Dr. Kyle Conkle
John Doe 2, a student athlete at North Carolina State University (NC State) from 2020 to 2021, alleged that while seeking treatment for hip and groin pain that he was sexually abused by the university’s Director of Sports Medicine, Robert Murphy. Murphy’s treatment involved unauthorized touching of Doe’s genitals under the guise of medical care. Prior to Doe’s allegations, Head Soccer Coach Kelly Findley reported to Senior Associate Athletic Director Sherard Clinkscales that he suspected Murphy was engaging in “sexual grooming” of male student-athletes. This report was critical because it formed the basis for the claim that the university had “actual notice” of potentially wrongful sexual conduct. Doe filed a Title IX suit alleging that NC State was deliberately indifferent to complaints about Murphy’s misconduct. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the allegations failed to establish that the university received actual notice of sexual harassment, particularly because the report described “suspected” rather than confirmed misconduct. Consequently, the issue observed warranted a determination on whether a report describing “sexual grooming” by a school employee is sufficient to constitute actual notice of sexual harassment under Title IX, which would subsequently obligate the university to take corrective action.
The Fourth Circuit then vacated the district court’s dismissal holding that a report of “sexual grooming,” when described in a manner suggesting wrongful, sexually motivated conduct can objectively be inferred as alleging sexual harassment. However, the appellate court remanded the case so the district court could determine whether the complaint adequately pleaded that the report was made to an official with the appropriate authority to address Title IX complaints.
Regarding the actual notice requirement under Title IX, an educational institution must have had actual notice of sexual harassment for liability to be imposed. Actual notice is met when an appropriate official receives a report that can objectively be understood as alleging sexual harassment, regardless of whether the official initially interprets it as such. And while “grooming” can be interpreted in various ways, when modified by “sexual,” it conveys a pattern of predatory behavior designed to exploit trust and authority. The court found that Findley’s report of Murphy engaging in “sexual grooming” of male student-athletes carried sufficient factual implications to be reasonably construed as alleging current sexual harassment.
The university argued that the report was merely a statement of suspected conduct lacking factual detail and that the report’s timing (dating back to 2016) was insufficient to establish notice of conduct in 2021. The court rejected these points, emphasizing that the duty to investigate is triggered by the receipt of any report that a reasonable official would construe as alleging Title IX prohibited sexual harassment. Although the district court assumed without deciding that Clinkscales had the requisite authority, the appellate court declined to resolve that issue on remand. The court noted that it is not its role to second-guess the district court on such matters at this stage.
Given that the district court’s dismissal was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings, the court now must decide whether Doe adequately alleged that the report was made to an official with the authority to address sexual harassment complaints and whether Doe should be granted the ability to amend his complaint if necessary.
Implications from this case are many. First, the ruling clarifies that a report containing the term “sexual grooming” may suffice to trigger a university’s duty to investigate under Title IX. The decision underscores that even allegations based on “suspected” conduct can be enough if a “reasonable official” would interpret them as alleging sexual harassment. Second, regarding potential responsibility, educational institutions must be cautious in dismissing complaints that use terms like “sexual grooming.” The decision reinforces that institutions have an obligation to investigate such reports rather than waiting for more detailed factual allegations. Third, for plaintiffs, this decision may make it easier to survive initial dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in Title IX cases by showing that reports of sexual grooming can establish actual notice. This could influence how future cases are framed and argued, pushing for more inclusive interpretations of what constitutes “notice”. Fourth, universities might need to revisit their policies and training protocols regarding the handling of sexual misconduct complaints. The decision suggests that any report that can be reasonably interpreted as alleging sexual harassment must be taken seriously and promptly investigated. Lastly, in the Fourth Circuit, this case sets a precedent for interpreting “actual notice” broadly in Title IX cases. Future courts may rely on this decision to assess the sufficiency of allegations in similar contexts, potentially leading to heightened institutional accountability.
