Federal Judge Dismisses Jilted Coach’s Claim against College

Mar 18, 2016

A federal judge from the Northern District of Alabama has granted Snead State Community College’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit of a jilted coach, who claimed the school discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of his race when it transferred him to a non-coaching position.
 
Specifically, the court found that he failed to prove there were similarly situated individuals, who suffered a different fate.
 
The plaintiff in the case was Rodney Hampton. Snead State Community College (SSCC) hired Hampton in 2005 as its Student Support Services Academic Coordinator. Hampton moved to the athletic side of the house in July of 2006 when he was named to the Assistant Athletic Director/Men’s Head Basketball Coach position.
 
The event that triggered the lawsuit occurred on July 18, 2011, when Hampton complained of race discrimination to his immediate supervisor, Sean Abernathy, then the school’s athletic director. After the complaint was relayed up the chain of command, Hampton met with school officials, but asserted that he did not want to file a former complaint.
 
Hampton worked without incident until October 24, 2011, when ten of his basketball players overturned a vending machine and stole its contents. Hampton met with Mark Richard, who had replaced Abernathy as the Athletic Director, to discuss the incident, and purportedly “agreed” and signed disciplinary notices for the players involved. However, Hampton later questioned the discipline when the parent of one of his players challenged it. Hampton reportedly noted that the discipline “was too harsh.”
 
Shortly after this incident, Hampton received a negative performance evaluation.
 
The next alleged incident of insubordination occurred two months later, on January 4, 2012, when Hampton accused Richard and other officials of lacking integrity and moral conduct. The outburst occurred during a coaches meeting when Richard and the others coaches disagreed with Hampton’s method of calculating grade point averages for eligibility purposes.
 
After that incident, school officials recommended that Hampton be transferred “to best serve the interest of the college and end the conflict and dissention in the department.” He was transferred back to his original position in 2005. The transfer had no impact on Hampton’s salary schedule, compensation, and benefits.
 
Hampton sued, alleging racial discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count II), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and a hostile work environment (Count III), in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981. Doc. 1. SSCC moved for summary judgment.
 
In its analysis, the court noted that to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, Hampton must show that “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) SSCC treated similarly situated employees outside of Hampton’s protected class more favorably. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).
 
After affirming the first three questions, the court turned to the final element of the prima facie case — i.e. whether Hampton has established that SSCC treated him differently than similarly situated employees. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). The school argued that it transferred Hampton laterally because of insubordination, lack of cooperation with others, lack of communication, poor judgment, and lack of academic performance. “To satisfy the final element of the prima facie case, Hampton must point to a similarly situated employee outside of his protected class who engaged in nearly identical conduct and yet was not demoted or transferred,” the court wrote. In that regard, Hampton identified Adam Rhoden, Steve Machen, and Gerry Ledbetter, white males who coached the cheer, tennis, and baseball teams, respectively, as comparators whom purportedly engaged in similar misconduct, but received less severe punishment.
 
The first two comparators “miss the mark because they involved a different athletic director,” wrote the court. Furthermore, Ledbetter “is also not a proper comparator because he engaged in different misconduct than the conduct that led to Hampton’s transfer.” Thus, “prima facie case fails, and summary judgment is due on the race discrimination claim.”
 
Hampton’s claim also failed because he “does not rebut all of SSCC’s articulated reasons” for the employment action.
 
Turning to the retaliation claim, the court noted that Hampton must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is a causal relation between the two events. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994). “Hampton can establish the first two prongs,” but fell short on the causal link prong.
 
The problem with the latter occurs “if there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the adverse action, the retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. Thomas.
 
“Hampton complained internally of race discrimination in July of 2011. … Snead State retaliated against him by giving him a negative performance evaluation in November of 2011 and by demoting him in April of 2012. The negative performance evaluation is a non-starter because when a lower performance evaluation does not result in a ‘loss of pay or benefits or further discipline,’ it does not constitute an adverse employment action.”
 
“As for the alleged demotion, it occurred nine months after Hampton’s statutorily protected activity. Absent evidence showing that Hampton’s statutorily protected expression was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, the nine-month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the alleged adverse employment action is not enough to establish causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Moreover, even if Hampton can establish a prima facie case, his retaliation claim still fails because Snead State has articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action, which Hampton has failed to rebut.”
 
Rodney Hampton v. Snead State Community College; N.D. Ala.; Civil Action Number 2:13-cv-02097-AKK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10682; 1/29/16
 
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se. (for defendants) Jack W Wallace, Jr., Lead Attorney, Office Of The Attorney General, Montgomery, AL; David M O’Brien, Alabama Department Of Postsecondary Education, Montgomery, AL.


 

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