A federal judge from the Eastern District of Missouri has rejected a motion to remand a negligence claim, brought by several former NFL players against their union, back to state court, finding that removal was proper in the first place because of the applicability of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
The impetus for the litigation was a lawsuit filed by former NFL players Neil Smith, Ladell Betts, and Anthony Davis in the 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, St. Louis, on July 17, 2014. The plaintiffs named the National Football League Players’ Association (NFLPA), Raymond Lester Armstrong, III, and Kevin Mawae as defendants.
They claimed the defendants were liable for fraudulent concealment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligent hiring (against NFLPA only), negligent retention (against NFLPA only), medical monitoring, and civil conspiracy.
Specifically, the plaintiffs, who had playing careers of various lengths, ranging from 1988 to 2010, claimed that they “suffered ‘multiple repetitive traumatic head impacts and concussions during practices and games.’ These injuries were neither acknowledged nor treated while the plaintiffs were players. ‘Defendants’ wrongful conduct . . . directly caused or contributed to cause’ the plaintiffs ‘to suffer harm, including . . . chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), which is caused by repetitive sub-concussive and/or concussive blows to the head.’”
The plaintiffs, throughout their careers, paid money to the NFLPA as association dues. The defendants assured them they would protect them, and owed them a fiduciary duty, according to the plaintiffs. The defendants were supposed to “act in the players’ best interests. However, the NFLPA did not spend significant funds on research into ways to mitigate or prevent brain trauma,” wrote the court, citing the complaint. “The NFLPA also failed to certify medical personnel treating players, despite having a duty to do such.”
Finally, the defendants “were in a superior position of knowledge, and knew the dangers and risks associated with repetitive head impacts and concussions. Despite this, they knowingly concealed the information from the plaintiffs. The defendants also fraudulently misrepresented there was no link between head impacts and cognitive decline.”
On September 10, 2014, the defendant NFLPA removed the litigation to federal court, leading to the plaintiffs’ bid to remand it back to state court.
In reviewing the arguments, the court touched on the defendants’ “three reasons” for removing the litigation to federal court: “First, Defendants argued removal was proper under Sections 8(b) and 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because the claims made by the plaintiffs constitute claims for breach of the duty of fair representation. Second, the defendants claimed removal was proper under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), because any additional duties the defendants owed to the plaintiffs would have to arise from the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Finally, the defendants contended removal was proper because the one non-diverse defendant was improperly joined.”
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs, in arguing for remand, claimed that:
the defendants’ reliance on the duty of fair representation is improper,
the federal-question jurisdiction does not exist under § 301 of LMRA in this case, and
complete diversity is lacking because one of the defendants shares a state of residence with at least one of the plaintiffs.
On the question about the duty of fair representation, the plaintiffs claimed that “their claims are independent of the duty of fair representation because the NFLPA was not their exclusive bargaining representative. They assert they are former professional football players, and the NFLPA only owes a duty of fair representation to its current members. The plaintiffs also maintain their claims are simply not subsumed within the duty of fair representation. Rather, they state their claims are based on a duty the NFLPA assumed voluntarily and separately from the CBA.”
The court disagreed, noting that “if the alleged breach occurred while the employee was employed, then there was a duty at the time of the breach.” In the instant case, the defendants “committed acts of fraud” against the plaintiffs while they were players.
“For example, the first allegation of fraudulent behavior states the NFLPA supplied false and misleading information to players in 1994,” wrote the court. “There are allegations similar conduct took place throughout the rest of the 1990s and 2000s, and into the present decade. Thus, there is a range from 1994 to at least 2012 where Defendants are alleged to have engaged in bad faith conduct against members of the collective bargaining unit. Every single plaintiff was a ‘current member’ of the NFLPA for at least some time between 1994 and 2012. Therefore, the duty of fair representation applied to the plaintiffs at the time, and the allegations indicate breaches of said duty occurred while the plaintiffs were playing. Their claims are not independent of the duty of fair representation and the duty of fair representation completely preempts their claims.”
As for the LMRA, Section 301 of the LMRA applies to breaches of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1998). Federal law governs breaches of a CBA. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957) (“301(a) . . . authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.”). Where § 301 applies, it completely preempts state-law claims. Williams, 582 F.3d at 874.
The court continued, noting that the party, in this case the defendants, asserting federal preemption of state law bears the burden of persuasion. Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 880 (8th Cir. 2009). The defendants “argue the NFL CBA contains a number of provisions applicable to player safety and health,” wrote the court. “If these provisions expressly place a duty on the NFLPA to keep players informed about health risks arising from participating in the NFL, or if the claims substantially depend on an interpretation of a provision in the CBA, § 301 will preempt the state law claims.”
The court relied heavily on the following “pertinent language” from the CBA: “The NFL recognizes that the NFLPA Medical Director has a critical role in advising the NFLPA on health and safety issues.” This “suggests the NFLPA should be well-informed on matters of health and safety, and should be a reliable source of information,” according to the court. It went to concluded that the negligent misrepresentation claim “is preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.”
Neil Smith et al. v. National Football League Players Association, et al.; E.D. Mo.;
No. 4:14CV01559 ERW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166677; 12/2/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Brett A. Emison, Lead Attorney, Langdon and Emison, Lexington, MO; John G. Simon, Lead Attorney, The Simon Law Firm, P.C., St. Louis, MO; Kevin E.J. Regan, Lead Attorney, Regan Law Firm, Kansas City, MO; Richard F. Lombardo, Lead Attorney, Shaffer and Lombardo, Kansas City, MO. (for defendant) James G. Martin, Lead Attorney, Dowd Bennett, LLP, Clayton, MO; David Louis Greenspan, Winston and Strawn LLP, New York, NY; Jeffrey L. Kessler, Pro Hac Vice, Winston and Strawn LLP, New York, NY.
