A federal judge from the Northern District of Indiana has dismissed in part a discrimination lawsuit brought by a Purdue University Northwest baseball player against his coach, other officials, and the university.
Plaintiff Jose Resendez was a member of the baseball team during the 2014-15 season. Defendant Shane Prance was the head coach of the team, and co-defendant Tom Albano was the athletic director.
Resendez, who “is of Hispanic heritage, specifically Mexican,” alleged that the impetus for his lawsuit was a series of incidents in which “Prance mistreated him because of his race.” Specifically, he alleged that on March 19, 2015, “Prance directed a racially derogatory comment” to him in which he said: “’I don’t want to deal with campus police saying a Mexican with a beard is jumping the fence and causing trouble on the field. Resendez, that was directed to you.’” Over the next five days, more comments were allegedly made, leading to a verbal altercation between the two. The parties dispute whether the altercation became physical. The relationship continued to deteriorate.
Then, late on the night of April 14, 2015, Prance called the police to report that a paintball gun was being fired at his house and that he could hear the paintballs hitting the house. When police arrived, he reported that he saw a vehicle outside his house during the incident, and that he recognized it as belonging to Resendez’s girlfriend. He further stated that, a couple minutes later, he saw the same vehicle in the area, and he was able to identify Resendez as the driver. The plaintiff disputed that he and his girlfriend were even in the area. Further, Resendez alleged that “these false accusations were racially motivated,” wrote the court. “In response to the accusation, police contacted Resendez, who offered to let them search for a paintball gun, but none was found.
“Shortly thereafter, Resendez was summoned to a meeting with Albano, the athletic director,” continued the court. “Prance had reported to Albano that Resendez physically assaulted him by charging and bumping into him during the incident on March 19, 2015. Prance further reported that Resendez had shot paintballs at his house. Accordingly, Resendez was suspended from the team pending an investigation into those incidents.”
The plaintiff maintained that Albano investigated Prance’s allegations about the assault and found that they were false, “but that Resendez remained suspended and Prance was not disciplined,” according to the court.
Resendez further alleged that Prance’s treatment of him was part of a pattern of treating non-white players worse than their white counterparts. He alleged that white players on the team were not disciplined as severely for their misconduct and that Prance did not file false police reports against any white players. He also alleged that non-white players received less playing time.
Resendez sued, asserting federal claims for racial discrimination, and state claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response to a motion to dismiss, Resendez filed an amended complaint. The defendants then moved to dismiss the amended complaint as well. The court referred that motion to the magistrate judge for preparation of a report and recommendation. In the report and recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended that the federal claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that the court relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Resendez objected to that report and recommendation, leading to the instant opinion.
Resendez first asserted three claims under federal law. In Counts 1 and 2, Resendez alleged that he was discriminated against because of his race. Count 1 alleges that Purdue is liable for that discrimination under Title VI, while Count 2 alleges that Prance, Albano, and others are liable for that discrimination under § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
After providing background on the Equal Protection Clause, the court noted that the plaintiff’s claim could have merit if he can show it was racially motived. “Thus, the operative question is whether Prance caused Resendez to be suspended because of his race,” wrote the court.
“The Seventh Circuit has set a low bar for pleading discrimination. It has held that plaintiffs need only identify a challenged action and allege that the defendant acted because of their race,” wrote the court, citing E.g., Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2015). “Resendez has done that here as to Prance, alleging that Prance held a racial animus and that he treated Resendez differently and caused him to be suspended because of his race.” The court went on to note that Resendez does not need to present evidence at the pleading stage. He has “adequately pled an equal protection claim against Prance.”
Turning to Prance’s argument he is entitled to qualified immunity because it is not clearly established that “a college baseball player who is a member of a protected class cannot be suspended from the team on account of a verbal altercation with the coach,” the court determined that the argument “is misplaced.
“The whole point of this claim is that Resendez was suspended not because of ‘a verbal altercation with the coach,’ but because of his race. And it has long been well-established that the government may not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. … Therefore, the Court denies the motion to dismiss Count 2 as to Prance.
“The result is different, though, as to Albano and Dworkin—the athletic director and the chancellor, who were not accused of harboring “any discriminatory animus.” Thus, the court granted their motion to dismiss as it related to Count 2.
Turning to the state claims and Resendez’ allegations against Prance for defamation, defamation per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that it “appears that Count 3 is based on Prance’s statement to Albano that Resendez assaulted him, and that Count 4 is based on Prance’s statement to the police that Resendez shot paintballs at his house. The intentional infliction of emotion distress count is based on the whole course of conduct.”
In moving to dismiss, Prance argued that he has immunity against this claim under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. “The ITCA provides that a government employee may not be named as a party in a civil suit where he acted ‘within the scope of [his] employment.'” Young v. Davis, 40 N.E.3d 1254, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
The court agreed. “The conduct alleged in this count is clearly within the scope of Prance’s employment. This count involves a statement that Prance, the baseball coach, made to the athletic director about an incident with one of his players during a team activity prior to a game. A coach’s discussion with an athletic director about an incident with a player during a team activity falls plainly within the scope of his employment as a coach. Thus, the coach is entitled to immunity.
In Count 4, Resendez asserted a claim for defamation per se, apparently based on Prance’s statement to the police that Resendez shot paintballs at his house. Prance first argued that he is entitled to immunity under the ITCA as to this count as well.
“Unlike the previous count, though, this conduct is not related to Prance’s employment with the university,” wrote the court. “It arose out of an incident of vandalism at Prance’s home, unrelated to any team activity or any aspect of his employment. The only connection between that incident and Prance’s employment was that Resendez, whom he accused, happened to be one of his players.” Thus, Prance’s argument failed.
Prance’s “alternative (argument) that he is entitled to qualified immunity because this statement was made to law enforcement officers” similarly failed because Resendez’ statement “was made without belief or grounds for belief in its truth.”
Turning to Count 5 and the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “based on the totality of Prance’s conduct towards Resendez,” the court first noted the elements of such a claim. In such instances, a defendant: “(1) engages in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) which intentionally or recklessly; (3) causes; (4) severe emotional distress to another.” Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 116-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
The court sided with the plaintiff, denying the motion to dismiss Count 5. “(A)t least for the pleading stage, the allegations of the false police report, the absence of a basis for the accusation, and the alleged racial motivation suffice to allege extreme and outrageous conductor,” it wrote.
Jose Resendez v. Shane Prance, et al.; N.D. Ind.; Case No. 3:16-cv-862 JD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52966; 3/29/18
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Andrea L Ciobanu, Ciobanu Law PC, Indianapolis, IN. (for defendants) William P Kealey, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stuart & Branigin LLP – Laf/IN, Lafayette, IN.
