Court Rules for NCAA and American University in Concussion Case Involving Field Hockey Player

Jul 31, 2020

A federal judge from the District of Columbia has granted the summary judgment motions of the NCAA and American University (AU) in a case in which one of the school’s student athletes claimed the two aforementioned defendants, and other defendants, were negligent in their handling of a field hockey-related concussion she suffered in September 2011.
 
In the same opinion, the court denied the U.S. Federal Government’s motion for summary judgment.
 
By way of background, plaintiff Jennifer Bradley claimed she “was hit in the head during a field hockey game between AU and Richmond University.” Subsequent to that hit, she allegedly began experiencing symptoms of a concussion arising from previous head injuries. Yet, she continued participating in field hockey practices and games based on the alleged advice of the team physician, until she suffered the aforementioned blow that ended her career.
 
She subsequently sued the NCAA, the Patriot League, the Government, AU, and others in Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The litigation was consolidated into federal court in the District of Columbia.
 
In the ruling, the district court found the plaintiff failed to show that the NCAA was the proximate cause of her injury, thus dismissing the negligence claim. Specifically, it wrote that “there is nothing of a factual nature in the record to support the plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that the NCAA did anything that was the proximate cause of her injuries.”
 
As for AU, the court wrote that the plaintiff’s negligence and medical malpractice claims can’t go forward against the university because she signed a waiver, acknowledging the risk.
 
Elaborating, it agreed with the university that “because the Acknowledgement of Risk form signed by the plaintiff applies to injuries arising from inherent risks of the sport, such as concussions, as well as the subsequent treatment of such injuries, the university (is) entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law,” Univ. Defs.’ Mem. at 20, and “concludes that the District of Columbia would apply its normal rule enforcing waivers that are clear and unambiguous,” Jaffe I, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 110. Because the waiver signed by the plaintiff “meets these criteria, the plaintiff’s claims of negligence and medical malpractice claims against the University defendants are therefore barred.”
 
Lastly, it turned to the Government’s motion for summary judgment, rebutting the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and medical malpractice.
 
The Government argued that because the team physician “was the borrowed servant” of a private practice, vicarious liability arising from his alleged negligent diagnosis “falls squarely” on him and his practice. The court disagreed, noting that it previously addressed the argument earlier in the litigation. It reasoned that because “whether one party is the ‘sole master to whom liability can attach . . . is usually a question of fact, generally to be decided by the jury,’ Chang v. United States, Civ. Action Nos. 02-2010 (EGS), 02-2283 (EGS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49405, 2007 WL 2007335, at *12 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (quoting Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 216, 220, 184 U.S. App. D.C. 324 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), the court must deny the Government’s motion for summary judgment.”
 
Bradley v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al.; D.D.C.; Civil Action No. 16-346 (RBW); 5/29/20
 
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Matthew Andrew Naci, PAULSON & NACE, PLLC. (for defendant NCAA) J. Christian Word, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Kevin Andrew Chambers, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP & Sarah M. Gragert, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP; (for defendant PATRIOT LEAGUE) Daniel C. Costello, WHARTON, LEVIN, EHRMANTRAUT & KLEIN, P.A. & Michelle R. Mitchell, WHARTON, LEVIN, EHRMANTRAUT & KLEIN, P.A. (for defendant AMERICAN UNIVERSITY) Christine Frazier Hein & John J. Murphy, III, WALKER, MURPHY & NELSON, LLP. (for defendant MARYLAND SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER) H. Kenneth Armstrong, ARMSTRONG, DONOHUE, CEPPOS, VAUGHAN & RHOADES, CHARTERED & Mary Kathleen Fallon, ARMSTRONG, DONOHUE, CEPPOS, VAUGHAN & RHOADES, CHARTERED (for defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) Derrick Wayne Grace, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


 

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