A federal judge from the Southern District of Indiana has allowed a group of student athletes, who alleged that the NCAA violated antitrust laws, to file an amended complaint.
Plaintiffs John Rock, Tim Steward, and Kody Collins challenged two NCAA bylaws that were at issue in an earlier case Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744 (S.D. Ind. 2011), affirmed by Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). The bylaws at issue in Agnew were the prohibition on multi-year athletics-based scholarships and the cap on the number and amount of athletics-based scholarships. The plaintiffs also challenged an NCAA bylaw prohibiting athletics-based scholarships at Division III schools.
The bylaws, they argued, “restrain trade among NCAA member institutions for the labor of student-athletes.”
The plaintiffs’ attempt to amend the suit comes in the wake of the court’s order earlier this year to grant the NCAA’s motion to dismiss in the case. In that ruling, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the elements of an antitrust violation.
The court then wrote that the plaintiffs’ complaint “reads more like a press release than legal filing. Given the applicable standard of review, the court ignores the plaintiffs’ conclusory legal allegations and needless case citations and will only detail the reasonable inferences it can make from the necessary factual allegations to determine if the plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief.”
In seeking to amend their complaint, the plaintiffs cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which provides that leave to amend pleadings should be “freely given when justice so requires.”
The NCAA opposed Rock’s motion to amend on “futility” grounds. “The NCAA correctly notes that this litigation involves the same claims present in Agnew, and that Rock had the benefit of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Agnew when he filed his original complaint in this case. The court notes, however, that Rock was not a party to Agnew and that for the first time, the proposed complaint challenging the bylaws at issue limits the relevant market to Division I college football and further pleads two subdivisions of that market—the Football Bowl Subdivision and the Football Championship Subdivision. While the Court makes no pronouncement on the sufficiency of the relevant market Rock now proposes, given the Seventh Circuit’s observation that ‘it is undeniable that a market of some sort is at play in this case’ Agnew, 683 F.3d at 338, the court cannot conclude that the proposed amendment is futile.
“This case was in its early stages when the court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss—no case management plan had been approved, no discovery had been taken, and no settlement conference had occurred. Moreover, in response to Rock’s motion to amend, the NCAA ‘requests the opportunity to expand on these arguments on a motion to dismiss should the court not find the proposed complaint to be futile.’
“The current posture of the parties’ briefs on these issues—Rock filing a motion, the NCAA responding, and Rock replying—inverts the briefing that would typically occur in the context of a motion to dismiss. Therefore, given that the court does not find Rock’s proposed amendment to be futile, the court finds it more appropriate to address the NCAA’s arguments on the merits after the benefit of full briefing on a motion to dismiss, should the NCAA choose to file such a motion.” It added that “pursuant to Rule 15, justice requires giving Rock a final chance to amend his complaint.” See, e.g., Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347-48 (finding the Court did not abuse its discretion by denying request to amend complaint after plaintiff had already amended complaint following fully briefed motion to dismiss).
John Rock v. National Collegiate Athletic Association; S.D. Ind.; 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73766; 5/24/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Elizabeth A. Fegan, Steve W. Berman, PRO HAC VICE, HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP, Oak Park, IL; Joseph N. Williams, William N. Riley, PRICE WAICUKAUSKI & RILEY, Indianapolis, IN; Stuart McKinley Paynter, PRO HAC VICE, The Paynter Law Firm PLLC, Washington, DC. (for defendant) Gregory L. Curtner, Kimberly K. Kefalas, Robert James Wierenga, SCHIFF HARDIN, LLP – Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI; Jessica A. Sprovstoff, Suzanne L. Wahl, PRO HAC VICE, SCHIFF HARDIN, LLP – Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI; Kathy Lynn Osborn, FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP – Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN.
