By Anna Arkadianou
The newly filed case of Ortega v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) presents a challenge to an existing NCAA eligibility rule within a college sports environment that increasingly recognizes athletes—and the tethered universities—as commercially driven participants in economic markets. Filed December 15, 2025 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the lawsuit was brought by Reineri Andreu Ortega, a prospective Division I wrestler, and probes whether the NCAA’s Division I “Five-Year Eligibility Clock” is consistent with federal antitrust law when applied to athletes whose post–high school education occurred outside the NCAA system. Although the rule predates recent changes in college athletics, the legal framework governing its application has evolved following NCAA v. Alston and subsequent developments related to athlete compensation.[1]
At issue is not whether the NCAA may impose limits on athletic eligibility, but whether the method used to calculate eligibility—specifically, starting the eligibility clock before enrollment at an NCAA institution—constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.[2] In the post–name, image, and likeness (NIL) era, eligibility rules now directly determine access to lawful compensation, increasing their economic significance and legal exposure.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Reineri Andreu Ortega is a Cuban-born wrestler who completed the equivalent of high school in Cuba in 2016.[3] From 2016 to 2019, Ortega enrolled in a post–high school academic institution in Cuba that did not sponsor intercollegiate athletics and was not a member institution of the NCAA. For purposes of applying its eligibility rules, however, the NCAA classified the institution as a “collegiate institution” within the meaning of NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.01.1, based on Ortega’s full-time enrollment in postsecondary coursework.[4] During this period, Ortega did not engage in intercollegiate athletic participation. Separately, Ortega trained and competed as a member of the Cuban National Wrestling Team, an activity unrelated to and independent from his academic enrollment.[5]
According to the complaint, Ortega entered the United States as a refugee in December 2022 and enrolled at Iowa State University in the spring of 2023.[6] He joined the university’s Division I wrestling program but did not compete during his first season. When Ortega later sought eligibility to compete, the NCAA determined that his five-year eligibility period had expired. Applying Division I Bylaw 12.6, the NCAA concluded that Ortega’s eligibility clock began in 2016—when he first enrolled in post–high school coursework in Cuba—rather than in 2023, when he enrolled at Iowa State.[7] After exhausting internal NCAA appeals, Ortega filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.[8]
The Five-Year Eligibility Clock
Under NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.6, an athlete is permitted five calendar years in which to complete four seasons of intercollegiate competition.[9] The eligibility clock begins when the athlete first registers as a full-time student at any “collegiate institution,” regardless of NCAA affiliation or athletic participation.[10] The NCAA has historically justified this rule as a means of promoting academic progress and timely graduation.[11] However, the rule operates independently of athletic participation and applies uniformly to students attending institutions without athletics programs. In Ortega’s case, this framework resulted in years of non-athletic academic enrollment abroad counting against Division I eligibility, effectively exhausting his opportunity to compete before he entered the NCAA system.
Antitrust Framework
Ortega’s complaint alleges that the NCAA’s enforcement of the Five-Year Eligibility Clock violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. NCAA bylaws are characterized in the lawsuit as horizontal agreements among competing member institutions that collectively regulate access to the Division I athletic labor market.[12] The relevant market is defined as the national market for Division I athletes, where institutions compete for athletic services, and athletes compete for roster positions and associated economic benefits.[13] Courts have increasingly recognized that these relationships are commercial in nature and subject to antitrust scrutiny, particularly in the post-Alston landscape, as reflected in recent appellate authority such as Elad v. NCAA.[14]
The Post-Alston Context
In NCAA v. Alston, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the NCAA’s claim to special antitrust deference and confirmed that NCAA regulations are subject to ordinary rule-of-reason analysis. The Court emphasized that the NCAA is not immune from antitrust law and that restraints affecting athlete compensation must be justified by concrete procompetitive benefits.
Following Alston, the NCAA lifted its restrictions on NIL compensation in July 2021, and subsequent litigation culminated in the House v. NCAA settlement, which permits direct revenue sharing between institutions and athletes. In this environment, eligibility rules now determine access not only to competition, but also to lawful compensation.[15] Ortega argues that starting the eligibility clock before NCAA enrollment restricts participation in this compensation market without advancing competition or consumer welfare.
Implications for Other Sports, Specifically Tennis
Although Ortega v. NCAA arises from wrestling, the legal questions it presents are not confined to that sport. If courts limit the NCAA’s ability to start the Five-Year Eligibility Clock before enrollment at an NCAA institution, the effects could extend to other Olympic and non-revenue sports, including tennis. Tennis shares several structural characteristics with wrestling, including early specialization, international development pathways, and limited professional earning opportunities for most athletes. Many elite tennis players pursue post–high school training or education abroad before enrolling in U.S. colleges. Under current NCAA rules, time spent enrolled in academic institutions outside the NCAA, regardless of competition, may reduce NCAA eligibility, potentially compressing collegiate careers.
As NIL compensation and revenue-sharing opportunities become increasingly tied to NCAA participation, eligibility rules may carry heightened economic consequences for tennis athletes whose development pathways differ from the traditional U.S. high school–to–college model. A judicial reassessment of how the eligibility clock is triggered could expand access to NCAA competition for international and nontraditional tennis players, while also reshaping recruiting strategies and roster management across programs.
More broadly, Ortega v. NCAA illustrates how eligibility rules, once viewed primarily as academic or administrative measures, now function within a commercialized athletic system. Sports such as tennis, which rely heavily on global talent pipelines and offer limited post-collegiate professional alternatives, may be particularly affected by judicial evaluation of NCAA eligibility enforcement.
Conclusion
Ortega v. NCAA is the latest case to highlight the growing tension between traditional NCAA eligibility rules and modern antitrust principles governing labor markets. By focusing on how eligibility limits are applied rather than their existence, the case reflects the continued judicial reassessment of NCAA governance in a post-NIL era. As courts apply Sherman Act scrutiny to eligibility rules alongside compensation restrictions, Ortega v. National Collegiate Athletic Association represents a significant test of whether pre-NIL regulatory frameworks can endure in today’s college sports economy.
Anna Arkadianou is a graduate student at Florida State University.
[1] NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021).
[2] Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
[3] Complaint ¶ 20, Ortega v. NCAA, No. 4:25-cv-00496, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (Dec. 15, 2025).
[4] Id. ¶¶ 20, 40; NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.01.1.
[5] Complaint ¶ 41.
[6] Id. ¶¶ 20, 42.
[7] Id. ¶¶ 14, 43; NCAA Division I Bylaw 12.6.
[8] Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
[9] NCAA Division I Manual § 12.6 (2025–26).
[10] Id. § 12.6.1.
[11] NCAA Division I Manual § 12.6.2 (2025–26).
[12] Complaint ¶¶ 22–25.
[13] Id. ¶¶ 48–55.
[14] Elad v. NCAA, No. 25-1870, 14-16. (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 2025).
[15] Settlement Agreement, House v. NCAA, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2024).
