By Dr. Kyle Conkle
The case of Arbolida v. NCAA represents a significant consideration in the evolving legal battle over the rights of college athletes to participate in the revenue generated by collegiate sports. The decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas reinforces that courts remain cautious about enjoining long-standing NCAA eligibility rules without a fully developed factual record, even post-Alston.
Plaintiff Cary Arbolida, a collegiate baseball player, began his career at Orange Coast College, a junior college, in 2019. Due to COVID-19, his first season was shortened, but he still played against other JUCO teams. He transferred to UC-Santa Barbara in 2020 but failed to secure a roster spot and returned to Orange Coast, competing in the spring of 2021 and 2022. He earned a two-year liberal arts degree before transferring to the University of Houston, where he played two years of Division I baseball, excelling in performance. After graduating in May 2024 and going undrafted in the MLB Draft, the University of Houston submitted a season of competition waiver to the NCAA, seeking to exclude the Plaintiff’s JUCO seasons from his eligibility count. The NCAA denied this request in October 2024. Following this, the Plaintiff enrolled at the University of Tampa, a Division II school.
On December 18, 2024, in a separate case (Pavia v. NCAA), a court enjoined enforcement of NCAA Bylaws 12.02.6 and 12.8, ruling them anticompetitive under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The NCAA responded by issuing a blanket waiver to affected JUCO athletes from the 2024–25 academic year, granting them an additional year of Division I eligibility for 2025–26. Arbolida entered the NCAA transfer portal in January 2025 and committed to Kansas State University (K-State). He claimed potential NIL compensation of at least $50,000 if allowed to compete. K-State submitted a second waiver request to the NCAA on his behalf, which is still pending.
On February 14, 2025, the same day as K-State’s first baseball game, Arbolida filed suit against the NCAA, alleging antitrust violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract. He sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the NCAA from enforcing its eligibility rules against him.
One of the central issues in this case revolved around whether the Plaintiff met the legal standards necessary to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order. First, the court had to determine whether the Plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his antitrust claim, which involved assessing whether the alleged conduct violates antitrust laws and whether the Plaintiff could substantiate these claims with sufficient evidence at said stage. Second, the Plaintiff had to demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. Finally, the court had to evaluate whether the balance of harms and the public interest weighed in favor of granting the temporary restraining order, taking into account the potential consequences for both parties and the broader implications for the public.
The court concluded that the Plaintiff did not meet his burden under the preliminary injunction standard. Regarding the antitrust claim, the court found it unlikely to succeed. The Plaintiff challenged the NCAA rules under the “rule of reason,” which requires demonstrating a relevant market and substantial anticompetitive effects. However, the Plaintiff failed to provide market data or any factual analysis concerning market structure or power. Although other courts in cases such as Pavia and Fourqurean have acknowledged that NCAA rules might have anticompetitive effects, this court determined that eligibility rules could, in fact, promote competition among schools by limiting player eligibility, thereby increasing recruiting pressures and compensation opportunities.
Additionally, the court found that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The Plaintiff’s asserted harms including disadvantages to junior college athletes, limited choices for student-athletes, and diminished fan enjoyment, were deemed speculative and unsupported by sufficient evidence. In addition, the alleged injury of being ineligible to compete at Kansas State University was partly a consequence of the Plaintiff’s own delay in seeking judicial relief. Despite being aware of his eligibility issues for months, he filed suit only on the day of the season’s first game. Courts in similar cases have denied injunctive relief when plaintiffs delayed seeking intervention, and the court here followed that precedent in rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim of irreparable harm.
Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order so there will be no immediate court action to stop the NCAA’s eligibility decision. However, the request for a preliminary injunction, a longer-term order that could block the NCAA’s rule while the case continues, is still under consideration.
So while Alston marked a shift in how courts view the NCAA’s amateurism model, it did not automatically invalidate all NCAA rules. Instead a continued need for a thorough, evidence-based approach under antitrust law’s “rule of reason” resurfaced. This standard requires plaintiffs to clearly define the relevant market, or the scope of competition affected by the rule, and to demonstrate substantial anticompetitive effects like reduced athlete opportunities, limited consumer choice, or market distortion. Without detailed economic data or expert analysis showing how the rule harms competition, courts are unlikely to grant emergency relief. The judiciary is particularly hesitant to make sweeping changes based on incomplete records, especially in cases involving complex regulatory frameworks like the NCAA’s.
Moreover, one can see, yet again, from this ruling that timing and procedural diligence are critical in seeking emergency equitable relief like that of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Courts disfavor last-minute filings, especially when the plaintiff has known about the issue for a substantial amount of time. Delays can suggest a lack of urgency or strategic gamesmanship, both of which undermine claims of “irreparable harm.”
The broader implications of this case are clear: post-Alston, courts may be more receptive to antitrust challenges against NCAA rules, but they require plaintiffs to meet a high evidentiary standard grounded in economic analysis and market impact. Future litigants seeking to reshape NCAA policy must come prepared with data-driven arguments and a clear litigation strategy from the outset. Until then, eligibility rules and institutional discretion will likely continue to prevail, and emergency relief will remain the exception, not the norm, in the evolving legal landscape of college athletics.
