A California appeals court has reversed a trial court, giving new life to the claim of a former UCLA basketball player, who sued Time Inc., the parent company of Sports Illustrated, over a highly critical expose the magazine wrote about the UCLA program, which portrayed the player as the “ringleader.”
In essence, the panel of judges found that a jury should be left to decide some of the alleged facts in the case, not the judge.
The article in question, which was published on March 5, 2012, told “a cautionary tale of how discipline problems and mistakes in judgment can sabotage even a storied program.” It attributed the team’s recent poor performance to coach Ben Howland’s tolerance of misbehavior by a group of “talented but immature” freshman players. The article characterized plaintiff Reeves Nelson, who recently had been dismissed from the team, as the “ringleader” of this group of young players, and it described his alleged bullying of his teammates in great detail.
Nelson sued on May 23, 2012, alleging causes of action for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, he took offense at being labeled a “psychotic bully,” and claimed the instances identified in the article in which he was accused of bullying were false. Nelson also alleged that the anonymous quotes referenced in the article have been confirmed as not attributable to any of his UCLA teammates and, thus, were exaggerated and false.
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Mary Ann Murphy granted the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, writing that Nelson’s suit infringed upon Sports Illustrated reporter George Dohrmann’s right to free speech. She also reportedly pointed out that Dohrmann had numerous sources supporting the facts referenced in the article “Not the UCLA Way” and, further, stated “this man spent a lot of time and talked to a lot of people.”
The Anti-SLAPP Law:
The appeal turned on the anti-SLAPP law, which provides that “a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
“The purpose of the statute is to encourage participation in matters of public significance by allowing a court to promptly dismiss unmeritorious actions or claims brought to chill another’s valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
“The anti-SLAPP law involves a two-step process for determining whether a claim is subject to being stricken. In the first step, the defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s suit is subject to section 425.16 by showing the defendant’s challenged acts were taken in furtherance of his or her constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue, as defined by the statute. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 733.)
“After the defendant satisfies the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability he or she will prevail on the merits at trial. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) In this phase, the plaintiff must show both that the claim is legally sufficient and there is admissible evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 823, disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. [(2002)] 29 Cal.4th [53,] 68, fn. 5; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 358.) In making this assessment, the court must consider both the legal sufficiency of and evidentiary support for the pleaded claims, and must also examine whether there are any constitutional or non-constitutional defenses to the pleaded claims and, if so, whether there is evidence to negate any such defenses. (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398-399.)
“In considering whether a plaintiff has met those evidentiary burdens, the court must consider the pleadings and the evidence submitted by the parties. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1), (2).) However, the court cannot weigh the evidence (Looney v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 521, 537-538) but instead must simply determine whether the plaintiff’s evidence would, if credited, be sufficient to meet the burden of proof. (Wilcox v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 823-825 [standard for assessing evidence is analogous to standard applicable to motions for nonsuit or directed verdict].)”
The appeals court reasoned that the anti-SLAPP law did not apply.
“Among other things, the article says that Nelson admitted some of the misconduct it describes—an admission that Nelson denies,” wrote the panel. “If a jury believes Nelson did not make the statements attributed to him, it could conclude that the defendants’ false attribution was made with knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Accordingly, Nelson has established a prima facie case of defamation and false light, meeting his burden to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion as to those causes of action.
Reeves Nelson v. Time INC. et al.; Ct. App. Calif., 2d App. Dist., Div. 4; 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1727, B245412; 3/11/14
Attoney of Record: (for plaintiff) Keith A. Fink, S. Keven Steinberg and Olaf J. Muller, of Fink & Steinberg. (for defendants) Daniel M. Petrocelli, Marc Feinstein, Madhu Pocha and Jonathan Hacker, of O’Melveny & Myers.
