A Georgia court of appeals has declined to put the brakes on a lawsuit brought by the family of a 6-year-old girl, who was struck by a foul ball, while attending an Atlanta Braves game, and subsequently sued the team.
The Braves had sought to overturn a trial court’s decision not to grant baseball team’s motion for a declaratory judgment. The declaratory judgment would have recognized the baseball rule in Georgia and would have likely absolved the team of any liability in the case. The rule provides that a team has satisfied its duty of care, but shielding some seats from foul balls and making those seats available to the public.
The incident leading to the litigation occurred on August 30, 2010, when plaintiff M. F., a six-year-old girl, was sitting with her father behind the visitors’ dugout at a Braves at Turner Field. The plaintiff was struck by a foul ball, causing a skull fracture and brain injuries. M. F.’s parent and guardian sued the Braves and three other defendants for negligence on July 16, 2012.
After the trial court denied the Braves’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment, the Braves moved for a declaratory judgment as to the applicable standard of care. The trial court denied this motion, but granted the Braves’ application for interlocutory review, leading to the instant opinion.
The appeals court noted that there is safety netting behind home plate, which protects 2,791 of the stadium’s 49,856 seats. But the netting does not extend to the seats directly behind the dugouts on either side of the field. “Although a Braves representative testified that M. F. and her family would have been free to move to unsold protected seats behind home plate by notifying an usher, the same representative testified that a surcharge would apply to seats purchased in this way,” wrote the court.
Turning to the Declaratory Judgment Act, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq., the appeals court cited case law from the state’s Supreme Court:
“While it has often been said that our declaratory judgment statute … should be liberally construed, it manifestly was never intended to be applicable to every occasion or question arising from any justiciable controversy, since the statute does not take the place of existing remedies.” Mayor of Athens v. Gerdine, 202 Ga. 197 (1) (42 SE2d 567) (1947). Thus “a declaratory judgment is not the proper action to decide all justiciable controversies.” Porter v. Houghton, 273 Ga. 407, 408 (542 SE2d 491) (2001); see also Fortson v. Kiser, 188 Ga. App. 660 (1) (373 SE2d 842) (1988) (although OCGA § 9-4-2 (c) authorizes declaratory relief even when a party has other legal remedies, “that statute obviously does not require the availability of such relief”).”
The appeals court continued, noting that “a party seeking such a judgment ‘must establish that it is necessary to relieve himself of the risk of taking some future action that, without direction, would jeopardize his interests.’ Porter, 273 Ga. at 408. Thus “a declaratory judgment action will not lie where the rights between the parties have already accrued, because there is no uncertainty as to the rights of the parties or risk as to taking future action.” Thomas v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 253 Ga. App. 199, 201 (1) (558 SE2d 432) (2001)
“Here, the event giving rise to the Braves’ potential liability has already occurred, and a declaratory judgment is not the proper means by which to test their defense that their observation of the baseball rule, or some variant of it, satisfied their duty of care to plaintiffs.”
One other issue that could surface as the litigation continues is whether the exculpatory language applies to youths.
The Atlanta Journal Constitution recently noted:
“In 1984, the state Court of Appeals declined to dismiss a lawsuit filed on behalf of an 8-year-old boy whose teeth were knocked out when he was struck by a foul ball at Atlanta-Fulton County Stadium. The case settled before going to trial.”
Meanwhile, the Atlanta attorney representing the plaintiff was pleased with the decision in his case.
“We, of course, agree with and appreciate the Court of Appeals’ decision to allow the case to continue,” said Mike Moran. “We believe there is no compelling public policy reason for courts to grant the Braves and their owner Liberty Media de facto immunity from claims when children are seriously injured in these seats.”
Atlanta National League Baseball Club, INC. v. F. F. et al.; Ct. App. Ga.; A14A0398.,
2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 507; 7/11/14
Attorneys or Record: (for appellant) Schiff Hardin, Leah Ward Sears, Ronald B. Gaither, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Bradley S. Wolff, Pamela N. Lee. (for appellees) J. Matthew Dwyer, Jr., Law & Moran, Peter A. Law, E. Michael Moran, Amanda L. Evans, for appellees.
