A state court judge in Pennsylvania affirmed a ruling that Robert Morris University (RMU) should not be held liable for a concussion that a college cheerleader suffered in a training camp that was required by RMU.
The judge reasoned that the cheerleader failed to show that the university breached a duty regarding stunt instruction and supervision at the camp, which was conducted by Universal Cheerleader Association (UCA) at the University of Scranton.
In 2010, Shaye-Ashley Kennedy was an incoming freshman at RMU, where she was selected as a member of the University’s cheerleading squad coached by Cynthia Hadfield. Prior to starting college, she attended a pre-camp for RMU cheerleaders run by Coach Hadfield. The RMU cheerleaders, including Ms. Kennedy, then attended a mandatory camp at the University of Scranton conducted by UCA.
On August 12, 2010, while at the UCA camp, Kennedy and three other cheerleaders were practicing a new stunt called a rewind. Three individuals at the base were to propel her upward, Kennedy would perform a tuck in the air, and the base would catch her. The UCA instructors demonstrated the stunt one or two times, breaking it down into steps, according to the plaintiff. On the first attempt, the base caught Kennedy, but she did not fully complete the stunt. Kennedy was not sure whether her RMU coach was present for that attempt but, she did not expect her to be there observing her group. Prior to the next attempt, Kennedy asked for more spotters in addition to the UCA instructor, and UCA brought in two RMU cheerleaders to spot. This time, Kennedy landed on top of her bases. While they caught her body, the back of her head hit the floor. She sustained a closed head injury, concussion, cervical strain and sprain, impaired vision in her right eye, and injuries to her jaw and neck.
Kennedy sued, alleging that RMU, acting through Hadfield, was negligent in several respects. She claimed Hadfield knew or should have known that the new trick was dangerous especially for persons who had little experience as a team and particularly for Kennedy, the “flyer.” She averred that there should have been a spotter in the front and the ground members of the squad should have been taught how to break the fall of the flyer. She alleged that the other members of the group made no attempt to catch her or cushion her fall.
RMU filed an answer in which it denied that the activities at the University of Scranton were solely under the direction of Hadfield and maintained that the accident occurred while the instruction and training was under the supervision and control of UCA. Furthermore, UCA instructors had instructed the team in the proper way to perform the stunt and the accident did not occur on the first attempt, according to the university. Moreover, the group did attempt to break Kennedy’s fall. Finally, RMU filed a cross-claim against UCA, in which it alleged that the accident occurred while Kennedy was participating in activities directed, controlled, and supervised by UCA and its certified cheerleading instructions, not under the direction of RMU or Hadfield. To the extent that the instruction, safety standards, or supervision were determined to be inadequate, UCA was liable to Kennedy and/or liable to RMU for contribution or indemnity, according to the university.
In its answer and new matter to RMU’s cross-claims, UCA admitted that the accident occurred while Kennedy was participating in a UCA training program and that UCA determined which stunts would be taught. UCA also denied that it was negligent and filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Kennedy’s complaint, noting that it had been dismissed as a primary defendant and that the statute of limitations had expired.
On October 7, 2014, RMU moved for summary judgment. It alleged that there was no dispute that UCA evaluated the cheerleader participants’ qualifications and skill levels, determined what stunts would be taught, and exclusively taught and supervised the stunts. RMU contended it had no duty to prevent injury to Kennedy while she was learning the stunt at a cheerleading camp supervised and controlled by certified instructors employed by UCA. UCA also filed a motion for summary judgment in which it asserted that UCA, not RMU, took responsibility for minimizing the inherent risks associated with performing advanced cheerleading stunts. Since RMU was entitled to summary judgment, UCA maintained that it was entitled to summary judgment on RMU’s cross-claims.
On October 7, 2014, the court granted summary judgment in favor of RMU and UCA. Kennedy appealed, presenting three issues for our review:
“I. Whether the trial judge’s decision granting RMU’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that RMU owed no duty to Appellant, was proper, when Appellant, a student at RMU and a member of the RMU cheerleading team was participating in a mandatory training camp arranged solely by RMU with Universal Cheerleaders Associates. Further, RMU controlled pre-camp instruction and training, selected students for membership in particular groups and enrolled those groups in different classes at the camp.
“II. Whether RMU could delegate its duties it owed to Appellant to a third party, namely UCA and thus excuse RMU from liability to Appellant when Appellant was allegedly injured because of unsafe training practices.
“III. Whether the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to UCA was proper when the basis of same was that the court held that RMU owed no duty to the Appellant and RMU had filed a complaint over against UCA.”
The appeals court noted that Kennedy “concedes that there is virtually no dispute as to the facts relevant to the issue of whether RMU owed a duty under the circumstances herein. Kennedy also agrees that the trial court properly looked to the five factors identified in Althaus v. Cohen, 562 Pa. 547, 756 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa. 2000), in determining whether RMU owed a duty of care, which includes:
“1. The relationship between the parties;
2. The social utility of the actor’s conduct;
3. The nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred;
4. The consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and
5. The overall public interest in the proposed solution.”
However, Kennedy took issue with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusions, pointing to the 1993 Third Circuit decision in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360.
“In that case, a Gettysburg College lacrosse player died from cardiac arrest during an off-season practice at the school,” wrote the appeals court. “The plaintiff contended that the college had a duty based on its special relationship with its student athletes to have properly trained emergency medical personnel and services available at its sporting events. The trial court disagreed, holding that the college had no duty to anticipate and guard against a fatal arrhythmia in a young and healthy athlete. Thus, the college was not negligent for failing to provide CPR trained coaches and trainers at the practice or otherwise have in place measures to deal immediately with the medical emergency. The court of appeals reversed. It reasoned that, since it was foreseeable that a lacrosse player could suffer serious injury during an athletic event, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would find that the college had a duty to provide an appropriate and timely response to a medical emergency during the sporting event.”
Kennedy alleged that there is a special relationship between herself and RMU due to her participation in the university’s cheerleading program. The training camp was arranged by RMU and her attendance was mandatory. “She argues that she was injured while performing a stunt with a group that had been assembled in pre-camp practice by Hadfield and that the coach was present when the injury occurred,” wrote the appeals court. “In terms of social utility, Kennedy contends that the cheerleading program is for RMU’s benefit. She maintains the risk to her and other cheerleaders was obvious. Finally, Kennedy suggests that if she had been injured on RMU’s premises, there would be clear imposition of a duty. She contends that the fact she was injured elsewhere at a camp arranged by her coach and while her coach was just a few feet away should not warrant a different result.”
The appeals court was unmoved.
“We agree with RMU that Kennedy failed to identify any duty on the part of RMU that was breached when she sustained her unfortunate injury,” it wrote. “There was no allegation that Hadfield or RMU negligently selected or entrusted its cheerleaders to UCA. Hadfield maintained that, ‘I made the decision to go with UCA because I believe they run the best collegiate camps in the nation.’ The record establishes that UCA, not RMU, operated the camp and directed and supervised instruction. UCA instructors were in charge of Kennedy’s group at the time of the accident.”
The appeals court added that RMU “engaged UCA as an independent contractor. RMU contracted with UCA for the instruction and supervision of its cheerleaders at UCA’s camp. The camp was conducted at the University of Scranton and there is no evidence that RMU retained any control over the manner of instruction or supervision of stunts. Thus, RMU would not be subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of UCA, even if Kennedy had alleged that UCA was negligent.”
Shaye-Ashley Kennedy v. Robert Morris University v. Universal Cheerleader Association; Sup.Ct.Pa.; No. 1844 WDA 2014, No. 1845 WDA 2014, 2016 PA Super 16; 2016 Pa. Super. LEXIS 47; 1/29/16
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) James J. Stuczynski, Erie. (for appellee) Frank H. Stoy, IV, Pittsburgh, for Universal Cheerleader Association.
