A federal judge from the Eastern District of Michigan has dismissed with prejudice the claim of a student athlete who alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated in October 2007 when he was informed he was no longer eligible to play football at Saginaw Valley State University.
In so ruling, the court found that plaintiff Anthony J. Awrey “did not identify any legal authority from any jurisdiction supporting the proposition that a student athlete’s interest in participating in collegiate athletics is a constitutionally protected property interest.”
The impetus for the litigation was the university’s decision on October 13, 2007 to make Awrey ineligible after he obtained a below-market rental rate for an apartment located near campus, violating NCAA rules. This violation caused Awrey to miss the last four games of the season, but ultimately he was allowed to return to playing football for another university after his eligibility was restored in April of 2008.
Awrey sued, alleging that SVSU, Eric R. Gilbertson, the University’s president, and Mike Watson, the University’s then-athletic director “violated his Constitutional right to due process when they removed him from the football team based on their determination that he had violated NCAA rules.” He also alleged that SVSU “deprived him of his property interest in playing college football without due process.” In addition, he claimed that the University “deprived him of his liberty interest in his good name and reputation by reporting the alleged NCAA rule violations.”
Last spring the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the Constitution does not recognize a property interest in continued eligibility for collegiate athletics, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, that the plaintiff’s complaint “does not plead a violation of his liberty interest in his reputation, that the defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that to the extent Gilbertson and Watson are named in their individual capacities, they are entitled to qualified immunity.”
In its motion the defendants argued “that the Sixth Circuit does not recognize a constitutionally protected property interest in continued participation in intercollegiate athletics. See Karmanos v. Baker, 617 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Mich. 1985), aff’d 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987). Indeed, In Karmamos, the plaintiffs admitted on appeal that there is no constitutionally protected property interest in participating in collegiate athletics. 816 F.2d at 260 (citing Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 959 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082, 1086 (10th Cir. 1983); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Brindisi v. Regano, 20 F. App’x 508, 510 (2001) (concluding plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected interest in participating in her high school’s cheerleading squad.).
“The plaintiff admits that Sixth Circuit precedent suggests that there is no constitutionally protected property interest in a student athlete’s continued participation in athletics. However, Awrey contends that because he was participating in a college football program, as opposed to the a high school program, he was attending the University on a scholarship, and he was required to abide by the University’s policies and the NCAA’s rules, elevating his interest in playing football is elevated to a constitutionally protected interest. He emphasizes that he signed a national letter of intent, committing to play football for SVSU, and that the University committed in return, to provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to participate in the football program. Notwithstanding his arguments, the plaintiff fails to identify any legal authority from any jurisdiction supporting the proposition that a student athlete’s interest in participating in collegiate athletics is a constitutionally protected property interest.
“Although it is possible that the plaintiff had a property interest in his continued relationship with the University, particularly in light of the letter of intent and scholarship agreement, his property interest claim will be dismissed because he has not demonstrated that the Constitution protects his interest in playing college football. First, the university’s decision deprived him of only a partial season of eligibility, which was restored in 2008 before the start of the next season. Second, while the letter of intent may furnish some suggestion of an implied contract under Ludwig, the university promised the plaintiff a scholarship and an education in exchange for his participation in the football program. See Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 409. The university did not promise that he would be permitted to play football, practice with the team, or play in the games.
“Notably, the plaintiff does not allege that his scholarship was revoked, or that the University interfered with his efforts to attain an education. The interest the plaintiff had in playing football at SVSU for the final month of the 2007 season, while undoubtedly important to him, is simply not the type of property interest the Due Process Clause was intended to protect. The plaintiff did not have a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to for playing football at SVSU.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
Turning to the question about whether “his liberty interest in his good name and reputation was violated by the University’s publication of a self-report of rule violations,” the court highlighted the following requirements in proving such a claim:
“First, the stigmatizing statements must be made in conjunction with the plaintiff’s termination from employment. Second, a plaintiff is not deprived of his liberty interest when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance. Third, the stigmatizing statements or charges must be made public. Fourth, the plaintiff must claim that the charges made against him were false. Fifth, the public dissemination must have been voluntary.
Ludwig v. Bd. of Trs. of Ferris State Univ., 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997).
“If the above requirements are met, the (plaintiff) is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard through a name-clearing hearing, when the plaintiff has made a request for such a hearing. Id. It is the denial of the name-clearing hearing that causes the deprivation of the liberty interest without due process. Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Brown v. City of Niota, 214 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 2000)).”
In the instant case, the plaintiff never asked the university or its officials for a name clearing hearing. Additionally, the defendants never denied a request for a hearing. The court added that the officials, who were sued in their individual capacities, were also entitled to qualified immunity. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
Anthony J. Awrey v. Eric R. Gilbertson et al.; E.D.Mich; Case Number 10-14738-BC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70613; 6/30/11.
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Roland J. Jersevic, Saginaw, MI. (for defendants)
Jamie H. Nisidis, Braun, Kendrick, Saginaw, MI.
