Federal Judge Sides with TCU in Litigation Involving Roster Spot on Basketball Team

Sep 30, 2016

A federal judge from the Northern District of Texas has dismissed the claim of a student athlete, who sued Texas Christian University (TCU), several athletic department officials and the TCU Board of Trustees, claiming the defendants breached a contract when they did not file the proper paperwork with the NCAA to make him eligible, upon transferring from Texas A&M University — Commerce (TAMU — Commerce), to immediately compete on the TCU basketball team.
 
During the 2013-2014 academic year, plaintiff Joshua Brown was a football player at TAMU — Commerce. In August 2014, he sought and received a release from the school to transfer to another university. Among the options that Brown pursued was TCU, which he and his father contacted about Brown playing basketball for the Horned Frogs for the 2014-2015 academic year. According to both parties in the case, TCU did not solicit or recruit Brown to play basketball for its team.
 
Unable to reach the head basketball coach, Trent Johnson, Brown and his father contacted Chris Tifft, one of Johnson’s assistant coaches. According to Brown, Tifft informed Brown that he would have to sit out for one year before being eligible to compete for the TCU basketball program. When asked by Brown’s father as to whether TCU would file a special-circumstances waiver request on behalf of Brown with the NCAA, Tifft informed the Browns that TCU would file the waiver request if Brown could provide evidence showing that he met the criteria required by the NCAA to qualify for such a waiver. If TCU filed the waiver and it were granted by the NCAA, Brown would have been immediately eligible to compete in basketball games for TCU. A question remained, however, about whether Brown provided all the required evidence for the waiver to Tifft or Johnson.
 
According to Brown, he was admitted to TCU three days after his meeting with Tifft. Affterward, Tifft allegedly informed Brown that he would be immediately placed on the men’s basketball team with full rights and privileges. But without the NCAA waiver, Brown would not be allowed to compete for the TCU basketball team for the 2014-2015 season. Brown did not have an athletic scholarship to play basketball for TCU, nor does Brown ever allege that one was offered to him. By definition, Brown was a walk-on basketball player for TCU.
 
Once enrolled at TCU, Brown or Brown’s father made several complaints, including:
 
Brown’s not being listed on the roster;
 
Brown’s being referenced as a “walk-on”;
 
own’s biographical information not being updated; and
 
a coach’s confiscating Brown’s hat because Brown wore it in the basketball conference room.
 
 
Brown’s father also began persistently contacting the NCAA and TCU’s assistant athletic director, Ike Ukaebgu, about receiving a waiver for Brown. Ukaebgu told Brown’s father to send documents supporting the waiver request to Ukaebgu, but that he needed approval from Johnson to file the waiver. Ultimately, Ukaebgu informed Brown’s father that Johnson said “no” to filing Brown’s waiver with the NCAA. Brown then continued to complain about basketball-related issues to other members of TCU’s staff. At a certain point, Tifft called Brown’s father about Brown’s excessive complaining and also to tell Brown’s father to address his concerns with Tifft and not others at TCU. Brown’s father indicated that his family’s religious beliefs require them to “go directly to the source first when we are having a problem,” according to the complaint.
 
On November 14, 2014, Brown sent a formal letter to Johnson to request that Johnson make a decision concerning the approval of the waiver filing. On November 15, Johnson requested a meeting with Brown about the letter and its contents. Johnson asked if he wrote the letter, and Brown responded that he did not write the letter, but was aware of its contents. Johnson met with Brown and his parents on November 16. At this meeting, Johnson informed the Browns that if he heard anything else about the waiver that he would kick Brown off the team. According to Brown, he was never allowed to participate in any team activities following the meeting with Johnson.
 
Brown alleged that in early April 2015, a member of TCU’s basketball staff ordered Brown to provide his login information for access to the student portal. Brown claimed that an email was sent by someone pretending to be Brown in order to request a change in Brown’s dorm assignment. On April 14, Tifft informed Brown that he would not be on the TCU basketball team for the 2015-2016 season because of a reduction in the number of players on the team’s roster. When Brown asked what the appeal process was, Tifft informed Brown that there was no appeal process from such a decision. Brown and his father then complained to Christopher Del Conte, the athletic director, about Brown’s being unfairly removed from the team and sought a written explanation from Johnson as to why Brown was removed. Del Conte responded by sending a letter to the Browns, stating that Johnson wished to reduce his roster by one player. According to Brown, Johnson stated that Brown was not good enough to compete at the Division I college level, but also admitted that Brown was not the worst player on the team. According to Brown, he is better than one “white” player on the team and this means he has been discriminated against by his coach, Johnson. Brown also stated that the white player is related to a former TCU football coach and keeping this player on the team instead of Brown constitutes “nepotism” in violation of the law.
 
In August 2015, TCU informed Brown that his original dorm assignment had been cancelled by the athletic department and Brown was assigned to a different dorm room. Brown complained that his new dorm room did not have equal amenities as compared to his original dorm room–the one he was assigned when he was a member of the basketball team. Brown charged that this violates the Fair Housing Act.
 
Brown was afforded two grievance hearings, which were unsuccessful. Afterward, Brown continued to complain to various TCU officials seeking reinstatement on the basketball team and requesting the video recordings of all practices held at the Dry Ranch retreat. On October 21, 2015, Brown filed a lawsuit in federal court, seeking declaratory relief under the following claims: Discrimination; Fair Housing Act; Constitutional Right to Privacy; Retaliation; TCU Student-Athlete Grievance Policy; and Breach of Contract. The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss.
 
Brown has failed to meet the required standing elements regarding the 2014-2015 season. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant Brown’s requested declaratory relief as it relates to Brown’s eligibility and TCU’s failure to file the special-circumstances waiver for the 2014-2015 season.
 
First, the court determined that Brown lacks standing as it relates to the special-circumstances waiver and his eligibility for the 2014-2015 season. Brown also does not have standing to pursue the remaining claims that relate to events surrounding that season and beyond. The defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a viable claim.
 
First, the court addressed Brown’s nepotism, harassment, and public-humiliation claims. As the defendants point out, there are no legally recognized causes of action for nepotism, harassment, or public humiliation, and Brown does not cite any authority to support these claims.
 
Next, the court considered Brown’s slander and defamation claims. In order to establish defamation under Texas law, a plaintiff “must prove that the defendant: (1) published a statement of fact (as opposed to opinion); (2) that was defamatory concerning Plaintiff; (3) while acting with negligence regarding the truth of the statement; and (4) the statement was false. Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (N.D. Tex. 2010)
 
“Here, Brown does not allege facts supporting any of the elements of defamation. Instead, he alleges that being cut from the team by the defendants implied that he was the worst player or that he had committed a horrific act. Brown fails to cite, and the court is not aware, of any cases where the act of kicking someone off a team gave rise to a viable defamation claim. If that were the case, the courts would be flooded with sports litigants. The court recognizes that one could infer from Brown’s being cut from the team that he was the worst player or that he was such a headache to the coaching staff that his removal was simply addition-by-subtraction regardless of Brown’s ability. But it is just as easy to infer a non-defamatory reason for the decision, such as the team’s needing to reduce its numbers. In any event, a valid claim requires a defamatory statement of fact. No such statement is involved in the act of removing someone from the team. Accordingly, the slander and defamation claims must be dismissed.”
 
Similarly, the court dismissed the Brown’s claim that TCU did not follow its grievance policy, that it retaliated against him and that it violated the Fair Housing Act regarding his dorm assignment.
 
In his last claim, Brown alleged that the defendants breached their contract with him after they “lured” him to TCU with an agreement that he “would be a member of the men’s basketball team with full rights and privileges for the 2014-2015 academic year and basketball season and that a special circumstances waiver would be filed with NCAA if evidence supporting such could be produced.”
 
He also claimed that “he detrimentally relied on TCU’s promise of full participation.
 
“In order to establish a claim for detrimental reliance, a party must show: (1) that the defendant made a promise, (2) that the plaintiff’s reliance on this represented promise was reasonable, and (3) that the plaintiff’s reliance caused a change in position to its detriment. Roxco Ltd. v. Harris Specialty Chems., Inc., 85 Fed. Appx. 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2004). Brown, however, contradicts this claim … in his amended complaint when he admits that he didn’t approach TCU until he had “sought and received his release from A&M Commerce. Thus, Brown has not alleged that he gave up anything at A&M Commerce or otherwise changed his position to his detriment to come play basketball for TCU. Brown fails to state that a promise by TCU was a condition precedent to Brown’s seeking a release and forfeiting his scholarship to attend A&M Commerce. Consequently, Brown’s breach-of-contract claim must be dismissed.”
 
Joshua Brown v. Texas Christian University Board of Trustees, et al.; N.D. Tex.; CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:15-CV-791-Y, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108619; 8/19/16
 
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se, Cedar Hill, TX. (for defendants) Rory M Divin, LEAD ATTORNEY, McDonald Sanders, Fort Worth, TX; James Thomas McBride, McDonald Sanders PC, Fort Worth, TX.


 

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