A magistrate judge from the Northern District of Georgia has recommended that a district judge dismiss a discrimination lawsuit brought by the former athletics director of Savannah State University (SSU) against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.
In so ruling, the court found that “a reasonable jury could not find that the plaintiff’s protected activity was the ‘but-for’ cause of the alleged adverse employment decision.”
Plaintiff Marilynn Stacey-Suggs, a long-time employee of SSU, served as interim athletics director, senior woman administrator (SWA) and even became the university’s first female athletics director in January of 2010. While serving as SWA, she spearheaded the school’s transition into the Division I level of the NCAA. Also, during her tenure as athletics director, the Mid-Eastern Athletics Conference extended provisional membership to SSU as its 13th member institution. In addition, she is also credited with helping to reduce the budget deficit she inherited by increasing donations while operating her department under budget.
In May of 2011, the Board of Regents appointed Dr. Cheryl Dozier, an individual defendant in the case, as the new interim president of SSU after deciding not to renew the contract of the university’s previous president. Subsequently, one of Dr. Dozier’s first official actions was to hire Damon Evans as a consultant to the university’s athletics program. Prior to coming to SSU, Evans was forced to resign as the University of Georgia’s athletic director in July of 2010 following his public arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol while in the company of a 28-year-old woman with whom he was romantically involved, even though he was married to someone else at the time.
After Evans allegedly began “running the athletics program from behind the scenes,” Dr. Dozier fired Stacey-Suggs and replaced her with Sterling Steward Jr., despite the fact that he allegedly had fewer qualifications and less experience than Stacey-Suggs.
Stacey-Suggs sued. She alleged that the decision to terminate her as AD was “motivated in substantial part by her gender,” and noted in the suit that “a less qualified male candidate who was paid a higher salary to do the same job” replaced her.
The suit also claimed that SSU has a pattern and practice and gender-based discrimination permeating throughout the university, alleging that numerous female faculty and staff have been forced out or left and been replaced by males.
After being removed as athletics director in July of 2011, SSU re-hired Stacey-Suggs as the associate director of student development, a “less prestigious, lower-paying position which carried with if far fewer responsibilities.” In addition, the suit contends that, after filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on December 28, 2011, the defendants retaliated on June 18, 2012 when she was told for the first time that her new post was “interim” only and that SSU intended to initiate a search to fill the role on a permanent basis.
Specifically, Stacey-Suggs alleged claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The suit asked that Stacey-Suggs be reinstated or be allowed to continue as associate director of student development on a non-interim basis but with the same salary, benefits and seniority as athletic director. She also sought a jury and attorney fees.
The defendants moved to dismiss leading to the instant opinion
In its analysis of the sexual discrimination claims, the court turned to the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the allocation of burdens and order of presentation and proof are as follows: (1) the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden (of production) shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken against the employee; and (3) should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove that the legitimate reason offered by defendant was a pretext for discrimination.
The court zeroed in on the second prong, where Dozier claimed she made the decision to terminate Suggs’ employment as AD “because she did not feel that she could trust the plaintiff and because the plaintiff allegedly did not possess the ‘leadership skills, administrative skills, budgeting skills, fundraising skills [and] the know-how of interacting’ that were necessary for the AD position. At the time of Dozier’s appointment as President, SSU was transitioning to permanent membership in the MEAC, a Division I athletic conference.”
Dozier added that the lack of NCAA compliance and budgetary experience were issues. “Persons I talked to would say what will get you in trouble is not having compliance and not having the money to run the program,” she testified.
For the above testimony and other reasons, the court found that the defendants “have easily satisfied their light burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment as AD.
This shifted the burden back to the plaintiff. In the instant case, “the relevant issue is whether Dozier, the decision maker, gave an honest explanation for her decision to terminate the plaintiff,” according to the court. The court concluded that she had and granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Title VII and Equal Protection claims for sexual discrimination.
Next, the court turned to the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against individual defendant Dozier in her individual capacity, and her argument that she is entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiff failed to show that Dozier violated a statutory or constitutional right when she terminated her employment as AD, which is a prerequisite for overcoming qualified immunity.
The last significant argument centered on the plaintiff’s claim that SSU has exhibited “a pattern and practice of gender-based discrimination, both within the athletics department and elsewhere in the University.”
The court held for the defendants on this argument, writing that the plaintiff “has not offered sufficient evidence to show that sexual discrimination against women is SSU’s standard operating procedure. The plaintiff has not offered any statistics in support of her pattern or practice claim, and the few anecdotes she points to are simply inadequate to permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor.” See Mathis v. Wachovia, 509 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 2007)
Marilynn Stacey-Suggs v. The Board of Regents of The University System of Georgia, d/b/a Savannah State University, and Cheryl Davenport Dozier, in her official capacity as President of Savannah State University and in her individual capacity; N.D. Ga.; Civil Action File No. 1:12-CV-3339-RWS-JFK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123371; 6/27/14
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiff) Allan Leroy Parks, LEAD ATTORNEY, Parks Chesin & Walbert, P.C. -Atl , Atlanta, GA; Jr., Alexandra Cole, Jennifer Kathleen Coalson, Parks Chesin & Walbert, P.C. -Atl, Atlanta, GA. (for defendants) Vincent Aaron Toreno, Ken David & Associates, LLC, Atlanta, GA.
