Judge: High School Softball Players’ Constitutional Law Claim Can Continue

Feb 6, 2015

A federal judge from the District of Arizona ruled that a lawsuit brought by several high school softball players against their coach, who kicked them off the school’s team for allegedly not leading a Mormon prayer, can continue. But the court dismissed the claims against the Mesa Unified School District.
 
The three plaintiffs were former members of the 2014 Mountain View High School varsity girls’ softball team in Mesa, Arizona.
 
The plaintiffs alleged four causes of action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
 
Count I alleges a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause against Goodman; Count II alleges a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the School District; Count III alleges a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause against Goodman and the School District; and Count IV alleges a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses against Goodman and the School District.
 
Count I centered on the allegation that the defendants — the coach and school district — allow and promote prayer at Mountain View varsity girls softball games. During the 2013-14 girls softball season, certain players were appointed ‘prayer leaders’ who led a team prayer at the beginning of every game. “Team captain Sidney Ryan announced that these team prayers would cease,” wrote the court, adding that the other two plaintiffs supported this decision. All three players were dismissed from the team. One of the reasons why they were dismissed from the team was that the school district found that they did not respect the religious views of others, according to the court.
 
In addressing Count II, the court noted that The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church) operates a seminary across the street from Mountain View. The School District allows Mountain View students who are LDS Church members to participate in a released time program whereby they are released from school to the LDS Church seminary five days per week for six periods of the day and then readmitted to the school.
 
Count III centered on the plaintiffs’ claim that they were effectively penalized for protected expressive speech in the form of “hip-hop and other popular music” that was played at a softball tournament.
 
Lastly, Count IV centered on the plaintiffs claim that the School District “has rules and procedures that are supposed to be utilized in the event that a student is to be removed from” the softball team, which could be deemed “bullying.” The School District did not comply with these rules when plaintiffs were removed from the softball team, claimed the plaintiffs.
 
In response to the lawsuit, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)6.
 
The court first examined the School District’s argument that all three plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the School District’s released time policy. The court agreed, dismissing Count III. Specifically, it noted that they lack standing “because they fail to allege that the released time policy affected them directly in any way. None of the plaintiffs allege personal exposure to the release time program, that the program caused them any adverse personal repercussions, or that it caused them to alter their conduct.”
 
Next, it considered the Section 1983 claims against the School District. On this point, it again sided with the School District, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not “sufficiently allege that the school district is liable for any alleged Constitutional violations under Section 1983.”
 
The plaintiffs were far more effective against the coach — Joseph Goodman.
 
His central argument was that he is entitled to qualified immunity. In determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity the court must consider (1) whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the government official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. If the answer to either is ‘no,’ the official cannot be held liable for damages.
 
The plaintiffs argued that Goodman’s promotion of student-led prayer at a public school sporting event was clearly unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which involved a high school’s practice of allowing a student to deliver a prayer over the public address system before each varsity football game.
 
“The Supreme Court found that these prayers were government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, because the ‘degree of school involvement’ made it clear that the prayers bore the ‘imprint of the State,’” wrote the court. “The court based this finding on the fact that the prayer was delivered ‘as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school property,’ over the school’s public address system that was subject to school control, and in a setting that was ‘clothed in the traditional indicia of school sporting events,’ which included (among other things) school uniforms that bore the school’s name, a field with the school’s name written on it, and a crowd adorned with school colors. This was unconstitutional because it would cause an objective Santa Fe High School student to ‘unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of approval.’”
 
Goodman sought to differentiate his situation from that in Santa Fe; but the court would have none of it.
 
“Goodman’s argument that government officials are entitled to blanket qualified immunity in cases involving student prayer is untenable,” it held. “Even if defining the contours of the intersection between one student’s First Amendment right to free speech and another student’s First Amendment Establishment Clause rights requires courts and government officials to navigate a ‘legal labyrinth.’ … Thus, assuming the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations and drawing all inferences in their favor, the court cannot conclude that disciplining a student for not conducting a religious exercise was not clearly unconstitutional. Goodman’s motion with respect to Count I will be denied.”
 
Turning to Count III, the court found it premature to make a determination about the nature of the music that was played at a softball tournament, since it was not protected by the First Amendment.
 
“Goodman’s argument that schools can regulate disruptive speech relies on the premise that the speech at issue was disruptive—a fact that is neither alleged in the complaint nor one that can be inferred in the context of a Rule 12(b) motion,” wrote the court.
 
Sidney Ryan, et al. v. Mesa Unified School District and Joseph Goodman, in his individual capacity; D.Az.; 2:14-cv-01145 JWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168775; 12/5/14
 
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiffs) Robert Evan Trop, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Office of Robert Evan Trop, Phoenix, AZ. (for defendants) Robert D Haws, Shelby Mae Lile, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Gust Rosenfeld PLC – Phoenix, AZ.


 

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