On June 29, 2017, Dustin Fowler was playing right field for the New York Yankees in his major league debut against the Chicago White Sox at Guaranteed Rate Field. In the bottom of the first inning, Fowler seriously injured his right knee attempting to catch a slicing line drive by José Abreau when he slammed into the stands in foul territory jamming his knee into an exposed, unpadded metal electrical box. The injury required surgery and cost Fowler the remainder of the season. While recuperating the Yankees traded Fowler to the Oakland Athletics. I previously reported on the injury and Fowler’s lawsuit against the Chicago White Sox and the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority in Illinois state court in the January-February issue of Professional Sports and the Law (volume 8, issue 6 – pages 1, 19, and 20).
The White Sox and the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois claiming that Fowler’s negligence action was completely preempted by § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). On June 29, 2018, Judge Gary S. Feinerman granted Fowler’s request to remand the case back to the Circuit Court of Cook County where he will continue to pursue his action against both defendants. Fowler v. Illinois Sports Facilities Authority, 2018 WL 3208509, and 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108940.
Judge Feinerman began his discussion of the preemption claim by quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) and a 2013 Seventh Circuit decision, Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2013), that cited Caterpillar — “Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” However, Judge Feinerman asserted that “Section 301 preemption is not boundless,” and he turned to a consideration of the White Sox’s contention that Article XIII of the 2017-2021 Basic Agreement establishing a joint Safety and Health Advisory Committee defeated Fowler’s negligence claim because “the White Sox conclude from Article XIII that, absent any objection from the Committee, the injury that Fowler suffered when he ran into the box was not reasonably foreseeable.” Judge Feinerman sharply set aside the White Sox’s argument writing that “the White Sox’s reading of Article XIII is not plausible. No club could have reasonably believed, based on the text of Article XIII, that the Committee would be able to identify safety risks so comprehensively and effectively that, as long as the Committee raised no objections, the club could simply assume that nothing in its premises posed an unreasonable risk to players.”
To support his assertion, Judge Feinerman analyzed two district court opinions involving the National Football League — Duerson v. National Football League, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. 2012), and Dent v. National Football League, 2014 WL 7205048 (N.D. Cal. 2014). In Duerson, the district court considered an estate claim that the NFL failed to fully inform Dave Duerson of the potential for significant brain injury after the Bears defensive back suffered multiple concussions. In the Dent class action suit, a group of former players claimed that the NFL negligently distributed prescription pain killers and controlled substances in violation of both state and federal laws to players without fully informing those players of the potential damage from excessive use resulting in permanent injuries. The district courts in both cases determined that the state law claims were preempted by § 301 because the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the NFLPA directly addressed many aspects of the players’ medical needs. In distinguishing both cases from Fowler’s situation, Judge Feinerman wrote that “one could reasonably conclude that the clubs—who directly employed medical staff to serve the players—bore the primary responsibility for the players’ medical care.” However, in Fowler’s case, “Article XIII leaves no doubt that the clubs were in a vastly better position than the Committee to assess the safety of their own premises. The clubs did not give up any control over their premises to the Committee, nor did they even grant it any consistent supervisory role. . . . It would have been wholly unreasonable for any club to delegate its responsibility to ensure the safety of its playing field to the intermittent and weak Committee described in Article XIII.” The judge ultimately held that “it strains credulity to suppose . . . that the Committee would examine such granular details of individual ballparks in its occasional meetings ‘for purposes of review and planning.’ It follows that the White Sox’s interpretation of Article XIII is not plausible, that the Basic Agreement therefore will not affect the White Sox’s duty of care to Fowler, and therefore that Fowler’s claims are not completely preempted under Section 301.”
On September 6, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Dent case. Judge Richard C. Tallman, writing for the three-judge panel determined that “the district court held that the players’ claims are preempted and dismissed their suit. We disagree. As pled, the players’ claims neither arise from collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) nor require their interpretation. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.” Dent v. National Football League, 2018 WL 4224431, *1. Further in 2014, the Eastern District Court of Missouri declined to follow Duerson in Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2014) and remanded the Green action to state court.
Judge Feinerman also turned aside the White Sox’s argument that his injury would require an interpretation of the CBA provisions concerning salary payments and payment of “reasonable medical and hospital expenses.” Although those CBA provisions could apply to the White Sox’s “own injured players,” Judge Feinerman found that they would not apply to Fowler, a member of an opposing team.
With Fowler’s case remanded to state court, the Oakland outfielder has the opportunity to argue that the location of the electrical box for wireless transmission that would primarily benefit fans on the field side of the wall without any padding was negligent because the White Sox and the Illinois Sports Facilities Authority could reasonable foresee that a player could be injured by running into the box. Normally players assume the risk of injuries involved in playing the game. However, visiting players typically have a limited opportunity to survey the playing surface and walls to determine the location of any possible obstructions such as this box that increase the possibility of an injury. Furthermore, teams and fans are fully aware that players often risk injury by running at top speed hoping to catch a fly ball before running into the wall. In this case, Fowler was playing in his first major league game, and he was delayed in getting to the stadium due to travel issues involving his call up. Thus, this case presents an interesting fact pattern that differs in some measure from precedents that are usually decided against plaintiff players for defendant teams and stadium authorities.
Fowler’s 2018 baseball season has been split between the Oakland Athletics and the Nashville Sounds, their AAA affiliate in the Pacific Coast League. Fowler was initially optioned to Nashville on March 28 prior to Opening Day. He was recalled on May 9. He was again optioned to the Sounds on August 2 and recalled on the last day of the month. He hit .341 for Nashville in 55 games. He missed at least 60 major league games due to starting the season in the minors and spending most of August in Nashville.
Edmonds is director of the Kresge Law Library and professor of law at the University of Notre Dame.
