A federal judge from the Western District of Texas has dismissed the claim of a former Texas State University (TSU) basketball player, who alleged that the university and several individual defendants at the school conspired to take away his scholarship and deny him his Constitutional rights.
In so ruling, the court wrote that “nowhere in this endless barrage of paper does (plaintiff Basil Brown) state a claim for the violation of any recognized Constitutional right or demonstrate liability on behalf of any of the 13 defendants he sues.”
The impetus for Brown’s lawsuit, which also named Athletic Director Larry Teis and several coaches as defendants, was TSU’s decision to remove Brown from the basketball team and terminate his scholarship.
The events leading up to the defining action began in July 2011, when Brown was participating in a mandatory team workout with the TSU basketball team. During one of these workouts, TSU was hosting a basketball recruit who Brown claimed kicked him in the groin.
This injury was allegedly so debilitating to Brown that he sought accommodations from the school months later, which he claimed the university denied.
The injury continued to allegedly impact Brown’s playing time, so much that he was passed on the depth chart in the fall of 2012. The plaintiff allegedly met with the coach and asked him why he was passed. After this meeting, the coach allegedly said he was removing Brown from the team.
On January 13 2013, Brown’s parents filed a formal complaint with TSU’s president, but claimed that the matter was never investigated. Later that spring, TSU hired a new head coach, Danny Kaspar, who formally dismissed Brown, leading to the lawsuit.
Brown, proceding pro se, alleged a number of causes of action including Constitutional violations, violations of federal statutes, and common law claims. Specifically, he alleged: (1) violations of various National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Rules; (2) violation of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title IV); (3) breach of contract; (4) retaliation; (5) violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); (6) violations of Brown’s Constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (7) violations of Brown’s Constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (8) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (9) “discrimination of one”; (10) disability discrimination; (11) collusion; and (12) gross negligence.
As for relief, he asked the court for: (1) damages—liquidated, compensatory, and punitive; (2) an order reinstating Brown on the TSU basketball team; and (3) an order reinstating Brown’s athletic scholarship.
On November 18, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the claims. In a lengthy opinion, the court granted the motion and addressed each of the claims.
Of relevance, the court noted that Brown is suing a number of different defendants, which may be protected from suit in federal court by the doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity. Both TSU and the Texas State University System Board of Regents (TSUS) are immune, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, to the extent Brown is suing the individual defendants in their official capacity, those claims are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
“Even if the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the suit, however, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability as well as from suit,” wrote the judge, citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994).
Turning to Brown’s allegation that the defendants violated NCAA rules, the court found that “to the extent Brown brings this claim against TSU and TSUS, these defendants are shielded from suit by sovereign immunity, and to the extent he sues the individual defendants in their official capacity, these claims are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”
In addition, in making his claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, “Brown fails to show how violations of NCAA Rules amount to conduct violating a clearly established Constitutional right. In other words, qualified immunity protects the individual defendants from these claims of NCAA Rules violations.
“In the alternative, Brown cites no authority—and the court is unfamiliar with any authority—indicating violations of NCAA Rules may provide the basis for a cause of action in federal court. On these grounds, Brown’s claims also fail.”
Among the other claims addressed by the court was Brown’s allegation that all of the defendants breached a contract with Brown when they: “(1) refused to pay the Plaintiff’s medical bills for surgeries due to injuries sustained while participating in men’s basketball at TSU according to policy, (2) denied the Plaintiff access to Summer I or Summer II under his men’s basketball scholarship even though summer school is an extension of his athletic scholarship from the previous academic year as the plaintiff had already notified TSU of his intention to attend summer school in March 2013, (3) failed to provide the plaintiff with a grant-in-aid agreement that contained language conforming to the renewal letter submitted, and agreed, to by the plaintiff on July 3, 2013 after the deadline for a scholarship reduction had already expired on July 1, 2013.
“Under Texas law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) there is a valid, enforceable contract; (2) the plaintiff performed, tendered performance of, or was excused from performing its contractual obligations; (3) the defendant breached the contract; and (4) the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff injury. Winchek v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 232 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).”
Similar to the above claim, immunity shielded all the defendants, except individual defendants in their individual capacities. But here, Brown “fails to show how violations of the terms of an athletic scholarship—assuming for the moment the scholarship constitutes a contract between the parties—amounts to conduct violating a clearly established Constitutional right.”
While the court picked apart each aspect of the plaintiff’s claim, it offered the following pointed summary of its decision:
“Brown has occupied significant resources of this court since he filed his lawsuit on June 5, 2013. Brown’s multitude of motions—all of which have been denied—include, five motions for temporary restraining orders, two motions for preliminary injunctions, motions to amend this court’s orders, motions to reconsider this court’s orders, multiple complaints, multiple emergency motions to compel, and so on and so forth. Nowhere in this endless barrage of paper does Brown state a claim for the violation of any recognized constitutional right or demonstrate liability on behalf of any of the 13 defendants he sues. While the court does not doubt the sincerity of Brown’s belief he has been wronged by the actions of Texas State University and its employees, this passion does not give this court jurisdiction over his dilemma. Nor does this belief excuse his refusal to acknowledge the obvious, which should have been clear to him from the moment his first motion for a TRO was denied on the grounds he failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits: the federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claims, and his allegations, as pled, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As it were, he has persisted, undaunted by this court’s orders, and in so doing has occupied substantial amounts of the court’s time, effort, and expenses, not to mention those of Texas State University and its employees.
“In the court’s view, this case should be closed, and while the court has considered imposing Rule 11 sanctions and attorneys’ fees to be paid by Brown to the defendants, the court ultimately decided against it, hoping instead Brown might receive this Order as his wake up call.”
Basil Brown II v. Texas State University System Board of Regents, et al.; W.D. Tex; Case No. A-13-CA-483-SS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173818; 12/12/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se. (for defendants) Michael James Patterson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the Attorney General, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX.
