A federal judge from the District of New Jersey granted a motion to dismiss filed by the NCAA, Kean University, and others, who were sued by the school’s former women’s basketball coach, Michelle Sharp, for wrongful termination.
The ruling came on the heels of earlier decision on December 8, 2014 when the same court granted Kean University’s motion to dismiss a similar lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, but left the door open for an amended lawsuit, which was the catalyst for then instant opinion.
Sharp became the women’s basketball coach at Kean in 1998, and achieved some success during her tenure.
In 2011, however, the NCAA notified Kean that the school was awarding more Dorsey Scholarships than what was allowed under NCAA rules. Sharp alleged that Kean did not inform incoming female student athletes of these rules, or of the possibility that their scholarships or spots on the basketball team may be revoked if the NCAA initiated a formal investigation. The NCAA launched a more exhaustive investigation in September of 2011.
Sharp clashed with university personnel over how the university should handle the investigation, according to the complaint. Specifically, she informed the university and several individual defendants that she did not believe that Kean afforded one of her player’s proper due process before it removed her from the team. And while Sharp believed that Kean should oppose the NCAA’s allegations, the university allegedly disagreed. Sharp alleged that after expressing her views to university personnel, defendant Faruque Chowdhury — Kean’s Director of Human Resources — called her to his office and “instructed her that she was making too much noise and that she needed to tone it down.” According to the complaint, Kean then retaliated against Sharp by relieving her of her duties as head women’s basketball coach, re-assigning her to the East Campus Recreational Facilities, and later relocating her to an inferior office space.
On January 21, 2014, Sharp filed her initial complaint, which included claims against only Kean and its employees. On December 8, 2014, this court dismissed Sharp’s complaint without prejudice and granted her leave to amend. Sharp then filed her amended complaint alleging that the defendants “sabotaged her reputation.” Then the defendants moved to dismiss.
The court made short work of the plaintiff’s claim.
Addressing the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 claims, the court wrote that section 1983 claim fails “because the NCAA defendants did not act under the color of state law,” a pre-requisite for such claims. See, e.g., Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.1995).
“A private entity like the NCAA acts under the color state law only where ‘the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state;’ where ‘the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials;’ or where ‘the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.’ Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-442 (E.D.Pa. 1996). In National Collegiate Association v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held that private conduct of the NCAA is not transformed into state action simply because a public university disciplines an employee in direct response to an NCAA investigation. 488 U.S. 179, 109 S. Ct. 454, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1988). The Court emphasized that in such a scenario, it is ultimately up to the public university as to whether it should discipline the employee, even though institutional pressure from the NCAA may influence the university’s decision. In other words, the state action of the university cannot be imputed to the NCAA. Id. at 195-96. Here, it was Kean, not the NCAA, who stripped Sharp of her coaching duties. Indeed, it appears that the NCAA does not even possess the authority to take disciplinary action against Sharp; rather, its enforcement authority extends only to the university itself. Because the NCAA did not act under the color of state law, Sharp’s section 1983 claim against the NCAA defendants must be dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, because Sharp’s section 1985 claim is premised on a violation of the equal protection clause, it too is subject to the state action requirement. United Broth. Of Carpenters and Joinders of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831-33, 103 S. Ct. 3352, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1049 (1983).” Thus, it was dismissed with prejudice.
Meanwhile, “Sharp’s Title IX claim against the NCAA fares no better as it suffers from numerous pleading deficiencies. Specifically, there is no allegation that the NCAA has received Federal financial assistance such that it would be subject to suit under Title IX. Cf. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 266 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir.2001).”
Furthermore, “Sharp’s amended complaint is also deficient in alleging that the NCAA defendants violated state and federal RICO statutes. To state a claim under the federal civil RICO statute, Sharp must sufficiently plead: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Sedima, S.P.R.L, v. Imrex Company, Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985). New Jersey’s civil RICO statute is substantially similar, as it contains the following elements: ‘(1) the existence of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise engaged in activities that affected trade or commerce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; (5) that the defendant participated though a pattern of racketeering activity; and (6) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the conspiracy.’ See N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c); Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84365, 2015 WL 3970297, *7 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015).
“Sharp’s RICO claims against the NCAA Defendants do not meet those requirements.”
Sharp’s claims against the Kean Defendants were similarly dismissed with prejudice.
Specifically, she failed “to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Kean” because she did not “demonstrate that one of Kean’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.”
Similarly, the same claims made against current and former Kean employees are also subject to dismissal because she failed to show “purposeful discrimination, i.e., she must demonstrate that she ‘received different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated.'” Sharp, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169298, 2014 WL 6908775.
Michele Sharp v. Kean University et al.,; D.N.J.; Civ. No. 2:14-423 (WJM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172203; 12/28/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Timothy J. McIlwain, Attorney at Law, LLC, HOBOKEN, NJ. (for defendants) Jennifer J. McGruther, Lead Attorney, State of New Jersey, Department of Law & Public Safety, Division of Law, Trenton, NJ.
