A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has granted summary judgment, near unanimously on all counts, to defendants — coaches, student perpetrators and school districts — that were implicated in a hazing incident at a football camp.
The lone exception was a claim by the victim that the defendants violated Title IX. Regarding that count, the court found that one of the school districts did not provide “sufficient evidence to either negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s Title XI claim or show that the plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence to carry his ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”
The plaintiff, an incoming freshman at Gustine High School, wanted to play football for GHS in the fall of 2006. So he attended a football camp jointly coordinated by Gustine and Liberty High Schools. While at the football camp, the plaintiff was assaulted by several upper class teammates, and suffered additional acts of hazing by these individuals.
The student perpetrators were ultimately expelled from the school.
The plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, sued in May of 2007. He names as defendants the Gustine and Golden Valley Unified School Districts, GHS, the participating football coaches, the individuals who allegedly perpetrated the events, and the parents of the minors allegedly involved in the events.
He filed the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. section 1681-1688 (Title IX). The plaintiff contends that the school districts and their employees violated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., by being deliberately indifferent to the alleged harassment.
Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment, leading to the instant opinion.
Addressing Section 1983, the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants “intentional acts or omissions caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s right to equal protection because as a male victim of sexual abuse and sexual harassment, discrimination and violence by other males, the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from female victims of sexual abuse and sexual harassment.”
The court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, noting that the district had “a sexual harassment policy in 2006 and that the policy prohibited sexual harassment and gender harassment/discrimination. The record reveals the only permissible inference is that the policy was consistently and fairly applied to male and female students enrolled in the Gustine Unified School District. The record also demonstrates that once school officials learned of the alleged sexual harassment, they suspended the suspected students and, later, expelled them. The plaintiff does not explain how this treatment differed from similar incidents involving female students, if there were such incidents. There is no record evidence that the plaintiff’s coaches treated him differently and discriminated against him because he was a male.”
Turning to the Title IX claim against defendant GUSD, the court recounted the plaintiff’s claim that “the severe and pervasive attacks on Plaintiff during the Camp amount to sexual discrimination and harassment in violation of Title IX.
“The substance of Plaintiff’s Title IX claim is that Coach Scudder, the Gustine High School head football coach and supervisor of the GUSD-approved football camp, had actual knowledge of the student-to-student sexual harassment occurring during the football camp and took no disciplinary action.”
To impost district liability under Title IX for student-to-student sexual harassment, four requirements must be met:
“(1) the school district must exercise substantial control over both the harassed and the context in which the known harassment occurs, (2) the plaintiff must suffer sexual harassment . . . that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school, (3) the school district must have actual knowledge of the harassment, and (4) the school district’s deliberate indifference subjects its students to harassment.
Reese, 208 F.3d at 739.”
The district countered that “the alleged harassment was not severe and pervasive; not based on the plaintiff’s gender; that the District lacked actual knowledge of alleged sexual harassment; and that there is no evidence of deliberate indifference by GUSD.”
After finding that the first three prongs had been satisfied, the court turned to “deliberate indifference.”
This element tripped up the school district for the moment.
“Construing the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a trier of fact could also find that (the coach) had ‘actual notice’ on the afternoon of July 14, 2006,” wrote the court. “It appears from the record an investigation on July 14 or July 15, 2006 would have elicited the same findings the police and district investigations later revealed, and could have prevented the sexual assault against the plaintiff, as well as assaults against several other Gustine High players. A question of material fact exists as to whether GUSD exhibited deliberate indifference.”
John Roe v. Gustine Unified School District et al.; E.D. Calif.; 1:07-CV-00796-OWW-SMS; 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118880; 12/22/09
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Kimberly Gail Flores, LEAD ATTORNEY, Allen, Fagalde, Albertoni & Flores, LLP, Merced, CA; Terry L. Allen, Allen, Proietti & Fagalde, LLP, Merced, CA. (for defendants) James F. McBrearty, LEAD ATTORNEY, Tuttle & McCloskey, Fresno, CA. Jeffrey R. Olson, M, LEAD ATTORNEY, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth, Modesto, CA; Mart Benjamin Oller, IV, LEAD ATTORNEY, McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP, Fresno, CA.
