An Indiana state appeals court affirmed the ruling of a trial court that neither the NCAA nor the United States Fencing Association, Inc. (USFA) owed a duty of care to a student athlete, who was injured in a competition.
The plaintiff in the case was Lydia Lanni. Lanni, a student athlete at Wayne State University, suffered a severe injury when she was struck in the eye by a fencing saber while watching what she alleged was an NCAA-sanctioned fencing match at the University of Notre Dame in March of 2010.
On February 8, 2012, Lanni sued the NCAA, Notre Dame, and USFA. She specifically alleged that the NCAA was negligent by: (1) failing to undertake a hazard and risk analysis prior to commencing the fencing match; (2) failing to select and/or supervise qualified officials; and (3) failing to supervise the competition to insure hazards and risks were consistently monitored to prevent injuries. Lanni also alleged negligence on the part of the USFA and Notre Dame.
On April 3, the NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint and/or an entry of summary judgment, claiming it had “no involvement” in the event.
The trial court granted the NCAA’s request for summary judgment. Lanni appealed, and the appeals court held that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment “without awarding Lanni a reasonable opportunity to present relevant materials in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Lanni v. NCAA, 989 N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
After the litigation was remanded to the trial court, the USFA filed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the motions, and granted summary judgment to the NCAA and the USFA. This appeal ensued.
The key considerations on appeal were:
Whether the NCAA owed Lanni a duty of care.
Whether the USFA owes a duty of care to those who participate in fencing matches that are played under the USFA’s rules and that are refereed by USFA-trained referees.
Whether the trial court erred when the court denied Lanni’s motion for a change of judge on remand from this court following our reversal of an earlier entry of summary judgment.
The court began its analysis by noting that “summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015).
“The trial court’s summary judgment for the NCAA turns on the element of duty. As such, we address the two theories of duty that Lanni attempts to invoke against the NCAA: whether the NCAA owed her a general duty of care under the factors articulated by the Indiana Supreme Court in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991), and whether there is a genuine question of material fact regarding whether the NCAA assumed a duty of care over Lanni and other student-athletes.”
The court went on to note that the Indiana Supreme Court’s “recent analysis in Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509 (Ind. 2014), is controlling. In Yost, a pledge at a local chapter of Phi Kappa Psi alleged he was injured in a hazing incident, and he sued the local chapter as well as the national fraternity. In considering whether the national fraternity owed the pledge a duty as a matter of law under Webb, our supreme court stated:
“Of these three factors, the parties’ relationship and public policy concerns undermine Yost’s claim of duty on the part of the national fraternity under the designated facts most favorable to Yost. The national fraternity lacked any direct oversight and control of the individual fraternity members. It did not have any employees present in the fraternity house, and the day-to-day management of the house was the responsibility of the local fraternity, not the national fraternity. Despite the national fraternity’s efforts to establish aspirational objectives and to promote their fulfillment, the relationship between the national fraternity and the individual student members was remote and tenuous. Public policy concerns likewise do not favor recognition of a specific duty of care toward Yost by the national fraternity.”
The court continued: “We see no daylight between our supreme court’s analysis in Yost with respect to the relationship between a national fraternity and a student engaged with a local chapter and the relationship between the NCAA and a student-athlete participating at an event on the campus of a member institution.”
The court went on to affirm summary judgment for the NCAA.
Turning to Lanni’s appeal, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the USFA follows:
“Specifically, Lanni asserts that the USFA assumed a duty to protect Lanni from injury because the March 2010 competition was played at least in part under USFA rules and with USFA-trained referees,” wrote the court. “But there is no dispute that the March 2010 competition was not a USFA-sponsored event, and there is no evidence to show even that the USFA had knowledge of the March 2010 competition. Thus, if the NCAA did not owe Lanni a duty, neither did the USFA, whose relationship to Lanni was even more remote than the NCAA’s and whose control over the March 2010 competition was even more tenuous. As such, we affirm the court’s entry of summary judgment for the USFA.”
Lydia Lanni v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, University of Notre Dame Du Lac, and United States Fencing Association, Inc.; Ct. App. Ind.; Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1409-CT-649, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 599; 8/26/15
Attorneys of Record (for appellant) J. Kevin King, Peter Campbell King, Cline, King & King, P.C., Columbus, Indiana. (for appellees) Marc T. Quigley, Libby Y. Goodknight, Catherine E. Sabatine, Krieg DeVault LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana; Edward F. Harney, Jr., William D. Beyers, Hume Smith Geddes Green & Simmons, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana.
