By Ahmed Chaib
Introduction
On October 29, 2025, objector–appellant Tyler Phillips filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit challenging the district court’s approval of the proposed class settlement in In re College Athlete names, images, and likenesses (NIL) Litigation.[44] Phillips contends that the agreement fails Rule 23(e)’s requirement that class settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” particularly as applied to non‑scholarship athletes, and that the district court did not sufficiently scrutinize the settlement’s releases and allocations.[45] The appeal refocuses attention on intraclass conflicts, pre‑certification settlement review, and the limits of using categorical proxies (such as scholarship status) to allocate antitrust relief in Division I athletics.
The Objector Appeal
Phillips’s court filing formally objected to the settlement and appealed the district court’s approval order. He argues that the settlement extinguishes the NIL and compensation-for-athletic-services (CAS) claims of walk-on athletes without providing compensation, relies on disputed assumptions regarding whether those athletes suffered competitive harm, and was approved without the heightened scrutiny typically required in the pre-certification settlement context.
Phillips further contends that the settlement draws an unjustified distinction between scholarship and non-scholarship athletes, notwithstanding allegations that both groups suffered the same underlying antitrust injury. He maintains that the district court accepted contested premises regarding the absence of harm to walk-on athletes without conducting a sufficiently searching inquiry, as required when evaluating pre-certification class settlements.
Finally, Phillips frames the allocation and release structure as a representation problem within the settlement process, emphasizing that walk-on athletes were excluded from relief despite timely objections:
“Twenty-five (25) class members…who were walk ons for their respective collegiate football or men’s basketball programs, submitted timely and valid objections regarding the Settlement’s uncompensated release of their BNIL claims.”[46]
Taken together, these objections frame the issues now before the Ninth Circuit regarding settlement fairness, adequacy of representation, and the permissible scope of classwide releases in antitrust litigation involving college athletics.
Background
To contextualize Phillips’s challenge, the underlying litigation alleged that NCAA rules violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by restricting compensation for athletic services and limiting student‑athletes’ ability to monetize their (NIL).[47] The district court approved a settlement exceeding $2.5 billion that combines retrospective damages with forward‑looking injunctive relief governing future compensation frameworks in Division I athletics.[48] The agreement allocates the majority of monetary relief to scholarship football and basketball players while releasing—without compensation—certain NIL and CAS claims asserted by non‑scholarship athletes (including walk‑ons), and it permits continued enforcement of NIL‑related rules subject to specified limitations.
Constitutional and NIL Governance Implications
Beyond procedural and antitrust concerns, Phillips advances a constitutional theory that could reshape NIL governance in college athletics. He contends that because many NCAA member institutions are public universities, the enforcement of NIL restrictions may constitute state action and therefore trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Phillips further argues that historical NIL rules constrained student-athletes’ expressive and associational rights by prohibiting compensation connected to advocacy, promotion, or affiliation, and that such limitations—when enforced by public institutions—operate as unconstitutional burdens on speech.
Phillips also maintains that the district court failed to meaningfully address these constitutional concerns when approving the settlement. In his view, the court did not adequately consider whether public universities’ continued enforcement of NIL-related restrictions implicates protected expressive activity. He further argues that settlement-based reforms do not resolve these constitutional deficiencies if public institutions remain able to enforce materially similar restrictions under the guise of injunctive relief.
If the Ninth Circuit accepts this reasoning, courts may be required to assess whether NIL rules impermissibly burden student-athletes’ expressive or associational rights when enforced by public institutions. Recognition of such constraints could limit the NCAA’s ability to preserve uniform NIL regulation through settlement mechanisms and may increase judicial skepticism toward settlement provisions that authorize continued NIL enforcement by public universities absent a close connection to legitimate educational objectives.
Implications for Antitrust and Class Action Practice
The Phillips appeal raises significant implications for antitrust settlements in the context of college athletics, particularly where heterogeneous classes of student-athletes assert overlapping but not identical economic interests. At its core, the appeal challenges whether a class action settlement may permissibly resolve antitrust claims by compensating some subclasses while extinguishing the claims of others based on categorical distinctions such as scholarship status.
A central issue concerns adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4).[49] Phillips argues that non-scholarship athletes suffered the same alleged antitrust injuries as scholarship athletes but were excluded from damages subclasses solely due to their scholarship status. Acceptance of this argument would require courts to engage more deeply with the economic realities of alleged antitrust injury rather than relying on administratively convenient proxies.
If the Ninth Circuit agrees, the decision would reinforce the principle that subclasses with divergent interests require meaningful structural protection, potentially including separate representation or tailored negotiation. This would complicate the negotiation of global settlements in college sports litigation, where revenue disparities between sports and athlete categories are substantial.
The appeal also underscores the heightened obligations imposed on district courts when approving settlements negotiated prior to formal class certification. Ninth Circuit precedent requires a more probing inquiry in such circumstances, including comprehensive consideration of objections and development of an adequate evidentiary record.
A ruling favorable to Phillips—which could land anytime in 2026—could signal increased appellate willingness to reverse settlement approvals where district courts rely heavily on expert assumptions without resolving contested factual disputes or permitting meaningful objector participation.
Ahmed Chaib is a doctoral student at Florida State University.
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Opening Brief of Objector–Appellant Tyler Phillips at 1–2, In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 25-4137 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). ↑
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Opening Brief of Objector–Appellant Tyler Phillips at 14–18, In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 25-4137 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). ↑
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Opening Brief of Objector–Appellant Tyler Phillips at 35–36, In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 25-4137 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). ↑
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15 U.S.C. § 1; In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW, Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 1–6 (N.D. Cal.). ↑
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Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2–5, In re College Athlete NIL Litigation, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2025). ↑
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). ↑
