A federal judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania has delivered a partial victory to University of Pittsburgh (Pitt), granting summary judgement on two of three counts in a case involving a former assistant coach, who sued for breach of contract.
The plaintiff in the case was Troy L. Douglas, who began his coaching career in 1989. Over the next 14 years, he would coach at 11 different schools in nine states. In January 2014, Douglas began his journey with Pitt when he met two other assistant football coaches from the school at a coaching convention. They told Douglas that then-head football coach Paul Chryst was looking for another assistant coach.
Douglas met with Chryst on February 10, 2014. During the meeting, Chryst allegedly offered the plaintiff the job, telling him that “we’re going to give you a two-year contract” and that he would receive $225,000 for his first year of his contract and $240,000 for the second year.
Douglas took the job and began work on February 14, 2014. Pitt tendered an employment contract that contained several terms that concerned the plaintiff. One of the provisions gave the University “just cause” to terminate the plaintiff if Chryst’s employment as head coach was voluntarily terminated or he was terminated for cause. The plaintiff expressed his concerns to Chryst, who promised to look into it.
In June 2014, the plaintiff moved his family to Pittsburgh. He allegedly continued to seek clarification from Pitt administrators.
At the conclusion of the football season, Chryst accepted a new head coaching job at the University of Wisconsin, where he previously played After Chryst left Pitt, it collected $3.28 million from Chryst as a buyout pursuant to his employment contract.
On December 26, 2014, Pitt administrators hand-delivered a termination letter to the plaintiff and all of the assistant football coaches. In the letter, Pitt informed the plaintiff that it was unilaterally terminating his employment effective February 6, 2015. By letter dated March 10, 2015, Pitt informed the plaintiff that, as a courtesy and without any legal obligation, it agreed to continue the plaintiff’s salary and benefits through March 2015.
Douglas sued on July 20, 2015, alleged that Pitt: (1) breached a two-year employment contract by terminating him less than a year into his contract; (2) fraudulently induced him into accepting employment; and (3) negligently misrepresented the terms of Plaintiff’s employment.
On May 20, 2016, Pitt moved for summary judgment.
In its analysis, the court first addressed Count I.
“The University argues that: (1) there was no ‘meeting of the minds’ on the essential terms of any contract for employment with Pitt when Chryst made a verbal offer to the plaintiff on February 10, 2014; and (2) the essential terms of the employment relationship intended by the university were reduced to a written contract provided to the plaintiff shortly after the February 10, 2014 meeting, which he refused to sign, but which he accepted by virtue of his continued employment.
“In opposing Pitt’s motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim, the plaintiff argues that a jury could readily determine that there was a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an employment contract. The plaintiff argues that Chryst made a specific offer of employment to the plaintiff identifying each integral term including duties, a two-year term of employment, a first-year salary, a second-year salary and benefits and the plaintiff accepted the offer. The plaintiff further argues that the evidence shows that, relying on the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff resigned from his then current employment at Iowa State, moved to Pittsburgh and began work on February 14, 2014.”
While acknowledging the agreement between the parties as to certain facts, the court noted that there are issues of fact as to other terms, including: “the exact duration of the contract at the time of Chryst’s verbal offer, what would happen if Chryst left before the end of his contract term, what would happen if Plaintiff left before the end of his contract term, the number of vacation days, income from outside activities and other fringe benefits.
“Considering the above-noted evidence, as well as additional evidence revealed during discovery, the evidence is sufficient to establish a jury question as to whether the university and the plaintiff exchanged and agreed to essential terms so as to form a contract. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment is not warranted.”
The court next turned to the plaintiff’s other two claims. The university based its defense of the gist of the action doctrine, which prohibits a plaintiff from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims. B.G. Balmer & Co. v. Frank Crystal & Co., 2016 PA Super 202, 2016 Pa. Super. LEXIS 516 at *31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Empire Trucking Co., Inc. v. Reading Anthracite Coal Co., 2013 PA Super 148, 71 A.3d 923, 931 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)).
The court was receptive, noting that the claims “have their genesis in contract and are nothing more than a restatement of the plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract in Count I. As such, his tort claims are subsumed into the breach of contract claim through the gist of the action doctrine. Thus, because the doctrine precludes the plaintiff’s torts claims in Counts II and III as they duplicate the breach of contract claim,” summary judgment is granted.
Troy L. Douglas v. University of Pittsburgh; W.D. Pa.; Civil Action No. 15-938, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147584; 10/24/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Peter R. Ginsberg, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Peter R. Ginsberg Law LLC, New York, NY; Beth A. Manzullo, PRO HAC VICE, Peter R. Ginsberg Law LLC, New York, NY. (for defendant) Shannon H. Paliotta, LEAD ATTORNEY, University of Pittsburgh, Office of General Counsel, Pittsburgh, PA.
