In a majority decision, a panel of Illinois state appeals court judges has reversed a trial court, which granted summary judgment to a school district that had been sued by a man who slipped and fell in the bleachers while attending his daughter’s high school basketball game.
In so ruling, the appellate court found that questions of fact had arisen about doctrine of natural accumulation (of rain or snow inside the gym), and whether the school district, Sandoval School District 501, might bear some responsibility for the accumulation of water in the stands.
The incident, involving plaintiff Frank R. Schemonia, occurred in the evening after it had snowed throughout the day. The panel noted that custodians “shoveled snow and put ice removal pellets on sidewalks and in parking areas (throughout the evening). Custodians also mopped wet floors to keep them dry. The defendant contends that custodians also placed ‘wet floor’ signs on the floors of the gym in order to warn spectators. The plaintiff said he did not see any ‘wet floor’ signs posted in the gym.
“The plaintiff was wearing nonslip boots due to his job as an electrician.” After the game concluded, the plaintiff sought to exit the bleachers when he fell backwards and hit his back and elbow on the stairs. He later claimed there was water on the stairs and he had someone take pictures of the stairs right after he fell. The plaintiff also claimed he smelled vinegar at the site of his fall.
The principal and the superintendent claimed there had been no complaints about the condition of the stairs on which the plaintiff fell. They also stated that to their knowledge no one else had fallen on those stairs.
In his complaint, Schemonia claimed the defendant, by its agents and employees, was guilty of one or more of the following willful and wanton acts:
Failed to keep the floor of the premises properly maintained and in a safe condition.
Failed to warn [p]laintiff that the floor was not properly maintained and that a dangerous condition existed.
Failed to warn [p]laintiff of the dangerous condition then and there on the premises, when [d]efendant knew or in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that said warning was necessary to prevent injury to [p]laintiff.
Failed to provide adequate safeguards to prevent [p]laintiff from injury while lawfully on said premises.
Failed to notify or warn [p]laintiff and others of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the bleacher stairs, even though it knew or should have known such stairs were dangerous.
On July 17, 2012, the defendant moved for summary judgment, making two arguments:
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to section 3-106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 2008)); and (2) defendant had no duty to prevent any injuries to plaintiff resulting from a natural accumulation of water that was tracked in a building from outside.
That fall, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding “the plaintiff’s fall was the result of water on the stairs, and the water on the stairs was tracked in on people’s shoes from the snow outside. The defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to keep him safe from injuries resulting from the water accumulated on the stairs.” Because of its decision on the natural accumulation argument, the trial court found it unnecessary to reach the issue regarding the application of the Act.
The plaintiff appealed.
The panel of judges noted that the plaintiff “must allege sufficient facts so that the trier of fact could find the defendant was responsible for an unnatural or artificial accumulation of water, ice, or snow, or a natural condition aggravated by the owner which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Bernard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 166 Ill. App. 3d 533, 535, 519 N.E.2d 1160, 1161-62, 116 Ill. Dec. 945 (1988). While it is well settled that business operators are not liable for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of water, ice, or snow that are tracked inside the premises from the outside (Reed v. Galaxy Holdings, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 39, 42, 914 N.E.2d 632, 636, 333 Ill. Dec. 213 (2009)), we agree with plaintiff that the natural accumulation doctrine is not all-inclusive. Just because it was snowing outside on the day plaintiff fell does not necessarily mean that the water on which plaintiff fell was a natural accumulation of water.”
Of relevance to the instant case was Richardson v. Bond Drug Co. of Illinois, 387 Ill. App. 3d 881, 901 N.E.2d 973, 327 Ill. Dec. 240 (2009), in which a plaintiff brought a negligence action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall in a drugstore on a day when there was a light snowfall outside. 387 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 901 N.E.2d at 975. The plaintiff did not know why he had fallen or what caused him to fall; he merely assumed the floor was wet. Other than the plaintiff’s mere assumption, there was no evidence to establish the presence of liquid on the floor prior to the defendant’s fall. Richardson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 886, 901 N.E.2d at 977. Similarly, the defendant ‘assumed, on the other hand, that plaintiff’s shoes were wet when he fell because it was snowing.’ Richardson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 886, 901 N.E.2d at 977. Given the conflicting assumptions, the court found there was nothing more than the ‘mere possibility’ that the plaintiff’s fall was caused by the defendant’s negligence. Richardson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 886, 901 N.E.2d at 977.
“In the instant case, the plaintiff has presented much more than an assumption that he must have fallen due to a wet floor. The plaintiff testified via deposition that he was wearing nonskid boots and that he had sat through an entire basketball game before he fell. The plaintiff testified that he fell on stairs far away from the front entrance where snow might have accumulated. The plaintiff said he actually saw water on the stairs and that the water which caused him to fall smelled like ‘vinegar.’ The plaintiff claims to have photographic evidence of the wet stairs. The plaintiff also claims others fell in the area where he fell. The defendant asserts that because there was no evidence that any person fell in the exact location where plaintiff fell, the plaintiff was unable to show an inherent problem or defect in the property and the only inference that can be drawn from multiple falls is that it was snowing outside and the tracked-in snow led to unrelated falls.”
The panel was sympathetic to the plaintiff. “Several persons, including the defendant’s witnesses, testified that janitors mopped the floor throughout the day. This indicates that defendant knew of the dangerous condition and attempted to rectify the situation. Where a property owner voluntarily institutes safety measures to prevent people from slipping on natural accumulations of snow, ice, or rain, it may be held liable for misfeasance. Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 523, 526-27, 623 N.E.2d 364, 366, 191 Ill. Dec. 119 (1993); Chisolm v. Stephens, 47 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1006, 365 N.E.2d 80, 85, 7 Ill. Dec. 795 (1977). Finally, while the defendant asserted through deposition testimony that ‘wet floor’ signs were placed throughout the gymnasium, the plaintiff said he did not see any such signs. This discrepancy alone presents a genuine issue of material fact which precludes entry of summary judgment.
“Here, unlike Richardson, the plaintiff has presented evidentiary facts to support his claim that defendant proximately caused his injuries due to an unnatural accumulation of water or a natural condition aggravated by defendant. The location of the fall, which was nowhere near the entrance of the gym, the fact that janitors mopped the floor throughout the day, the fact that others fell in the gym, plaintiff’s testimony about the smell of vinegar in the area of the fall, and the discrepancy about whether ‘wet floor’ signs were in the gym justify an inference of probability necessary to survive a motion for summary judgment.”
Frank R. Schemonia v. Sandoval School District 501; App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist.; NO. 5-12-0514, 2014 IL App (5th) 120514-U; 2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 296; 2/20/14
