A federal judge from the Eastern District of New York has denied, in part, a school district’s motion for summary judgment, allowing a former high school volleyball coach to continue to pursue her claim of employment discrimination against the district.
In a lawsuit against her former employer, Smithtown Central School District, plaintiff Maura Olga Stouter alleged discrimination and retaliation based on sexual orientation, age, and gender, and the existence of a hostile work environment. The discrimination claims were brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, and New York Human Rights Law. Smithtown filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss all claims, which the court considered in the instant case.
Stouter was 59 years old at the time the complaint was filed. She is a Caucasian lesbian, whose sexual orientation was known by the district’s athletic coordinator (and plaintiff’s supervisor) Patrick Smith. Stouter served as a physical education teacher in the district from 1970 through June 2003, when she retired from teaching. The plaintiff also coached Smithtown girls’ varsity volleyball from 1970 to June 2006, when she was notified by Smith that her coaching contract would not be renewed for a second time after her retirement.
The non-reappointment of Stouter came after a series of events where she questioned the district’s compliance with Title IX regulations in 2004 and 2005. Stouter disagreed with the district’s finding of compliance and published her own findings in a separate report. This spurred an exchange of letters between Stouter and Smith regarding the allegations made by both parties in 2005. In February 2006, Stouter was notified that she would not be reappointed as the varsity girls’ volleyball coach, and in July 2006, the district hired a younger female, Kelly Bebee, as her replacement.
After filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in August 2006, the plaintiff obtained a Right to Sue letter. Stouter commenced the action against the district on July 5, 2007, alleging the following claims:
(1) discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, as well as retaliation, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1694…; (2) age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)…;(3) gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972…; and, (4) discrimination on the basis of gender, sexual orientation and age, as well as retaliation, pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law…
The court first defined the legal standard for summary judgment in discrimination claims akin to the case at bar. Noting that “[m]otions for summary judgment in employment discrimination actions should be evaluated with special care,” the court cited other cases in the Second Circuit. It continued:
Since ‘direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent will rarely be found, ‘affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’’ …Even in the discrimination context, however, a plaintiff ‘must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment…’
Subsequently, the court turned to the issue of timeliness regarding the plaintiff’s claims. In the instant case, actions that occurred prior to October 12, 2005 were time-barred. However, the plaintiff argued that the exception to the limitations period, the continuing violation doctrine, kept her claims alive.
The court pointed out that the Second Circuit has been loath to accept and apply the continuing violation doctrine absent of showing compelling circumstances (citing Kubicek v. Westchester County, No. 08-CV-372, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117061, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009)). Ultimately, the court found that the discrimination claims made by the plaintiff did not constitute “continuing violations” (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002)) and were time-barred, while Stouter’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the ADEA were acceptable and subject to further consideration.
The court granted summary judgment as a matter of law to Smithtown on the plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title VII, pointing out that “[n]othing in the text of the statute protects an individual from discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.”
Regarding the plaintiff’s Title VII disparate treatment claim, the court ruled that there was no evidence to suggest there was discrimination based on gender. The court based this finding on the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by another female, that she was the only female ever to retire and continue coaching within the district, and that she was hired and terminated by the same individual. The court stated, “[a] plaintiff’s being hired and fired by the same manager is a highly relevant factor suggesting that invidious discrimination was unlikely.” Chin v. ABN-Amro N. Am., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Next, the court turned to the ADEA claims. According to the Supreme Court, “under the plain language of the ADEA… a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., U.S., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009). Here, Stouter offered hearsay evidence at best, alleging that she had been told by other people that Smith and her replacement said she was “too old for the job”, among other things.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, Stouter had to demonstrate that: “(1) she was in the protected age group; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and, (4) the adverse employment action ‘occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.’ Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003).” New York Human Rights law uses the same criteria. Disputed here was the fourth prong of the test. The court agreed with Smithtown that the “plaintiff cannot establish that the failure to reappoint her as the varsity girls volleyball coach occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” The court ruled in favor of defendant Smithtown and dismissed the age discrimination claims.
With respect to the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims under Title IX, the court sided with defendant Smithtown once again. While the court acknowledged the splits within the circuit and between circuits with respect to Title IX discrimination claims by employees, it declined to directly address the issue here. The court deemed Stouter’s claim as abandoned after her claim only addressed the defendant’s claim of retaliation.
In sum, the court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims for “(1) a hostile work environment based on gender, pursuant to Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law; (2) sexual orientation discrimination, pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law; and, (3) retaliation, pursuant to Title VII, Title IX, and the New York Human Rights Law.” The remaining claims were dismissed.
Stouter v. Smithtown Central School District, E.D.N.Y.; CV 07-2707 (ETB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12279, 2/12/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) David George Gabor, Hope Senzer Gabor, Gabor & Gabor, Garden City, NY.; (for defendant) Peter G. Albert, Law Offices of Peter G. Albert, Commack, NY.
