By Dr. Kyle Conkle, Assistant Professor of Sport Management, University of North Alabama
In Cortez Braham, Jr. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the court was put into position to consider whether several NCAA eligibility rules violated federal antitrust law and whether the plaintiff, a Division I football player, was entitled to injunctive relief. Braham, a first-generation college student and athlete, began his career at Hutchinson Community College in 2019 and later transferred to West Virginia University and then finally to the University of Nevada, Reno. Due to COVID-19 disruptions and NCAA eligibility restrictions, by 2025 he had exhausted his eligibility under the NCAA’s “Five-Year Rule” and was declared ineligible for the 2025–2026 season. Braham, who was represented by Gregg Clifton of Lewis Brisbois, filed suit challenging three rules: the Five-Year Rule, the 2-4 Transfer GPA Rule which requires JUCO transfers to maintain a 2.5 GPA as opposed to the 2.0 GPA required for other transfers, and the Rule of Restitution which allows the NCAA to retroactively penalize athletes and schools who participate under a court order later overturned. Braham alleged these restrictions constituted unlawful restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to restore his eligibility.
The court analyzed the request for injunctive relief under the four-part test in Winter v. NRDC. This included the likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. Regarding the first prong, the court rejected the NCAA’s argument that eligibility rules are noncommercial, noting that the commercial realities following NCAA v. Alston, including NIL compensation and direct athlete payments, transform eligibility rules into restraints that impact the Division I football labor market. The court found the Five-Year Rule to be anticompetitive because it restricts access to Division I opportunities, particularly disadvantaging JUCO athletes whose pathways may be limited. Moreover, the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications, including preserving the uniqueness of college athletics and aligning academics with eligibility, were deemed insufficient under a rule of reason analysis.
On the second prong, the court determined Braham faced irreparable harm, emphasizing that the loss of a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” to compete at the Division I level and to capitalize on NIL and professional opportunities could not be compensated through damages. The balance of equities also weighed in his favor regarding whether the personal harm to the athlete outweighed the NCAA’s interest in strict rule enforcement. Finally, the public interest supported granting relief because allowing competition promoted fairness and reflected the modern commercial landscape of college athletics.
Consequently, the court granted Braham’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing the Five-Year Rule, the 2-4 Transfer GPA Rule, and the Rule of Restitution against him. The decision underscores the growing willingness of courts to subject NCAA eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny in light of the evolving economics of college sports, especially as they relate to NIL opportunities and athlete mobility. It further signals a potential shift in judicial treatment of JUCO athletes, who have historically faced heightened transfer and eligibility restrictions.
As for significant takeaways, the court rejected the idea that NCAA eligibility rules could be insulated from antitrust review simply by being framed as educational or grounded in amateurism. It emphasized that the realities of modern Division I athletics demonstrate that eligibility rules operate in a commercial marketplace which includes NIL opportunities, multimillion-dollar media contracts, and the economic value tied to athlete participation. Because these restrictions directly shape labor conditions and limit athlete mobility, they must be evaluated as restraints of trade under the Sherman Act.
Within that framework, the court concluded that rules like the Five-Year Rule and the 2-4 Transfer GPA requirement function as anticompetitive barriers. The Five-Year Rule arbitrarily truncates an athlete’s competitive window regardless of personal circumstances, while the GPA requirement imposes tougher academic thresholds on JUCO transfers than those applied to other students. These restrictions disproportionately affect community-college athletes, who frequently rely on Division I competition as a critical route to visibility, scholarships, and professional advancement. In effect, the rules narrowed access to the market, constrained athlete choice, and reinforced existing structural inequities.
Another point of emphasis was that the court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated irreparable harm, a key element in securing injunctive relief. Unlike financial disputes, the opportunity to compete at the Division I level represents a singular, time-sensitive experience that cannot be recreated once lost. Exclusion from play forecloses the chance to translate athletic performance into NIL endorsements or professional scouting opportunities which signify losses that cannot be adequately compensated with damages. Recognizing the finite nature of athletic careers, the court held that denial of eligibility constitutes a unique and irreparable injury under the Winter test.
Finally, the NCAA’s traditional defenses like preserving amateurism, maintaining competitive balance, and aligning athletics with academics were deemed outdated and unconvincing. The court noted that the monetization of NIL rights and the decline of the amateurism model undermine the credibility of these justifications. Moreover, the NCAA offered no concrete evidence showing that the contested rules advanced educational integrity or consumer demand. By weakening these long-standing rationales, the decision reflects an ongoing judicial shift away from deferring to the NCAA’s regulatory authority and toward recognizing the commercial realities of college athletics.
This ruling carries significant implications for the future of college athletics, both in the courtroom and in the operations of athletic departments. By framing eligibility restrictions as restraints on economic opportunity, the decision is likely to embolden athletes to challenge a broader range of NCAA policies. These challenges will not be limited to football given that basketball and other revenue-generating sports where NIL value and mobility are critical are also poised to see increased litigation.
The ruling also highlights the growing judicial skepticism of the NCAA’s traditional defenses. Broad appeals to amateurism, academic alignment, or competitive balance are no longer sufficient without concrete evidence that restrictive rules directly advance those goals. As courts demand more rigorous justifications, the NCAA’s regulatory power is likely to weaken further, pressured not only by litigation but also by legislative efforts at both state and federal levels. This shift suggests that the organization will need to narrow or reform its eligibility bylaws or face continued invalidation through case law.
Equally important is the court’s recognition that eligibility restrictions cause irreparable harm by cutting athletes off from NIL and professional opportunities. This acknowledgment strengthens the legal standing of athletes’ economic rights and creates momentum toward a system where participation in college sports is more clearly tied to professional pathways. Over time, this development could expand athlete bargaining power, open broader access to economic opportunities, and reshape the role of college athletics as a pipeline to professional competition.
In addition, by granting individualized injunctive relief rather than sweeping reform, the court demonstrated how athletes can secure tailored remedies against specific rules without dismantling the NCAA framework in its entirety. While this case-by-case approach may appear incremental, the accumulation of such rulings has the potential to transform the eligibility landscape, producing a collection of precedents that steadily redefine athlete rights and weaken the NCAA’s position of authority.
For athletic departments, sport managers, and policymakers, the practical significance is paramount. Compliance strategies and athlete support systems must adapt to an evolving legal environment. Rules that were once viewed as unquestionable are now vulnerable to antitrust attack, particularly when they inhibit athlete mobility or economic participation. In conclusion, institutions must move beyond reactive approaches, adopting forward-looking strategies that safeguard both compliance and the rights of their athletes.
