A California state appeals court affirmed a lower court and declined to vacate a trial court’s decision to compel arbitration in a case in which a former assistant coach of the Oakland Raiders sued the club and its head coach after a scuffle broke out in a coach’s meeting.
Plaintiff Randy Hanson joined the Raiders in 2007 as an assistant secondary coach. Two years later, in January 2009, he was promoted to assistant coach. In both 2007 and 2009, Hanson signed employment agreements, which contained the following arbitration clause: “Hanson agrees that all matters in dispute between Hanson and [the Raiders], including without limitation any dispute arising from the terms of this Agreement, shall be referred to the NFL Commissioner for binding arbitration, and his decision shall be accepted as final, conclusive, and unappealable.”
Hanson also agreed to “abide by and be legally bound by the Constitution, Bylaws, and rules and regulations of the NFL . . . and by the decisions of the Commissioner of the NFL . . . which decision[s] shall be final, conclusive and unappealable.” In pertinent part, the NFL Constitution, article VIII, section 8.3 provides: “The Commissioner shall have full, complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate: … (C) Any dispute between or among players, coaches, and/or other employees of any member club or clubs of the League, other than disputes unrelated to and outside the course and scope of the employment of such disputants within the League.”
The incident in question occurred on August 5, 2009 when Hanson was meeting with Head Coach Tom Cable and other coaches. Cable, “without warning or provocation,” grabbed Hanson (and threw him) against the wall, causing the left side of Hanson’s face to strike a table, according to newspaper accounts.
On February 23, 2010, Hanson sued, alleging causes of actions for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Regarding the Raiders’ liability, Hanson alleged that at the time of the assault, Cable was acting within the scope of his “agency and employment” with the Raiders. Hanson also alleged the Raiders later “ratified” Cable’s conduct by failing to conduct more than a cursory investigation of the incident and discipline Cable. Hanson further alleged that as a consequence of the incident, he was placed on leave of absence for an extended period of time, was not allowed to return to his position as assistant coach, and instead, was eventually permitted to return to an undefined role in the Raiders’ personnel department under conditions that caused him embarrassment, distress, and humiliation.
The defendants moved to compel arbitration. Hanson argued that the arbitration clause in his employment contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The trial court was unpersuaded, noting that the plaintiff never “disagreed” with the agreement’s arbitration provision, nor was there any evidence of pressure.
On appeal, the plaintiff made two arguments:
“First, he contends that the tort claims alleged in his complaint fall well beyond the scope of the arbitration clause in his employment contract (hereinafter also referred to as the arbitration clause). Second, he argues that even if his tort claims are arbitrable, the arbitration clause is unenforceable as ‘permeated by unconscionability.’ More specifically, he contends the arbitration clause is part of a contract of adhesion that was imposed on a take-it-or leave-it basis, fails to disclose or include the NFL arbitration rules that would govern all arbitrations, lacks mutuality, and fails to provide for a neutral third-party arbitrator. As we now discuss, we conclude that none of Hanson’s assertions requires reversal of the order compelling arbitration.”
Right off the bat, the court wrote that “Hanson’s argument concerning the scope of disputes subject to arbitration is forfeited because he failed to raise the issue in the trial court when he initially opposed arbitration.”
Even if the argument has been made at the trial court level, it would fail on its merits. “(W)e cannot say … that Hanson’s tort claims against Cable were ‘unrelated to and outside the course and scope’ of their employment in the League, or did not relate sufficiently to the professional relationship of Hanson and the Raiders so as to fall outside the employment contract clause allowing for arbitration of ‘all matters in dispute’ between them.”
Meanwhile, the appeals court was unwilling to “reweigh” the merits of the uunconscionability argument. “The trial court was free to reject Hanson’s assertions that he met his burden of demonstrating that the arbitration clause was part of an adhesion contract or that he was ‘unfairly surprised’ or oppressed by either the arbitration clause or the requirement to arbitrate all matters in dispute pursuant to the NFL Dispute Resolution Procedural Guidelines,” it wrote. “Based on our independent review, the evidence submitted to the trial court does not establish that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable as a matter of law.”
Randy Hanson v. Tom Cable et al.; Ct. App. Calif., 1st App. Dist., Div. 3; A138208, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2663; 4/15/15
