By Erica J. Zonder & Emily J. Houghton
Background
Tuskegee University hired Mia Maxwell in 2021 to serve as the Title IX Coordinator. At the time of her hire, the Title IX coordinator reported to the university General Counsel. The reporting structure was later changed so that the Title IX coordinator reported to the Chief Operating Officer.
In August 2023, Maxwell filed a lawsuit against Tuskegee University and two employees, Reginald Ruffin (Athletic Director and Head Football Coach) and Kymberly Holland (Coordinator of Alumni Affairs and Reunion Programs). The complaint alleged discrimination, harassment, and intimidation under Title VII, retaliation under Title VII, retaliation under Title IX and libel and slander in Violation of Alabama Code §6-5-18.
In September 2023, Maxwell was suspended following an investigation into a complaint that she provided alcohol to students and started a verbal altercation with a fellow employee. Maxwell was then fired in October 2023, due to the altercation which violated university policy and further because the university allegedly discovered that the plaintiff had not reported that she received confidential information from another employee (who was also subsequently fired).
Count 1: Discrimination, Harassment and Intimidation in Violation of Title VII
Maxwell alleged several different incidents that led to discrimination, harassment and intimidation. The first incident arose in summer 2022, when Maxwell brought the non-renewal of a student athlete scholarship to Ruffin’s attention. The plaintiff claimed that an email in which Ruffin stated “this is going to get ugly” (Complaint, 2023, *22) amounted to gender based harassment. When Maxwell brought an accusation of sexual harassment about an assistant football coach to Athletic Director Ruffin she alleged he made sexist comments about how women on campus dress and how women cause problems for men (Complaint, *25). In August 2022, Ruffin sent an email to Tuskegee President, the General Counsel and Maxwell asking for clarification on the Title IX investigation into the assistant football coach in which he allegedly made false statements about instructions the plaintiff gave to the assistant football coach. After receiving that email, Maxwell filed a complaint with the human resource office at Tuskegee University (Complaint, *30). She alleged that the emails and in person conversation were harassment and discrimination. The university investigation into her complaint against Ruffin was closed due to insufficient evidence. In November 2022, Maxwell filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, receiving a “right to sue” letter in June, 2023.
The court (Magistrate Judge Recommendation) focused on two elements of Maxwell’s amended complaint specifically for Title VII harassment/hostile work environment – whether Ruffin’s conduct was based on gender; and whether Ruffin’s conduct was severe or pervasive. Regarding the emails, the court found that they “cannot be deemed gender-based so as to amount to Title VII harassment” (Maxwell v. Tuskegee, 2025a, p. 6), as nothing in the phrase “this is going to get ugly,” nor the rest of the email, contains any sort of sexual/gender-based connotation. The court similarly found that the second email did not contain such language nor would it support an inference that Ruffin would have used different language had Maxwell not been a woman (see Ambus v. Autozoners, 71 F.Supp. 3d at 1300). The court found Ruffin’s statements about female students’ dress could be serve as a “necessary predicate” for a harassment claim based on gender, as the 11th Circuit had previously found that gender specific comments can constitute harassment even if not directed at the alleged victim (see Reeves v. CH Robinson Worldwide, 594 F.3d at 811-13), leading to an assessment of whether the severe/persuasive requirement is met. Viewed in context, the court found that these statements could at most be characterized as an isolated offensive utterance, as the statements did not egregiously violate social norms nor repeatedly occur (p. 6). And further, all of Ruffin’s conduct (emails, statements) occurred over a one-month span and did not permeate Maxwell’s two year period of employment.
Count 2: Retaliation in Violation of Title VII
Maxwell alleged that her firing resulted from retaliation for filing the harassment claims with the university and the EEOC and for her desire to follow university process when a rape allegation surfaced. The complaint states that the general counsel pressured her to expel the accused student from the university. Instead, Maxwell attempted to follow the grievance process but the general counsel expelled the student before it was complete (Complaint *39).
Furthermore, the complaint alleged that the general counsel continued to interfere in the plaintiff’s job duties by hosting a town hall meeting with students (Complaint *41) and not allowing the plaintiff to answer questions as the Title IX coordinator, continuing to meet with students on Title IX matters, and moving into the office next to the plaintiff. This allegedly undermined Maxwell’s ability to do her job as Title IX coordinator and presented a conflict of interest for the university with the general counsel attempting to oversee Title IX issues.
Maxwell also argued that the failure to pay for the expenses she incurred for practicing law in state of Alabama which she was instructed to do because the newly hired general counsel had not yet met the requirements is a retaliatory act (Complaint, *51).
Per the court, the burden of persuasion is upon Maxwell to demonstrate that her protected activity was the “but-for cause” of the alleged adverse action by the employer. And further, based on her summary judgment opposition, that court said that it “appears” she is basing her retaliation claim on her termination following her filing of an internal complaint against Ruffin, and the subsequent EEOC filing (p. 7). However, there are intervening events, i.e. the altercation (including verbal threat) with another employee, and also the non-reporting of the sensitive email. The University’s disciplinary action guidelines allow for termination for breach of policy, which includes fighting or serious breach of acceptable behavior. The court rejected Maxwell’s argument that her burden was to merely demonstrate that retaliation was a motivating factor, as mixed motive theory only applies to Title VII discrimination claims, not retaliation claims (Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health, 82 F. 4th at 1338, citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v Nassar), and she failed to meet the but-for burden here. The court also noted that failure to pay bar application bar fees and other forms of retaliation were not argued in her summary judgment opposition and was therefore waived.
Count 3: Retaliation in Violation of Title IX
Maxwell alleged that Athletic Director Ruffin retaliated against her during two different Title IX investigations. According to the complaint, he used “threatening language” to intimidate her in a student-related Title IX investigation and separately “falsely accused” Maxwell of “misrepresenting university policy” in a case against an assistant football coach (Complaint, *57). In addition, Maxwell argued that the failure to reimburse for fees associated with getting certified in the state of Alabama as a lawyer, the taking of office space Maxwell used for Title IX trainings and hearings, and interfering with the Title IX grievance process of other parties amounts to retaliatory conduct (*58).
The court, as with the Title VII retaliation claim, similarly found that the evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, again noting the intervening events. All other potential examples were not argued in opposition to summary judgment (see above).
Count 4: Libel and Slander in Violation of Ala. Code §6-5-182
The final count alleged that the Athletic Director and the Coordinator of Alumni Affairs, made defamatory comments about Maxwell to third parties. Per Maxwell, in the email inquiring about the process related to the assistant football coach, AD Ruffin’s comments were false and damaging regarding her management of a Title IX claim and therefore were causing harm to her professional reputation (Complaint *64). The email was sent to the President, General Counsel, and Maxwell herself. The comments from the Alumni Coordinator were made in a discussion with a university board member (who happened to be Maxwell’s former college roommate),
stating that Maxwell “lied” about her complaints against Ruffin, also causing harm to her professional reputation.
In regards to the defamation claim against Ruffin, the court found it was”clear” from the plain language that the email contains nothing that could be construed as defamatory (p. 11). And then further, the email was not published to a third party – it was an email by the AD of the university to the president, general counsel, and Title IX coordinator of the university about the work status of an employee of the university. “Communications among the managerial personnel of a corporation about the company’s business do not constitute publication” (see Dixon v. Econ. Co. among others) therefore falling outside the scope of actionable defamation under Alabama law (p. 11). Regarding the statement made by Alumni Coordinator Holland to Trustee Knight, the court found it less clear that this was in furtherance of official business, as both parties worked for the university, or was more personal conversation arising from the relationship between the two parties. As such, the court held that absent any special damages flowing from the private conversation between Holland and Knight, Maxwell can proceed only with a showing of slander per se, and “nothing” in the brief conversation between the two parties can be construed as such (p. 13).
Conclusion
The Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgement be granted in its entirety against all three defendants. Maxwell filed timely objections, all of which were subsequently overruled and the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge was adopted. Of additional note concerning the retaliation claim(s), was the import of intervening events between Maxwell’s suspension and termination – an independent investigation that determined Maxwell failed to report she had received confidential information in violation of university policy – which also breaks the causal chain between Maxwell’s alleged protected activity and her termination (Maxwell v. Tuskegee, 2025b, p. 4).
References (partial)
Maxwell v. Tuskegee et al, Case 3:23-cv-00472 (M.D. Ala. August 23, 2023).
Mia Maxwell v. Tuskegee Univ., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168924 *; 2025 LX 319586 (Aug. 29, 2025a).
Mia Maxwell v. Tuskegee Univ., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188723 (Sept. 25, 2025b).
Erica J. Zonder, J.D., M.S. is a Professor of Sport Management at Eastern Michigan University
Emily J. Houghton, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Sport Management at Minnesota State University, Mankato
