A federal judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has turned away a wrestling club in that state, which sought to become a party in a lawsuit involving a seventh grade girl’s bid to participate on a seventh grade boys’ wrestling team in the Line Mountain School District.
In denying the motion to intervene, the court found that the Pennsylvania Wrestling Club, Inc.’s interest in the case is too “remote.” Elaborating on this, the court theorized that the Club’s chief purpose was to be in the middle of a movement to establish a statewide women’s wrestling program.
The underlying dispute centered on Audrianna Beattie and her parents’ effort to have her participate on the boys’ team at the Line Mountain Middle School, in light of the fact that there was no girls’ team.
The school denied the request, citing a district-wide policy that “prohibits female participation on male varsity, junior varsity and junior high interscholastic athletics, except when any such team is specifically designated a co-ed team by the administration with the formal approval of the School Board.”
The Beatties petitioned the school board to change its policy, but were denied.
Consequently, they sued, challenging Line Mountain’s policy under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
While awaiting the court’s decision on a permanent injunction, the Club moved to intervene, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), “claiming that it has an indispensable interest in the litigation,” according to the court. “The movant claims an interest both in protecting A.B. from injury resulting from wrestling with boys that may derail her potential future Olympic career (a prospect the movant espouses), as well as a statutory duty given the structure of its organization to ‘protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic competition.’ 36 U.S.C. § 220503(8)
“The movant also seeks to join the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. (PIAA) as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1)(A). The PIAA is a statewide body governing scholastic athletics that maintains authority over all Pennsylvania school districts in the realm of athletics. Attempting to expand this case beyond the confines of the existing controversy, the movant seeks to join PIAA so that it can persuade the Court ‘to exercise its ‘broad’ equitable powers . . . and compel Pennsylvania to . . . establish a statewide women’s wrestling program.’”
The court noted that “a movant seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) must satisfy the following requirements: “(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter, by the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation.” Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pennsylvania, 701 F.3d 938, 948 (3d Cir. 2012)
“In the matter at hand, the most pertinent prong of this test is the existence of the applicant’s ‘sufficient interest in the litigation,’ or the lack thereof. See Benjamin, 701 F.3d at 948. To intervene as a matter of right, an applicant’s interest must be substantial, ‘capable of definition, and will be directly affected in a substantially concrete fashion by the relief sought.’ Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1988). ‘The polestar for evaluating a claim for intervention is always whether the proposed intervenor’s interest is direct or remote.’ Id.”
In the instant case, the movant’s “interest” in the litigation is not sufficiently specific, definite, or direct to warrant intervention as of right in this case, according to the Court. “The movant bases its request partly on the general notion that it has an interest in the wrestling skills of A.B. The movant seeks to protect her wrestling ability from injury so that she may fulfill the movant’s dream of ‘a promising amateur wrestling career which the Olympic movement desperately needs.’ The movant hopes A.B. will be an Olympian in the year 2024, when she will be 23 years old. This interest is substantially more remote than direct, and is not ‘a significantly protectable interest.’ Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S. Ct. 534, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1971). Consequently, it is not sufficient grounds to intervene.
“The movant also attempts to argue that its organizational structure imposes a statutory mandate to ‘protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator or official to participate in amateur athletic competition,’ which includes a duty ‘to encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for women.’ That may well be so. Nevertheless, if that interest is viewed as the foundation of the movant’s motion, it is ‘adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation,’ because the Plaintiff’s requested relief would fulfill those obligations in this case and controversy. See, e.g., Benjamin, 701 F.3d at 948.
“In actuality, it appears to this court that the movant is attempting to use the underlying narrow dispute between the parties as a cause célèbre to acquire relief that is substantially more expansive and significantly different than that which the plaintiff seeks. The existing parties to the litigation maintain differences in their own dispute, but neither supports the movant’s entry into this case.
“The movant’s primary goal in attempting to intervene is to join the PIAA as a ‘required party’ defendant in the lawsuit, with the hope of obtaining an order from this Court mandating the PIAA to establish a statewide girls wrestling league.
“PIAA has not taken any actions to actively obstruct that result, nor does it have a stated policy that prohibits it. PIAA’s own bylaws state: ‘PIAA has no rules that deal with the participation of boys and girls on the same athletic Team or with boys and girls Practicing together for interscholastic athletics. PIAA therefore does not prohibit such combined participation or practicing.’ PIAA Constitution and Bylaws, 2013-2014, at 96.
“Consequently, PIAA does not impede the plaintiff’s requested relief, and the court may provide it without joining PIAA as a defendant if the merits so warrant. The only party necessary to effectuate the plaintiff’s requested relief is the defendant, Line Mountain School District, which has the policy established that impedes the plaintiff’s request. PIAA is neither necessary nor indispensable and shall not be joined.”
Brian Beattie, Angie Beattie v. Line Mountain School District; M.D. Pa.; Civ. No. 4:13-CV-02655, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164750; 11/20/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Abbe F. Fletman, LEAD ATTORNEY, FLASTER GREENBERG, P.C., Philadelphia, PA; Terry L. Fromson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Women’s Law Project, Philadelphia, PA. David C. Shipman, Elion, Wayne, Grieco, Carlucci, Shipman & Irwin, PC, Williamsport, PA; Lawrence M. Otter, Lawrence M. Otter, Attorney at Law, Doylestown, PA. (for defendant) Christopher J. Conrad, Nicole M. Ehrhart, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, Camp Hill, PA.
