By Jeff Birren, Senior Writer.
Sterling Carvalho was the head football coach at Kahuka High School from 2018 through 2024. It appears from media accounts that the father of one player publicly criticized Carvalho. Carvalho confronted the player who subsequently complained to school authorities. Following an investigation, Carvallo was terminated in March 2025. He sued Keith Hayashi, Superintendent of Hawaii State Department of Education; “Complex Area Superintendent Samuel Izumi”, who terminated him; Tavian “Manoa” Hallums, the student who complained about Carvalho; Manao’s father, Kalani Hallums, “Kalani”; twenty Doe Defendants; and ten Doe Agency Defendants. He claimed a breach of contract and defamation. Carvalho sought both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to allow him to immediately resume coaching. The Court denied both motions, because Carvalho failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of either claim, there was no showing of irreparable harm, nor would an injunction serve the public interest. (Carvalho v. Keith T. Hayashi, Hawaii Circuit Court, First Circuit, Civil No. 1CCV-25-00011368 (JJK), 2025 Haw. Trial Order LEXIS 323 *; 2025 LX 320255 (8-1-2025)).
Court Proceedings
Carvalho filed the Complaint on July 14, 2025. The Court held an in-person conference on July 18, 2025. Hayashi, and Izumi, “collectively ‘State Defendants’” filed an opposition to the motions on July 25, 2025. The hearing took place on July 28, 2025. Carvalho called five witnesses. The State called one.
Opinion
The Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statute Section 603-21.5 and venue was proper due to Section 603-36. Hayashi failed to appear as a witness for Carvalho, “since he was not subpoenaed to appear.” The Court made eighty-four findings of fact. Most are a single sentence.
Findings of Fact
Manoa played varsity football under Carvalho during the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 seasons. The State Department of Education classifies all head coaches, including Carvalho, as a “causal hire.”
Every coach must annually re-apply by submitting a signed form, undergo an annual background check, and if hired, sign an employment contract. Each contract is good for a single year unless the coach resigns or is terminated. A coach can be terminated for “cause”, such as a “material breach” of contract, “inappropriate conduct” or insubordination. The Coach is required to become familiar with and adhere to the Athletic Handbook and policies. In 2022 and 2023 he signed the employment contract that was counter-signed by Athletic Director Yamagata.
In December 2023, Carvalho learned that Manoa filed a complaint with the Department of Education. The investigation began in January 2024. The Department’s Human Resources Director, Nanette Hookano, conducted the investigation. She interviewed eighteen witnesses. Carvalho declined her request for an interview. Hookano completed the investigation in November 2024 and gave a copy to Carvalho and Izumi. The report recommended that Carvalho be held accountable. During the investigation, Yamagata offered Carvalho a written contract for the 2024 season. Yamagata executed the contract, but Carvalho did not. He was allowed to coach that season. The employment period ran until June 30, 2024, and he received his full salary.
Yamagata met with Carvalho in January 2025 although he was aware that Carvalho had not yet met with Izumi. Carvalho was told that was if he was to return, he would have to change his offensive coaching staff. At the hearing, Yamagata testified that he did not offer Carvalho a contract for 2025, nor were any other employment terms discussed.
Carvalho met with Izumi in February 2025. By letter dated March 31, 2025, Izumi informed Carvalho that after reviewing the HR report, its supporting documentation, and Carvalho’s statements during their meeting, he was terminating Carvalho. Carvalho’s defamation claim was based on the March 31, 2025, letter, because Izumi wrote that Carvalho “was not remorseful, not respectful and that Plaintiff created a hostile environment, which was false.”
Izumi also gave the letter to the school principal, the Education Department’s Director of Human Resources, and the Office of Talent Management. This “followed protocol.” A copy was also sent to Carvalho’s prior attorney. Carvalho agreed that giving the letter to the school principal and his former attorney was appropriate.
Carvalho was a public figure, given “his success on the field and his sterling reputation in the community.” He testified that it would be “speculative to state what the impact on the team” would be if he did not coach that season. However, he contended that the “public interest” was limited to the players and those seeking his return as a coach.
Carvalho assumed that he had been hired for the 2025 season because Yamagata “had performed his evaluation.” Yamagata testified that Carvalho was not given a written contract, did not attend the annual July mandatory meeting, nor was he invited to attend. He was not provided with the annual mandatory packet, and another person was hired to be the head coach.
Conclusions of Law
This section contains seventy-three separately numbered paragraphs.
- Standard of Review
Carvalho moved for both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent his termination “without a showing of adequate and just cause” and without the opportunity to contest the termination, present evidence, examine witnesses and make “arguments [on] his own behalf.” He also sought an injunction to “enjoin and restrain the Defendants” and others “from continuing to utter, publish and distribute defamatory statements about Plaintiff.”
It was an uphill battle. “An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Morgan v. Planning Dept., Cnty of Kauai, 104 Hawaii 173, 188, (2004).” The Court evaluates (1) “whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable damage favors the issuance of a temporary injunction; and (3) whether the public interest supports granting the injunction. Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156,158, (1978.)”
Carvahlo sought reinstatement of his position as coach. Such an injunction “compels one to perform an affirmative act to do or undo a previous act. Stop Rail Now v. DeCosta, 120 Hawaii 238, 244, (App, 2008).” Mandatory injunctions that go beyond maintaining the status quo are “particularly disfavored and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Stop Rail Now, 120 Hawaii at 244, quoting Wahba, LLC v. USRP (Don), LLC, 106 Hawaii, 446, 472 (2005).” The injunction to enjoin further defamatory statements is a “prohibitory injunction” and is not subject to the higher standard. Carvalho did not seek injunctive relief against Manoa or Kalani.
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
- Breach of Contract Claim
The Court found that Carvalho had not “established” a likelihood of success on the merits. His breach of contract claim required him to “prove” the “following elements: (1) The existence of the contract; and (2) Plaintiff(s’) performance [unless excused]; and (3) Defendant’s(‘s) failure to perform an obligation under the contract; and (4) Defendants’(s) failure to perform as a legal cause of damage to plaintiff(s’); and (5) the damage was of the nature and extent reasonably foreseeable by defendant(s) at the time the contract was entered into. Hawaii Civil Jury Instruction No. 15.8.”
The “the pivotal question here is whether a contract existed for Plaintiff to coach the KHS football team for the 2025-2026 season.” In the absence of that contract, “the Court cannot afford Plaintiff the relief he seeks”. Carvalho failed to convince the Court that there was a contract. Carvalho did not introduce into evidence the supposed 2025 contract, failed both to complete a reapplication process undergo a background check. Thus “no express contract exists.”
Carvalho insisted that he had an oral contract based on the January 2025 meeting during his post season evaluation meeting. Yet there “is no evidence” that “the parties discussed contract terms sufficient to constitute a valid and binding offer.” As a result, there “was no “meeting of the minds” nor “mutual assent to any terms.” Yamagata testified that at “no time” did they “discuss contract terms” and Carvalho did not sign a new contract. “Acccordingly, the Court concludes that no oral contract exists” for the 2025 season.
Similarly, no employment contract “can be implied” for the 2025 season. An implied contract need not be expressed, but an obligation may be created “where a person performs services for another, who accepts the same” but where it was not intended to be gratuitous, or based on the other person’s request. Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling Inc., 105 Hawaii 490, 504 (2004).” The plaintiff must show either that the defendant requested such services or assented to receiving the services “under circumstances negativing any presumption that they would be gratuitous.”
Nothing suggests that the Defendants requested Carvalho to serve as coach for the 2025 season. “In fact, AD Yamagata’s testimony establishes the opposite.” No contact terms were discussed during any post season meetings. Carvalho was not invited to the mandatory meeting where contracts were handed out and was not offered a contract. It is incontrovertible that the school hired someone else to coach the team in 2025. The Court “cannot conclude that an implied contract” existed.
Consequently, the Court could not find “that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his Breach of Contract claim.” Carvahlo insisted his termination was improper because it failed to “consider Plaintiff’s own statements, public opinion or inconsistencies in how Manoa stepped down as team captain”. For this purpose, it did not matter, “because a non-existent contact” cannot be breached. Moreover, even if the termination was improper, “the only contract in effect at the time of the termination (March 31, 2025) was the 2024 Employment Agreement, which would have expired on its own terms on June 25, 2025.”
B. “Plaintiff Has Not Established a Likelihood to Prevail on the Merits of Defamation Claims Against State Defendants
Carvalho sued the State Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. This had an “oops” from the beginning. “The defamation claim against State Defendants in their official capacities is a claim against the State and is therefore barred by HRS §§ 662-2 and 662-15(4). See Makanui v. Dept’ of Educ., 6 Haw. App, 397, 406 (App. 1986).” He cannot demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on claims that are barred by statute. (These statutes will also apply to the Doe Agency Defendants.)
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This left him with claims against the same defendants but in their individual capacities. The only supposedly defamatory statements identified by Carvalho were contained in the termination letter sent by Izumi on March 31, 2025. In Hawaii, this tort has four elements: a false or defamatory statement concerning another, an unprivileged publication to a third party, negligence if the plaintiff is a private figure, actual malice if the plaintiff is a public figure, and “either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Nakamoto v. Kawauchi, 142 Hawaii, 259, 270 (2018).”
The problems commenced from there. The termination letter was only sent to Carvalho, the school principal, the Education Department’s Director of Human Resources, and the Office of Talent Management. Carvalho failed to prove that the State Defendants made false statements about him to a third party. There was no showing that sending the letter to the Principal or Human Resources was not privileged. “Without more, Plaintiff cannot sustain a defamation claim against State Defendants in their individual capacities.” Such liability requires “clear and convincing proof of malice or improper purposes.” This is determined by the “reasonable man standard” with “clear and convincing proof.”
It was “unlikely” that Carvalho would prevail against the Superintendent as there was no evidence that the Superintendent published it to anyone. The only identified communication was sending the investigation report to Carvalho’s counsel “which Plaintiff concedes was appropriate.” He was also unlikely to prevail against Izumi “as uncontroverted evidence shows the termination letter (and the investigation report) were disclosed only to (state personnel) who required access in their official roles.” This “was a privileged publication as part of his official duties.” There was no evidence that Izumi acted “unreasonably and therefor with malice to undermine the State Defendants’ qualified privilege defense.”
Furthermore, Carvalho qualified as a “public figure” and therefor “must demonstrate ‘actual malice’ by clear and convincing proof. See Rodriquez v. Nishiiki, 65 Haw. 430, 438 (1982); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).” The Court was “not persuaded by Plaintiff’s self-serving allegation that the State Defendants acted maliciously.” Community members had sent in letters of support for Carvalho, but they “lacked personal knowledge as to the relevant interactions between Plaintiff and Manoa.” The Court did not find any evidence that the termination letter was publicly disseminated” or that the report itself “rises to the level of actual malice.” He failed to demonstrate he would prevail on the defamation claim and consequently failed to satisfy the first prong of the injunctive relief standard.
III. Irreparable Harm
The second prong is whether the balance of irreparable damages favors the issuance of an injunction. Financial loss “by itself does not constitute irreparable harm.” An injury “is irreparable where it is of such a character that a fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law. Penn. v. Transportation Lease Haw., Ltd., 2 Haw. App. 272, 276 no.1 (App. 1981).” Carvalho asserted that losing his job in these circumstances “will permanently affect (his reputation and likely prevent (him) from ever again coaching football in Hawaii.” This is speculative “because Plaintiff testified that he has not attempted to seek employment” with another school so no application had been rejected. He “appears to suggest” that the “irreparable harm is borne on the students and the Kahuku community who/which are denied his leadership towards success, but even Plaintiff admitted at the evidentiary hearing that such a notion was speculative in nature.” Having some public support does not constitute irreparable harm.
IV. Public Interest
This prong requires a showing that the requested injunction serves the public interest. Carvalho insisted that this was shown by the public opposition to his termination and that there was evidence that he had a “good reputation.” However, requiring the school to abide by contract terms “where no contract exists, and to force the school to breach the contract with its current head football coach, does not serve the public interest.” The Court found “on balance” that “the public interest does not tip in favor of either party.” The Court denied the motions for a TRO and a preliminary injunction.
Editorial
Carvalho’s camp has been vigilant on social media. He lost the motions in court but has been active trying to win in the court of common opinion. Counsel can expect to see an ever-increasing usage of social media and must take this into account in jury selection.
It is hard to glean the underlying facts relating to Manoa’s complaints, but it is easy to see that Carvalho’s two claims face serious challenges. All is not well when after an evidentiary hearing, the judge opines that a party is not likely to prevail on the merits. Judges are probably not impressed by claims that are barred by statute. Lawyers should counsel coaches to exercise extreme caution when confronting a student who has filed a complaint, and schools can expect to be sued by a fired coach, or by the student if the coach is not fired.
The motion with its relative thin evidentiary support may cause some to wonder what were the odds that the Court would grant injunctive relief. After the ruling, Carvalho’s counsel admitted to the press that “it was a long shot.” (“Attorney for former Kahuku football coach says battle not done.” Christian Shimabutu, Aloha State Daily, August 4, 2025). There was no shot. It takes a contract to bring a contract claim, and privileged, and legally required communications rarely forms the basis of a successful defamation suit. On the other hand, Carvalho now has a road map to buttress his Complaint. This season he has the time.
