circuit case that the School Defendants cite in support of their position, Smith v. Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1999), does not, in fact, support their argument. Smith was a case about teacher-on-student sexual harassment. The issue in Smith was whether the principal and assistant principal of the school where the harassment occurred were proper Title IX defendants. The language that the school defendants cite in support of their argument that Title IX contains a beneficiary requirement was actually cited by the Seventh Circuit for the proposition that “only a [Title IX] grant recipient can violate Title IX.”Id. at 1018. Although the school defendants claim that Doe v. Petaluma City School District, 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993), which was cited in Smith, supports their position, the Court disagrees. Doe, like Smith, involved sexual harassment (this time student-on-student). And, as in Smith, the Doe court was attempting to determine whether individuals are proper Title IX defendants. The Doe court did use ‘beneficiary’ language; however, this language is not found anywhere in Title IX. Instead, it is drawn from Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 545, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 72 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
“This brings the Court to the bigger problem with the School defendants’ argument — the school defendants’ position completely ignores the plain language of Title IX. The statute provides, with several exceptions not relevant here, that ‘[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The statutory language is clear, unambiguous, and is never limited to “beneficiaries” of programs or activities. Given the plain language of the statute, “‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.'” Pittway Corp. v. United States, 102 F.3d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989)). Because Title IX is not limited to ‘beneficiaries,’ the Court finds the School Defendants’ arguments unavailing. Having reconsidered its prior ruling, the Court remains convinced that the non-Franklin County School Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Title IX claims was properly denied.
As for the plaintiff’s appeal that the court reconsider its decision about whether the IHSAA was a proper Title IX defendant. In its original ruling, the court relied on Smith, which stated that “Title IX only protects against discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” Smith, 128 F.3d at 1019. The plaintiff took issue with the court’s analysis, claiming that “the IHSAA, if it escapes the implementing regulations’ definition of a recipient of federal financial assistance, may nonetheless be held liable under Title IX if it was ceded ‘controlling authority’ by the School Defendants.”
The judge continued, writing that “although the Seventh Circuit has not expressly weighed in on the controlling authority theory, the dicta from Smith indicates that the court would not be receptive to this argument. Further, in Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Association of Illinois, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (N.D. Ill. 2001), the Northern District of Illinois declined to apply the controlling authority theory, and instead dismissed the athletic association defendant. The Johnny’s Icehouse court noted that other courts, specifically the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the District Court for the Western District of Michigan, had accepted the controlling authority theory as grounds for imposing Title IX liability. That may be so, but the plaintiff has not identified any case from a court in this circuit holding that the controlling authority theory is valid. While there is certainly room for disagreement on this issue, having reconsidered its ruling, the court remains convinced that the Plaintiff’s Title IX claim against the IHSAA was properly dismissed.”
Amber Parker v. Indiana High School Athletic Association, et al., S.D. Ind.; Cause No. 1:09-cv-885-WTL-JMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23409; 3/11/2010
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Mark W. Sniderman, CAPLIN SNIDERMAN P.C., Carmel, IN; William R. Groth, FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH & TOWE LLP, Indianapolis, IN. (for defendant IHSAA) Robert M. Baker , III, Indianapolis, IN. (for defendant school districts) Thomas E. Wheeler , II, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Indianapolis, IN.
