By Kyle Conkle, Ph.D.
The recent Second Circuit decision in Choh v. Brown University adds another important layer to the ongoing conversation surrounding athlete compensation as well as institutional control in the future of college athletics. The case centered on two former Brown University basketball players who filed a putative class action lawsuit against the eight Ivy League institutions and the Ivy League Council of Presidents. The plaintiffs alleged that the Ivy League’s long-standing agreement prohibiting athletic scholarships and additional compensation for Division I athletes amounted to unlawful price-fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. At the core of the dispute was whether the Ivy League’s collective decision to avoid athletic scholarships created an unlawful restraint on competition within the market for academically elite student-athletes.
The primary legal question before the court was whether the plaintiffs had properly defined a relevant market under antitrust law. More specifically, the court examined whether the Ivy League itself could constitute a distinct market for both educational and athletic services involving academically and athletically high-achieving student-athletes. The plaintiffs argued that Ivy League institutions operate within a uniquely competitive space because they combine elite academics with Division I athletics. However, the court ultimately found that argument difficult to sustain because the complaint itself acknowledged that other academically selective institutions, including Stanford University, also compete for the same caliber of student-athletes while offering athletic scholarships.
The court applied the rule of reason analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which requires plaintiffs to establish a plausible relevant market in which competition has allegedly been harmed. In reaching its decision, the court relied on precedent from Ohio v. American Express Co., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, and the Second Circuit’s prior decisions regarding interchangeable substitute products and market definition. The court also drew important comparisons to NCAA v. Alston, particularly regarding the distinction between NCAA-wide market power and the more limited influence of an individual athletic conference such as the Ivy League.
A significant part of the court’s reasoning focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations. The proposed “Ivy-only” market failed because the complaint openly recognized that schools outside the Ivy League compete for the same academically elite athletes. In other words, the existence of comparable institutions offering scholarships weakened the argument that the Ivy League operated within its own isolated economic market. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative “Ivy-plus” market, which attempted to include institutions such as University of Notre Dame, Duke University, and Rice University. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to explain why those schools belonged in the market while other academically comparable institutions did not. As a result, the court concluded that the market definitions lacked the necessary economic boundaries required under antitrust law.
The plaintiffs also argued that because the case involved a horizontal agreement among competing institutions, they should not be required to define the market so precisely. The court disagreed. While acknowledging that some horizontal restraint cases involve self-evident markets, the court emphasized that this situation was materially different because the Ivy League does not possess the kind of near-total market dominance that the NCAA was found to hold in Alston. That distinction became central to the outcome. The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice, holding that the plaintiffs’ failure to establish a plausible relevant market was fatal to their Sherman Act claim.
From a broader sport management perspective, the decision is significant because it demonstrates how difficult future antitrust challenges may be against conference-specific compensation restrictions. Courts are clearly signaling that broad claims about prestige, tradition, or academic reputation alone are not enough to establish a legally distinct market. Future plaintiffs will likely need stronger economic evidence and more narrowly tailored market definitions if they hope to survive dismissal.
At the same time, the case highlights the continuing tension within college athletics between institutional identity and the evolving business realities of sport. While the Ivy League has historically defended its model as one centered on educational values and amateurism, the landscape surrounding athlete compensation has shifted dramatically in recent years. NIL opportunities, transfer flexibility, and post-Alston scrutiny have changed how athletes evaluate opportunities and how institutions compete for talent. Even though the Ivy League prevailed in this case, the broader pressure on conferences and universities to justify compensation limitations is unlikely to disappear.
It seems plausible to agree with the court’s legal reasoning because antitrust claims require a clearly defined market, and the plaintiffs’ argument struggled to overcome the reality that academically elite athletes have multiple alternatives outside the Ivy League. However, the decision also leaves important policy questions unresolved. The fact that substitute institutions exist does not necessarily eliminate concerns about fairness or compensation limitations for athletes competing within the Ivy League structure. From an ethical standpoint, the case reflects the larger national debate over how universities balance educational missions, maintaining competitive balance, and the increasing commercialization of college sports.
Moving forward, this decision will likely influence both litigation strategy and institutional policy across college athletics. Plaintiffs challenging compensation restrictions will need more sophisticated economic analysis, while conferences and universities will continue reevaluating how their policies align with the rapidly changing expectations surrounding athlete compensation and athlete rights. For sport administrators and coaches, the case serves as a reminder that legal compliance alone is no longer enough. Institutions must also consider how policies affect recruiting, athlete perception, and long-term competitive positioning in a college athletics environment that continues to evolve at a rapid pace.
