Mayfield Loses Again in Litigation against NASCAR

May 4, 2012

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a lower court’s decision to effectively dismiss the claim of a NASCAR driver, who after testing positive for banned substances and being suspended, sued NASCAR and the testing agency for breach of contract and defamation, among other things.
 
In so ruling, the panel found that the lower court “properly dismissed” the claim and did not “abuse its discretion.”
 
The dispute began on May 1, 2009, when a NASCAR official asked driver Jeremy Mayfield to take a random drug test. Inside the testing trailer, Mayfield was instructed on the procedures for providing a urine sample. He claimed that he was told “to select a urine cup from a cluttered non-sterilized table,” which he did.
 
On May 7, 2009, an official called and told Mayfield that his urine sample tested positive for a prohibited substance and asked for Mayfield’s medical records. Mayfield provided his medical records that same day.
 
Mayfield alleged that on May 9, 2009, the results of both tests were forwarded to NASCAR. Later that day, a NASCAR representative informed Mayfield that he was indefinitely suspended from competition as both a driver and an owner.
 
On May 15, NASCAR held a press conference in which officials “stated to reporters that Mayfield was suspended because he took a ‘performance-enhancing’ or ‘recreational drug.’” They further said that the test results were not related to an over-the-counter drug or a prescription medication.
 
Mayfield would ultimately sue for breach of contract, negligence, defamation, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and breach of North Carolina’s Persons with Disabilities Protection Act.
 
In deciding for the defendants, the lower court focused on the document that Mayfield and other drivers sign to compete in NASCAR.
 
The document “requires that both driver and car owner ‘abide by the NASCAR Substance Abuse Policy, and car owner covenants that driver and the team’s crew members are additionally tested for substance abuse under the car owner’s or team’s substance abuse policy,’” wrote the court. “Under the Policy, competitors must submit to random drug tests. All testing is to ‘be done at a facility or facilities . . . that have been certified … . If a competitor tests positive for a prohibited substance, his NASCAR license will be revoked for an indefinite period.’”
 
Furthermore, “NASCAR may publish the results of any test or tests conducted pursuant to this
 
Policy and the circumstances giving rise to such test to such third parties as NASCAR, in its sole discretion, deems reasonable under the circumstances. The Competitor or Official shall have no claim or cause of action of any kind against NASCAR or any director, officer, employee, or agent of NASCAR with respect to such publication.”
 
The lower court also noted a passage that a participant signs off on, which reads that the Policy “promotes the integrity of NASCAR-sanctioned racing and the safety of NASCAR Competitors, Officials, and spectators. Accordingly, I HEREBY RELEASE, DISCHARGE, COVENANT NOT TO SUE, AND AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS NASCAR, its officers, employees, directors, agents, and such testing facilities and Medical Review Officers as NASCAR retains or selects in connection with implementation of the Policy, as well as the officers, employees, and agents of each of them, and any other persons or entities against whom I might have a claim, from and/or for claims, damages, losses, or expenses of any kind, whether caused by negligence or otherwise, arising out of the implementation of the Policy, or any act or omission in connection therewith, including and without limitation, the testing of specimens and the publication of the test results and circumstances giving rise to such test or tests to any third party or parties by NASCAR or said testing facilities or said MRO, as well as the officers, employees, and agents of each of them, or any other persons or entities.”
 
Mayfield appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously granted judgment on the pleadings and improperly denied their motion to reconsider and amend the complaint.
Turning to the district court’s reliance on the liability waiver, the appeals court noted that the plaintiffs “admit that their negligence claim is barred by the waiver. Thus, the only issues are whether (they) also waived the defamation, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims.”
 
The panel noted that the defamation issue had already been decided for the defendants on “other grounds,” leaving the “breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims.” For varying reasons, the court found that the waiver does apply to both claims.
 
Jeremy A. Mayfield; Mayfield Motorsports, Incorporated v. National Association For Stock Car Auto Racing, Incorporated; Brian Z. France; Aegis Sciences;; 4th Cir. ; No. 10-2437; 3/26/12
 
Attorneys of Record: (for Appellants) Tillman Finley, MARINO LAW PLLC, Washington, D.C.,. (for Appellees) David Boies, Helen M. Maher, Olav A. Haazen of BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP, Armonk, New York.
 


 

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