By Ruoshan Hu
On January 20, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, holding that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of female students’ unmet interest and varsity-level ability to compete in the relevant sports activities, and therefore concluding that the University of Kentucky did not violate Title IX.
The case arose from a class action brought by plaintiff Elizabeth Niblock under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 against the University of Kentucky, alleging that the University violated Title IX by failing to provide sufficient varsity athletic opportunities for female students in equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse. Chief Judge Sutton delivered the majority opinion of the Sixth Circuit. In addition, Chief Judge Sutton and Circuit Judge Murphy filed a concurring opinion highlighting an alternative analytical approach that reached the same outcome but warranted separate discussion, questioning the continued applicability of the 1979 “Three Safe Harbors” within the current legal framework.
Majority Opinion
The Sixth Circuit rejected Niblock’s appeal and affirmed the district court’s judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary burden, concluding that the University of Kentucky did not violate Title IX. The court explained that, under established principles of burden allocation, Niblock was required to present evidence demonstrating the existence of a sufficient number of female students with both interest and Division I–level ability whose athletic opportunities were not being accommodated by the University’s existing programs. The majority held that the plaintiff failed to carry this burden. The court further rejected Niblock’s argument that the question of interest and ability should be treated as a question of law to be independently investigated by the court. Instead, the majority emphasized that determinations regarding interest and ability constitute findings of fact, not questions of law, and therefore remain the plaintiff’s responsibility to prove. Because Niblock failed to present sufficient evidence of unmet interest and varsity-level ability, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
Under the Department of Education’s 1979 Policy Interpretation governing the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics (the “Three Safe Harbors”), an institution complies with Title IX if it satisfies any one of three criteria: (1) substantial proportionality between athletic participation opportunities and student enrollment; (2) a continuing practice of program expansion for the underrepresented sex; or (3) full and effective accommodation of that sex’s interests and abilities through existing programs. Plaintiff Niblock contended that the University of Kentucky satisfied neither the proportionality requirement nor the program expansion requirement and therefore violated Title IX. The University countered by invoking the third harbor, under which the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating that, in equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse, a sufficient number of female students with Division I–level ability had interests not fully accommodated by the University’s existing athletic programs. Accordingly, whether Niblock could produce sufficient evidence to satisfy this burden became the central issue in the case. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the ground of insufficient evidence.
Concurrence
With respect to the concurring opinion, the Sixth Circuit reached the same outcome as the majority but relied on a different analytical approach. Chief Judge Sutton and Circuit Judge Murphy explained that the case could be resolved without reliance on the Department of Education’s 1979 interpretative guidance governing the application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics, and instead by returning directly to the statutory text of Title IX itself. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex,” and therefore requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged conduct resulted from sex-based differential treatment.
In this case, the evidence presented by the plaintiff did not establish that the University of Kentucky’s failure to sponsor women’s equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse teams was attributable to sex-based discrimination, as the University likewise did not sponsor corresponding men’s teams in those sports. Under these circumstances, the alleged outcome would have remained the same regardless of the plaintiff’s sex, undermining any claim of discrimination on the basis of sex.
The concurrence observed that courts have long relied on the Department of Education’s 1979 Interpretative Guidance when adjudicating Title IX athletics equity cases. This reliance was grounded in then-prevailing administrative-law doctrines, including Chevron deference, under which courts deferred to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions. However, with the rejection of Chevron deference, courts may no longer automatically adopt the Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX solely because it appears reasonable. The concurrence cautioned that courts should no longer heavily rely on interpretative guidance issued by administrative agencies, and should instead prioritize statutory text and judicial interpretation when resolving Title IX claims.
Discussion and Conclusion
The significance of the decision extends beyond the outcome itself. First, the case reaffirms that in Title IX athletics litigation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must present clear and sufficient evidence to support the alleged violation. Speculative assertions based on potential future developments or anticipated impacts are insufficient to establish liability.
Second, the Sixth Circuit made clear that the sufficiency of the evidence in this case constitutes a finding of fact rather than a question of law. Absent a showing of clear error, an appellate court will not disturb the district court’s factual findings, nor will it undertake evidentiary collection on the plaintiff’s behalf.
Finally, the concurrence signals judicial caution toward long-standing reliance on administrative interpretative guidance. Considering the narrowing of deference doctrines in administrative law, courts adjudicating Title IX claims may be less inclined to automatically rely on administrative agencies’ interpretative guidance and instead place greater emphasis on statutory text and existing judicial precedent in the future.
Ruoshan Hu is a doctoral student at Florida State University.
Niblock v. Univ. of Kentucky, No. 24-6060 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 2026).
