Court Dismissed Owner’s Claim against Former Coach, IFL League Commissioner

Dec 14, 2012

A federal judge from the District of Nebraska has dismissed the claim of a minor league football team and its owner, which alleged that a former employee, now with another team, improperly accessed his email that was stored on Yahoo!, Inc., an Internet service provider.
 
In so ruling, the court found that the plaintiff failed to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
 
The plaintiffs in the case are Gridiron Management Group, LLC, an Omaha, Nebraska-based company, and Jeffrey Sprowls, a member and owner of Gridiron. Gridiron owned and operated the Omaha Beef, a member of the Indoor Football League (IFL). Sprowls ran the Beef’s day-to-day operations.
 
The defendants are the Allen (Texas) Wranglers, also a member of the IFL; Patrick Pimmel, the former coach of the Beef and the Wranglers; and Thomas Benezio, former commissioner of the IFL.
 
Sprowls maintained private electronic accounts with Yahoo!, Inc., an internet service provider. Those accounts contained both personal and business information. Sprowls was the sole authorized user of those accounts; and he did not provide any of the defendants with the means to access them, according to the court. Sprowls also maintained personal and business information electronically on one or more computers that he and/or Gridiron owned.
 
“Sometime in 2011, Pimmel, at Benezio’s direction, began using unauthorized means to gain access into Sprowls’s electronic accounts,” wrote the court. “This allowed Pimmel to gain unauthorized access to Sprowls’s electronic accounts on more than 100 separate occasions. After gaining access to Sprowls’s accounts, Pimmel viewed Sprowls’s private electronic communications and disseminated them to Benezio. Benezio did not warn or inform Gridiron or Sprowls that those accounts had been accessed.”
 
Gridiron and Sprowls sued on June 18, 2012, alleging seven causes of action. Specifically, the defendants claimed that: “(I) all the defendants engaged in fraud in connection with computers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030; (II) all the defendants engaged in unlawful access to stored communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701; (III) all the defendants engaged in conduct in violation of Nebraska’s Telecommunication Consumer Protection Act, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 86-2,104 and 86-2,110; (IV) Wranglers and Pimmel engaged in conduct in violation of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-601, et seq.; (V) all the defendants tortiously interfered with a valid business expectancy held by Gridiron; (VI) Benezio breached a fiduciary duty owed to Gridiron and Sprowls by virtue of his position as commissioner of the IFL; and (VII) Benezio acted negligently by failing to inform Gridiron and Sprowls that Pimmel was accessing Sprowls’s electronic accounts and by disseminating the information he received.”
 
The defendants claimed that Pimmel accessed, without authorization, their private electronic accounts and disseminated their “private, proprietary information.”
 
The court expanded on the aforementioned Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), noting relevant case law.
 
“Athough a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 629-30 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Rather, the complaint must set forth ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ Id. at 630 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
 
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). Courts must accept . . . specific factual allegations as true but are not required to accept . . . legal conclusions. Outdoor Cent., Inc. v. GreatLodge.com, Inc., 643 F.3d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading that merely pleads ‘labels and conclusions,’ or a ‘formulaic recitation’ of the elements of a cause of action, or ‘naked assertions’ devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice. Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint’s factual allegations must be ‘sufficient’ to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).”
 
The court continued: “Gridiron and Sprowls have alleged that Sprowls was the sole authorized user of his private electronic accounts and that Pimmel intentionally gained access to those accounts and disseminated the information he obtained. They have alleged that Pimmel did so knowingly, and with the intent to defraud. They have not, however, alleged any facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that they suffered from more than the ‘mere disclosure of information,’ Landmark Credit Union v. Doberstein, 746 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993 (E.D. Wis. 2010), or that they have suffered a ‘loss.’”
 
Gridiron Management Group LLC, Jeffrey Sprowls v. Allen Wranglers, Thomas Benezio, Patrick Pimmel; D. Neb.; CASE NO. 8:12CV3128, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150020; 10/18/12
 
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiffs) Michael J. Mullen, BURNS LAW FIRM, Omaha, NE. (for defendant) Lauren R. Goodman, Patrick E. Brookhouser, Jr., MCGRATH, NORTH LAW FIRM, Omaha, NE.; David M. Slaby, PRO HAC VICE, PAULE, CAMAZINE LAW FIRM, St. Louis, MO; Joel E. Feistner, Thomas M. Locher, LOCHER, PAVELKA LAW FIRM, Omaha, NE.


 

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