In a majority decision, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has affirmed a lower court ruling that South Kingston Little League, Inc. did not owe a duty to a spectator, who suffered an injury when she stepped into a hole next to the batting cage.
In so ruling, the high court found that the Town of South Kingston, not the Little League, owned, operated, maintained, and had exclusive control over the facility, and the town’s employees inspected the facility regularly and conducted repairs as necessary.
The plaintiff, Kathleen Carlson, sustained the injury on July 28, 2010 while attending her son’s little league baseball game at Tuckertown Park in the Wakefield section of South Kingstown. The league had a permit, issued by the town, to host this game, as it did for all its games. But the town charged no fee to use the park in accordance with a written policy the league has about not charging nonprofit sports leagues.
After the game, the plaintiff, who had been standing near the batting cages located just off the first-base line, walked toward the concession stand, where she planned to meet her son. On her way there, the plaintiff stepped in a hole and broke her leg. A witness to the injury said in a deposition that the “divot” was a part of a “repetitive problem” caused by “kids waiting to get into the batting cage, when they dig their cleats into the ground.” There was a discrepancy about the size of the divot.
The town had inspected the facility just days before and found no problems. There have been no previous incidents at the facility involving the area near the batting cage.
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was “negligent in maintaining the premises of Tuckertown Field.” As a result of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff claimed that she “sustained severe personal injuries that required medical treatment that is ongoing, as well as lost wages and loss of earning capacity, anxiety, pain and suffering.” On July 7, 2014, the league moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had not owed a duty of care to maintain the park. The plaintiff objected to the motion, insisting that the defendant had a duty to inspect the park prior to hosting a Little League game and to repair any defects that were discovered, or at a minimum to warn of known dangerous conditions. The league’s motion was argued and granted on August 18, 2014. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff based on the information disclosed during discovery. Specifically, plaintiff argues that there are questions of fact as to whether the league should have known about the “defect” and whether it was ignored.
In response, defendant asserts that it did not owe a duty of care to plaintiff, given that the town—and not the league—maintains the park where the injury occurred.
The court noted that “it is well settled that to prevail on a claim of negligence a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.” Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. D.F. Pepper Construction, Inc., 59 A.3d 106, 110 (R.I. 2013)
The high Court was persuaded.
“Turning to the particular facts in this case, we are satisfied that the plaintiff has failed to overcome the duty hurdle in her negligence action against the defendant because the defendant does not own, operate, or have control over the park where the plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred,” it wrote. “Instead, it is the town that owns, operates, maintains, and has exclusive control over the park. The town’s employees—not the league’s—inspect the park regularly and conduct any repairs necessary to the park. As such, it was the town—and not the league—that repaired the divot that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Additionally, it is the town that is responsible for preparing the field before the baseball game. There is no evidence that the town ever required the league to do any work to the park or on the field. Importantly, although the defendant had exclusive use of the playing field during the baseball game, the injury occurred outside of the playing field after the game had ended in an area adjacent to the batting cages. This area was open to the general public, and there is no evidence indicating that the defendant exercised any control over such area. There is also no evidence that the defendant could exclude or limit access to this area. Additionally, the players would not be present in this area during the game. There is uncontroverted evidence before this court that the town is responsible for maintenance of the park. In the context of this case, therefore, we are of the opinion that the league did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff.”
In a decent by Justice Robinson, he noted the size of the divot and the fact that a fellow Little League parent and former assistant coach had testified that the divots were a “repetitive problem” that were caused by players who would dig the toe and spikes of their baseball cleats into the ground while waiting for their turn to enter the batting cages.
“The fact that the divots were a ‘repetitive problem’ and that they ‘were caused by players who would dig the toe and spikes of their baseball cleats into the ground’ takes this case out of the ambit of the several cases cited by the majority holding that there is no duty ‘where an injury occurred on property not owned by the defendant.’
“The plain blunt fact is that Tuckertown Field was changed and made more hazardous by the deliberate activities of the players ‘who would dig the toe and spikes of their baseball cleats into the ground while waiting for their turn to enter the batting cages.’
“… The Little League had a duty to warn spectators of the presence of the divots repeatedly caused by the activities of the players as they prepared to enter the batting cages. Needless to say, if the summary judgment had been vacated (as I believe it should have been), the plaintiff would still have had to grapple with issues of breach and causation, not to mention credibility. I would not venture to hypothesize as to which party would prevail at a trial. I only know that the plaintiff’s quest for recovery should not have been cut off short of a trial. Therefore, I respectfully record my dissent.”
Kathleen Carlson v. Town of South Kingstown et al.’ S.Ct. Rhode Island; No. 2014-318-Appeal, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 18; 2/9/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Ronald J. Resmini, Esq. (for defendants) Erik J. Tomberg, Esq., Brian J. Clifford, Esq.
