A federal judge from the District of Colorado has let stand most of a claim lodged by two youth football organizations, which alleged that the Jeffco Midget Football Association, Inc. (JMFA) prevented the organizations from competing in JMFA’s league because most of their members were Native Americans.
The lone victory for the JMFA was that the plaintiffs – Creek Red Nation, LLC (CRN) and Highlands Ranch Youth Football Association (HRYFA) – had not adequately pled a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
CRN is “a group of six youth football teams primarily made up of minority children.” After four years of participation as a member association in JMFA, the association wrongfully expelled CRN, according to the complaint.
HRYFA—another participating member of JMFA—”immediately took in the CRN teams so that the CRN teams could play in JMFA under the HRYFA banner,” according to the complaint. The plaintiffs further alleged that JMFA “then expelled all 24 HRYFA teams, in order to keep out the CRN teams,” a decision allegedly based on race.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claim one), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (claim two), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (claim three), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (claim four), as well as claims for breach of contract (claim five) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (claim six).
The JMFA moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The former deals with whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a suit, while the latter centers on the sufficiency of the pleading.
JMFA argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 2000a.
To establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she has personally suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Beyond these constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy the following prudential principles: (1) the plaintiff generally must assert his or her own legal rights; (2) the court must refrain from adjudicating “generalized grievances”; and (3) the plaintiff’s complaint must fall within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional right in question. Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1994).
An organization may, in some situations, have standing to bring claims on behalf of its members. In order to have “organizational standing,” the organization must demonstrate: (1) that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) that the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of the individual members. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).
The facts, as alleged by the plaintiffs, “lead to the reasonable conclusion that the individual players will be harmed by being wrongfully denied the opportunity to play football with the teams and individuals of their choosing,” wrote the court. “The court rejects the argument that the individual players will not suffer harm because they can nevertheless play for a different team. Such reasoning strikes the court as too similar to the discarded belief that discrimination is not harmful if an ‘equal’ alternative exists. The discrimination itself is the harm. Thus, the Court finds that, contrary to JMFA’s argument, the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged harm to their individual members.”
The court also found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees equal rights under the law, since they did not, as the defendant alleged, have to claim that JMFA was acting “under color of State law.”
Next, the court turned to the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which protects an individual from conspiracies to deprive him or her of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). However, the court noted that the plaintiffs pled facts that would “lead to the reasonable conclusion that two or more persons acted in concert to perform the alleged improper acts.”
The defendant’s lone victory involved the plaintiffs’ attempt to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, which protects an individual’s “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). On this point, they failed to sufficiently allege “either an effect on interstate commerce or the support of State action,” which are requisites for such a claim.
Lastly, the court considered the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ claim brought under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601, which protects against discrimination in places of public accommodation. The court looked to federal law to assist it in determining what constitutes a “place of public accommodation,” pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601. With that in mind, the state law should be “liberally” construed, according to the court. United States v. Beach Assocs., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801, 808-09 (D. Md. 1968). Thus, it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on that claim.
Creek Red Nation, LLC, and Highlands Ranch Youth Football Association, a non-profit corporation v. Jeffco Midget Football Association, INC.; D. Colo.; Civil Action No. 15-cv-01087-CMA-KLM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43870; 3/30/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Daniel J. Caplis, LEAD ATTORNEY, Babar Waheed, Daniel J. Caplis, P.C., The Law Offices of, Denver, CO; Mark Lee Bryant, LEAD ATTORNEY, Mark L. Bryant, Attorney at Law, Englewood, CO. (for defendant) Dennis Boyd Polk, Heather S. Hodgson, Holley, Albertson & Polk, P.C., Lakewood, CO; Edward J. Hafer, John M. Palmeri, Gordon & Rees, LLP-Denver, Denver, CO.
