A federal judge from the District of Oregon has dismissed the complaint of three male student athletes, who claimed the University of Oregon (Oregon) and several individual defendants violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and their due process rights under the 14th Amendment, respectively.
In granting the motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court determined that “the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the university afforded the plaintiffs appropriate process without regard to gender.”
The plaintiffs — Brandon Austin, Dominic Artis, and Damyean Dotson — were student athletes at Oregon. Following allegations that the three sexually assaulted a female student, Oregon investigated and considered whether the plaintiffs violated its Student Conduct Code. Upon finding that the plaintiffs violated the Code, Oregon issued lengthy suspensions and opted not to renew their athletic scholarships.
The plaintiffs sued. Aside from the university, they also named Director of Student Conduct & Community Standards Sandy Weintraub, Assistant Dean of Students Chicora Martin, Vice President for Student Life Robin Holmes, and President Michael R. Gottfredson as defendants.
In the opinion, the judge detailed the events leading up to the lawsuit, and the fact that the Lane County District Attorney decided not to press charges against the plaintiffs “due to the victim’s conflicting statements and actions,” according to the plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, an administrative hearing was held. Afterward, Weintraub ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that they had engaged in sexual misconduct as defined by the Student Conduct Code. They were suspended for four to ten years, effectively expelling them from Oregon.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they were regarded as three of the top amateur basketball players in the country and were widely projected to be selected in the first round of the NBA Draft, leading to multi-million dollar contracts and further economic gains. The defendants’ actions, they claimed, has stripped them “of their positions at the Division I school, ruined their chances with the NBA, associated them with suspension and sexual assault, and caused them past and future personal and professional harm.”
Addressing the qualified immunity defense as it applies to the due process claims alleged against the individual defendants, the court noted that the defense can only be pierced when the opposing party has a “clearly established” right that is being denied.
“Here, the plaintiffs are unpaid college student athletes who were denied the renewal on the subsequent term of their otherwise renewable one-year scholarships, from which they benefited the full promised year. … I find that the plaintiffs have failed to plead a clearly established constitutional right for the purposes of a qualified immunity analysis.
“Because there is no relevant precedent that clearly establishes the proposed constitutional rights at issue, … the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the due process claims asserted against them.”
As for the plaintiffs’ Title IX sex discrimination claims, the court again sided with the defendants, writing that the plaintiffs “have failed to plead factual allegations supporting any plausible theory that the defendants selectively enforced Title IX by suspending the plaintiffs for sexual misconduct because of their gender or sex.”
The court went on to elaborate on the concept of selective enforcement.
More precisely, “what constitutes sufficient factual pleadings to survive the motion to dismiss stage where a male alleges sex discrimination after a university suspends him for sexual misconduct?”
The plaintiffs failed on this count with the court noting that “there is no logical nexus that connects the failure to criminally prosecute with gender bias on the part of the defendants.”
Elaborating, it pointed to Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:15-cv-02478-SVW-JEM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123612, *16 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016). That court “recently dismissed a similar Title IX complaint because the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that his suspension was motivated by gender or that a similarly situated female student had been treated more leniently,” wrote the judge.
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs’ second Title IX theory that the defendants’ allegedly flawed proceeding led to an erroneous outcome. Specifically, it argued that the defendants “failed to comply with Title IX or even with the University’s own protocols and instead aimed to reach a result that was predetermined based on the plaintiffs’ sex.”
The judge was reluctant to go down that path.
“I decline to extend the Second Circuit’s reasoning — Doe v. Columbia University, Civ. No. 15-cv-1536, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13773, 2016 WL 4056034, *7 (2d. Cir. July 29, 2016) — because the plaintiffs make no similar allegations of an atmosphere of scrutiny and, even had they done so, there remains no plausible inference that a university’s aggressive response to allegations of sexual misconduct is evidence of gender discrimination.”
The court continued: “(T)o accept the Second Circuit’s pleading standard would put universities in a double bind. Either they come under public fire for not responding to allegations of sexual assault aggressively enough or they open themselves to Title IX claims simply by enforcing rules against alleged perpetrators. Given these circumstances, The plaintiffs have failed to show how the university’s enforcement of its student conduct code, even if it had been overzealous, equates to sex discrimination.”
The plaintiffs’ final claim under Title IX is that the university exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ rights based upon their gender. The judge dismissed this claim “for the same reasons that the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim fell short.
“First, the standard of proof required for a university investigation and suspension based on its code of conduct is entirely different from the DA’s standard to prosecute a criminal case. Second, the plaintiffs continue to allege that the university is gender-biased, but fail to allege specific facts supporting that theory. Instead, the plaintiffs merely posit, without reason or alleged facts, that the university would not have investigated or penalized them if they were not male.”
Lastly, the court considered the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, this allegation fell short as well, primarily because it, like some of the Title IX claims, did not meet the pleading standard.
Brandon Austin v. University of Oregon et al. D. Ore.; Case No. 6:15-CV-02257-MC (Lead Case), Case No. 6:16-cv-00647-MC (Member Case); 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121198; 9/8/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Alan C. Milstein, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podisky, Moorestown, NJ; Marianne G. Dugan, LEAD ATTORNEY, Attorney at Law, Eugene, OR. Alex B. Spiro, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brafman & Associates, P.C., New York, NY; Brian L. Michaels, LEAD ATTORNEY, Eugene, OR. (for defendants) Michelle B. Smigel, LEAD ATTORNEY, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, Portland, OR; J. Michael Porter, Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP, Portland, OR.
