An Illinois state appeals court has held that a trial court acted appropriately when it dismissed a negligence claim brought by a student athlete injured in a football game against three university coaches. The panel of judges found specifically that the coaches were entitled to sovereign immunity.
The appeals court was less agreeable concerning the trial court’s decision to dismiss the clam against the trainers, remanding that decision back to the lower court for further consideration.
In September 2006, plaintiff Clinton Sellers, a member of the Eastern Illinois University football team, suffered an injury during a football game. Prior to the injury, the plaintiff had experienced trauma to his body during practice sessions that produced neurologic symptoms, including stingers.
In August 2008, the plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting a professional-negligence count against the team’s trainers (Mark Bonnstetter, Jennifer Tymkew) and a negligence count against the coaches ( Roc Bellantoni, Mark Hutson, and Bob Spoo).
The next month, the defendants Bonnstetter, Tymkew, Bellantoni, Hutson, and Spoo filed a combined motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, leading to the instant appeal.
The appeals court looked initially at the claim against the trainers. The plaintiff claimed the trainers “were to practice injury prevention, emergency care, and physical reconditioning on plaintiff and coordinate their care of plaintiff with plaintiff’s physician and coaches. Plaintiff alleged the Trainers (1) advised plaintiff they were communicating with Dr. Rudert with regard to plaintiff’s neurological problems; (2) did not fully and accurately describe and/or failed to describe plaintiff’s neurological problems to Dr. Rudert; and (3) failed to keep an accurate historical record of the frequency, nature, and extent of plaintiff’s neurological problems. By acting in the aforesaid manner, the Trainers acted independently of Dr. Rudert as they neither regularly coordinated with him nor acted under his direction. Accordingly, plaintiff contended the Trainers exceeded the scope of their authority under their license. Plaintiff also contended the Trainers exceeded their authority as NCAA trainers by (1) substituting their judgment regarding the severity of plaintiff’s injuries as they did not consult with the appropriate team physician or refer plaintiff to a physician for further evaluation and (2) encouraging plaintiff to continue playing after experiencing stingers without assuring a physician had appropriately evaluated him.
“Plaintiff argues the Trainers exceeded the scope of their license as set forth in section 3 of the Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act (Athletic Trainers Act) (225 ILCS 5/3 (West 2008)). As stated earlier, an employee’s violation of a statute does not necessarily mean the employee acted outside the scope of his or her state employment. Welch, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 352, 751 N.E.2d at 1194. Here, the Trainers’ state employment was as athletic trainers for a university football team. The alleged facts show the Trainers committed the alleged negligence while coordinating and providing care to plaintiff in his capacity as a student-athlete on the football team. Specifically, the alleged facts in support of the outside-the-scope-of-authority assertion argue negligence based on the Trainers’ failure to perform the functions set forth in section 3 of the Athletic Trainers Act (225 ILCS 5/3 (West 2008)). Moreover, the alleged facts do not suggest the Trainers’ actions were inconsistent with an intent to further the university’s interests or the Trainers acted for reasons other than what they perceived to be in the state university football team’s best interests.”
Turning to the claim against the coaches, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint “contends the Coaches’ jobs were (1) to monitor, coach, and instruct plaintiff during football practices and games and, (2) in coordination with plaintiff’s physician and athletic trainers, evaluate and assess plaintiff’s physical capacity to safely engage in the physical activities required by football. Plaintiff alleged the Coaches (1) advised plaintiff they were communicating with Dr. Rudert with regard to plaintiff’s neurological problems; (2) did not fully and accurately describe plaintiff’s neurological problems to Dr. Rudert; and (3) failed to keep an accurate historical record of the frequency, nature, and extent of plaintiff’s neurological problems. By acting in the aforesaid manner, the Coaches acted independently of Dr. Rudert as they did not regularly coordinate with him or act under his discretion with respect to plaintiff’s health and safety. Accordingly, plaintiff contended the Coaches exceeded the scope of their authority as coaches and as NCAA coaches. Additionally, like with the Trainers, plaintiff contended the Coaches exceeded their authority as NCAA coaches by (1) substituting their judgment regarding the severity of plaintiff’s injuries as they did not consult with the appropriate team physician or refer plaintiff to a physician for further evaluation and (2) encouraging plaintiff to continue playing after experiencing stingers without assuring a physician had appropriately evaluated him.
“Plaintiff contends the Coaches exceeded the scope of their authority under NCAA guidelines by assuming the role of medical professionals. We note plaintiff does not allege the State required the Coaches to comply with the policy and regulations of the private association. Moreover, an employee’s violation of policies and/or regulations does not necessarily mean the employee acted outside the scope of his or her state employment. Welch, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 352, 751 N.E.2d at 1194. Here, the Coaches’ state employment was to coach a university football team. The pleaded facts allege the Coaches committed the alleged negligence while coaching plaintiff, a student-athlete on the football team. The alleged facts do not suggest the Coaches’ actions were inconsistent with an intent to further the university’s interests or the Coaches acted for reasons other than what they perceived to be in the state university football team’s best interests.”
It was at this point that the panel of judges began to view the plaintiff’s claim against the trainers and coaches, respectively in a different light, writing that “the Athletic Trainers Act demonstrates the existence of a standard of care for athletic trainers, and thus a duty of care independent of state employment exists for athletic trainers. In his second-amended complaint, plaintiff asserts the Trainers breached that independent duty of care, and thus the trial court erred by dismissing the count against the trainers.”
As for the coaches, the court found that the plaintiff “has failed to show his second-amended complaint sets forth an independent duty of care for the coaches. We note plaintiff has not challenged the applicability of the third Robb criterion, and thus we find the trial court properly found all three Robb criteria were satisfied and sovereign immunity applies to the coaches.”
Clinton Sellers v. Karl Rudert et al.; App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.; NO. 4-09-0115, 2009 Ill. App. LEXIS 1167; 11/20/09
