By Dr. Rachel S. Silverman
A New York court held that a school district was not liable for injuries suffered by a student-athlete and a cheerleader who were attacked after a high school basketball game by unknown spectators and opposing players. Following a varsity basketball game at George W. Hewlett High School (HHS) between HHS and Roosevelt High School (RHS), a group of individuals, described as “strangers,” assaulted basketball player James Lawes III and cheerleader Triniti Jones in a school hallway. The injured students sued the district, alleging negligent supervision and inadequate security.
The court’s analysis focused on two key issues: duty and foreseeability. Mirand v City of New York (1994) established that schools have a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries related directly to a lack of supervision. However, the court emphasized that although schools owe a duty to supervise their own students, this does not apply to third-party spectators. Since the assailants were non-student spectators at an after-school sporting event, the school had no legal duty to control them. This is supported by Jerideau v. Huntington Union Free School Dist. (2005), where the court held that a school was not liable for stabbings following a football game because the District did not have a duty to supervise nonstudent spectators at the game.
The court also found the incident was not foreseeable. There was no history of violence or prior incidents between the schools, and the attackers were unidentified. The District’s Director of Health, Physical Education, and Athletics, David Viegas, testified before trial that prior to that night, he had never been made aware of any prior incidents or altercations between the two schools. Security Aide Thomas Redash testified similarly. Lawes stated that during his prior seasons playing against RHS, there had been no verbal or physical altercations between the team members or the fans. The plaintiffs explained that during the game, there was “belligerent heckling” and “abusive conduct” by unknown spectators and players directed at HHS players. They further argued that there is a general rivalry between the schools, derogatory remarks were exchanged during the game, and the removal of one RHS player from the gym during the game should have provided the District with constructive notice of the assault. The court clarified that general rivalry, heckling, or verbal exchanges during games are insufficient to establish foreseeability (Pitner v Brentwood UFSD, 1998). Courts have held that verbal harassment alone does not establish foreseeability (Sanzo v. Solvay UFSD, 2002). The court also relied on Wood v. Watervliet City School District (2006), which held that foreseeability requires evidence of prior threats or aggressive conduct by the assailant. Similarly, in Dixon v. William Floyd UFSD (2016), the court granted summary judgment where a student was assaulted by non-students, and the district lacked notice of any risk.
To prevail on a negligent security claim, plaintiffs must establish a “special duty,” meaning a specific assurance of protection made directly to them and relied upon. The “special duty” doctrine originated in Cuffy v. City of New York (1987), which established the four-part test for imposing liability on a public entity. Generally, no liability arises from the performance of a governmental function absent a special duty (Bonner v. City of New York, 1989). This principle applies equally to school districts (Bain v. NYC Board of Education, 2000). The four required elements to prove a “special duty” exists are affirmative promise or action, knowledge of potential harm, direct contact, and justifiable reliance. An affirmative promise requires that the school made a specific promise or taken action to protect the individual, not simply provided general security. Courts have consistently rejected negligent security claims where no specific promise of protection was made (Jimenez v. City of New York, 2002). Knowledge of potential harm means school officials must have known that failing to act could lead to harm to that person. There must have been direct interaction between the school (or employees) and the injured person. Lastly, the injured person must have relied on the school’s promise or protection when deciding whether to act or not. All four elements must be present for a valid claim. The court found no evidence of any of the four required elements, and therefore, there was no evidence of a “special duty.” The mere presence of security personnel does not create a special duty (Weisbecker v. West Islip UFSD, 2013), nor do internal policies or guidelines (Valdez v. City of New York, 2011).” In Manning v. Ardsley UFSD (1998), the court similarly dismissed claims arising from a post-game assault due to the absence of a special duty.
The court further noted that conclusory allegations, without supporting evidence, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 1980). Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and dismissed all claims.
Practical Implications
This case reinforces the importance of understanding both the scope and limits of legal responsibility at athletic events. Although schools cannot guarantee students’ safety, administrators should remain proactive in managing crowd behavior, especially during high-risk periods such as post-game. Increased supervision in hallways, exits, parking lots, and other common areas helps reduce the likelihood of similar incidents. Additionally, although internal policies and security protocols may not, on their own, create legal liability, they are essential components of an effective risk management plan. Consistent enforcement of these procedures can help prevent incidents and demonstrate a commitment to safety, which may be important in both legal and practical contexts.
References
Lawes v. Hewlett-Woodmere UFSD (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 2026)
Mirand v. City of New York (1994)
Jerideau v. Huntington UFSD (2005)
Pitner v. Brentwood UFSD (1998)
Sanzo v. Solvay UFSD (2002)
Wood v. Watervliet City School Dist. (2006)
Dixon v. William Floyd UFSD (2016)
Cuffy v. City of New York (1987)
Bonner v. City of New York (1989)
Bain v. NYC Board of Education (2000)
Jimenez v. City of New York (2002)
Weisbecker v. West Islip UFSD (2013)
Valdez v. City of New York (2011)
Manning v. Ardsley UFSD (1998)
Zuckerman v. City of New York (1980)
