By Jeff Birren, Senior Writer
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently held that a football player’s training injury claims were barred by the State’s legal barrier to sports negligence claims. It reversed the denial of a motion for summary judgement and directed the trial court to grant summary judgment to the University of Indiana, (“IU”). IU’s strength and conditioning (S&C”) coaches told Chris Bradberry to use a resistance band and to use the post of a machine “to hold the resistance bands in place.” He followed instructions. The band flew off, hit Bradberry in the eye, and caused him to permanently lose sight in that eye. Indiana provides “enhanced protection against liability” and his claims were rejected as a matter of law. The Trustees of Indiana University v. Chris Bradberry, et. al., Court of Appeals of Indiana, Case No. 25A-CT-284 (12-29-2025).
Background
Football “is a violent, high force contact sport.” It requires “strength, speed, mobility and stability” training. IU’s staff were “highly qualified and experienced professionals.” Bradberry was participating in a “voluntary” workout in 2022. The players were told “to perform resistance band face pulls.” It “is generally performed by pulling resistance bands that have been secured to a fixed post toward the face.” The S&C coaches used a “Woodway machine to hold the resistance band in place.” Woodway machines are treadmills with a belt attached to add resistance. “It is undisputed” that the “machines are not designed” to be used for face pulls but the S&C coaches “determined” that the treadmills could be used this way. Two bands were placed over the post. “Since many football players like Bradberry were taller than the six-foot post, they were further instructed to perform the exercise in a split-stance lunge position to keep the bands parallel to the ground.”
Bradberry was injured when “the bands slipped over the top of the post and struck him in his left eye. He suffered significant life-altering injuries, including irreversible damage to his left retina. He is legally blind in that eye”. He “suffers from regular eye strain-inducted headaches. He has already undergone three surgeries because of his injuries and may to have corrective surgeries in the future.” Bradberry sued IU for “negligence and reckless and intentional misconduct. His parents asserted a claim for loss of services.” He claimed that using the “Woodway configuration was ‘totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in playing the sport of football.’”
IU sought summary judgment, arguing that this type of “freak sporting accident” does not create liability in Indiana. Bradberry responded by stating that the S&C staff “intentionally designed, planned, and executed a strength, training exercise that was reckless, consciously indifferent to player safety, and totally outside the range of normal activity in football.” He supplied a report and affidavit from an expert “who concluded” that having “resistance bands looped over an open post and not tied off or anchor [ ] was reckless in nature [ ] and was likely to lead to a facial injury to a player.”
At the hearing, Bradberry further asserted that the S&C coaches were not “participants in this sporting events [,].” The trial court agreed because “no coach was spotting [him] or directly instructing him.” It denied the motion but certified its order for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals “accepted jurisdiction.”
Standard of Review
That Court reviews orders granting or denying summary judgment de novo and applies the same standard as the trial court. “Indiana places the initial burden on the moving party” to show there “are no genuine issues of material fact” and thus is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” If that happens, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party” to produce evidence establishing the existence of a triable fact. All doubt as to the facts or reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-moving party, but the trial court’s findings and conclusions do not “bind” the Court of Appeals.
Indiana Law
The Court’s springboard was a State Supreme Court case, Pfenning v. Lineman, et al, 947 N.E. 2d 392 (Ind. 2011.) (The first time the Court of Appeals cited Pfenning it used an incorrect cite, 974 N. E. 2d 292.) A sixteen-year-old novice golfer was struck by a golf ball as she sat in a cart, one without a roof or plexiglass window. The defendant golfer whose errant shot struck her and the defendant golf course both prevailed on summary judgment. The company that furnished the golf cart, and the estate of her grandfather, the person that signed her up for the event, had their summary judgments overturned. The Court engaged in multiple pages of review of decisions from cases across the country before turning to Indiana law.
Pfenning stated that Indiana’s approach in sports negligence cases was intended to promote “participation in athletic activities and [] discourage excessive litigation of claims by persons who suffer injuries from participants’ conduct. Pfenning, 947 N. E. 2d at 403”. At first blush, a sports negligence case has the same three requirements, duty, breach, and that the breach proximately caused the injury that exist in every negligence claim. The Court acknowledged that a heightened burden of proof in sports-negligence cases was created by courts, not the legislature. There is “no duty” as “a matter of law” when engaging in conduct that is “ordinary” in the sport. Indiana is thus very friendly to defendants seeking summary judgement as courts can rule as a matter of law, even determining whether specific conduct is “ordinary.” Pfenning “blurred the distinction between intentional, reckless and negligent conduct that causes sports injuries.”
Bradberry “was engaged in sports activity” when he was injured. The parties disagreed as to what sport he was engaged in. IU said Bradberry was participating in weightlifting. Bradberry countered that he was a football player, such that his behavior “should be analyzed” as part of the football program. This asserted difference was “immaterial”. Weight training is “an essential part of the sport.” Next came an analysis of the “three main points of contention.”
“Sports Participation Under Pfenning”
Pfenning created a significant shield for those participating in sports, but the question was whether the S&C coaches were “sports participants.” Bradberry did not make this assertion until oral argument, so IU claimed that he waived this contention per In re C. G. 157 N. E. 3d 543, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). IU had an opportunity make its counter arguments and submit “their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law”, so there was no waiver. It did not matter: the S&C coaches were participants. In C. G, a “coach aggressively blocked another player’s shot and the ball hit C. G. in the head. Id. at 544-45.” That coach was a participant, and as were IU’s S&C coaches. Bradberry attempted to distinguish C. G. by pointing out that the basketball coach was actively involved in the practice. Here, one S&C coach “was not observing the face pull or providing instruction” while the other was across the room.” This was not good enough for the Court.
Neither “Pfenning nor any other case applying it has held that a participant must have been directly involved in the physical activity before invoking Indiana’s sports negligence framework.” Tippecanoe Sch. Corp. v. Reynolds, 187 N. E. 3d 213 (Ind. App. Ct. 2022), “held that ‘an analysis’” of the coach’s behavior “are subsumed by a review of whether the coach was intentional or reckless in her conduct.” Id. at 220. The “Bradberys effectively ask us to reach a conclusion different than Reynolds and hold that the decisions made by IU’s S&C coaches in designing, implanting, and supervising the face pull exercise were outside the ambit of Pfenning”. They did so because the specific activity was not pre planned, but was created that day, when the normal procedure did not suit their intentions. The S&C coaches thus made an “immediate decision” that related to the injury.
“To read an ‘immediacy’ requirement into Pfenning” would “undermine the policy goals behind Indiana’s sports’ negligence framework.” Coaches should not be liable “for ordinary coaching decisions, nor should they ‘fear that judges will later conduct arm-chair-quarterback their every move.’” Megenity v. Dunn, N. E. 3d 1080, 1084 (Ind. 2017). This applies both to game time decisions but also planning and preparing practice sessions. The S&C coaches were sports “participants” even if they were not “spotting him at the time, nor able to “intervene at a moment’s notice.” Their “conduct must be analyzed under Pfenning.”
“Ordinary Conduct”
The “face pull exercise” was not “foreign to football”. Bradberry insisted that the “Woodway configuration” was not the proper way to perform the exercise. Perhaps not, but the Court believed that the specific “turns on the sport generally [,] not the activity specifically”, Megenity, 68 N. E. 3d at 1083. In Megenity, a karate student performed a drill improperly and “hit the bag with such force that Megenity” was injured. The State Supreme Court used its fear of arm-chair judges and held for the kicker and not the injured student. It “was ordinary, even if was contrary to protocol.” Id. at 1084.
The Court seemed surprised that the plaintiffs “ask us to parse nuances of the decisions made by IU’s S&C coaches, who had decades of combined playing and coaching experience.” Never mind, apparently, that the Bradberry’s expert opinioned that this was an improper way to perform face pulls. Nor was the Court bothered that there were safer ways to perform the exercise. Thus, “even if taking as true for the purposes of summary judgment that the way the S&C coaches had Bradberry perform face pulls was not technically correct nor the safest available option, that does not create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the face pull exercise is generally ordinary in the sport.” The coaches’ actions and supervision may have been inappropriate, but it was not out of the ordinary. Reynolds, 187 N. E. 3d, at 219. Therefore, the Court would not engage in the “judicial armchair-quarterbacking the Pfenning sports negligence framework was designed to avoid.”
“Recklessness”
The Bradberry’s presented no argument that the “S&C coaches intended to injure Bradberry,” so the Court confined its analysis “to whether there is any evidence in the record that they did so recklessly. A plaintiff “must prove three elements: (1) the sports participant who caused the injury intentionally acted or intentionally failed to act; (2) in doing so, they were consciously indifferent to the injured party’s safety; and (3) their ‘particular conduct—including state of mind—[fell] ‘outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.” Megenity, 68 N. E. 2d at 1085, quoting Welsh v. Young, 950 N. E. 2d 1283, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
“[O]ur State Supreme Court opinions provide little clarity as to what constitutes recklessness in this context. Pfenning simply said that a golfer’s failure to yell ‘fore’ after hitting an errant shot” could not support a claim of recklessness. Pfenning, 947 N. E. 2d at 405. The Megenity defendant “consciously disregarded” his classmate’s safety, but that did not suffice. 68 N. E. 3d at 86 (emphasis in the original.) Court of Appeals decisions “applying the Pfenning/Megenity framework have had even less to say in this issue.” Reynolds and C. G. did not involve recklessness allegations. The Court consequently turned to “guidance” from cases that pre-dated Pfenning. Recklessness entails a “conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions.”
One opinion stated that a sports participant “will be considered to have acted in a reckless disregard of the safety of another” if “’he does an act, or intentionally fails to act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical hard to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.’ Mark v. Moser, 746 N. E. 2d 410, 422, (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (Am. Law. Inst. 1965), disapproved on other grounds by Pfenning, 947 N. E. 2d 392, cited favorably by Megenity, 68 N. E. 3d at 1985.” It gave examples that would satisfy this standard, including head-butting an opponent, biting the ear of an opponent during a boxing match, tossing a baseball bat into the opposing team’s dugout, or flinging a golf club, and hitting another player, “albeit in frustration.”
Bradberry’s expert “presented evidence that the Woodway configuration was ‘reckless’ in the sense that it was ‘likely to lead to a facial injury.’” However, recklessness “requires an unreasonable risk of injury substantially greater” than that which would make the behavior negligent.” There was no evidence that the S&C coaches “were aware of the inherent danger associated with the Woodway configuration.” Both testified that they had never experienced this consequence from either their instructions or personal exercises. “Critically, none of the designated evidence supports the conclusion that the S&C coaches were motivated by an indifference to player safety. The post that had been used had caused the bands to fray. The shift to the Woodway configuration might have been “technically unsafe” but it “was motivated by player safety.”
This failure might have “been enough to survive a summary judgment motion” using a negligence standard, “but proving recklessness requires a showing that a participant’s conduct be ‘pursued with knowledge and indifference that an injury is probable.’” There is nothing “in the record that IU’s well qualified, highly experienced S&C coaches were consciously indifferent to a substantial risk of injury” when using the Woodway configuration. Bradberry’s claims failed as a matter of law. The Court stated in a footnote that because his claims failed, so, too, did his parents’ claim for loss of services.
Editorial
In most other states the heightened standard of proof is typically referred to as “primary assumption of risk” in sports cases. Indiana uses different words to get to the same end point. One wonders if this court-created doctrine for sports “participants” is applied in grade-school gym classes when the injured minor had no choice but to participate in the activity. After all, if misuse is “generalized” then apparently it becomes legally acceptable and nothing in the opinion suggests that it is limited to college students. One of the S&C coaches had a “PhD. in sports science.” Should not such a person when teaching students be held to a higher standard than children playing kickball?
The Court twice mentioned its refrain about not engaging in “judicial arm-chair-quarterbacking” in sports. Courts do this every single day in virtually all activities. Complex eye surgery is vastly more complicated than using resistance bands, but courts are not reluctant to rule in medical malpractice cases, even though it is likely that more of Indiana’s corps of judges participated in gym classes than attended medical school. The opinion’s list of “reckless” behavior, including biting an opponent’s ear or tossing a baseball bat or golf club at a competitor are typically intentional torts, though seemingly not in Indiana. Consequently, think long and hard about bringing sports injury cases in Indiana.
The decision is consistent with prior Indiana opinions, but the Court piled on. The opinion expressed not a word of sympathy for Bradberry but went out of its way to praise IU’s S&C coaches. Despite their years of experience, they failed to spend a mere ten seconds tying the bands to the machine. That would have prevented the injury, and it was “undisputed” that they used a configuration that has not intended by the machine’s manufacturer. Their lack of knowledge of “the inherent danger” of their behavior was their safety net. The Court acknowledged that Bradberry had presented enough evidence to possibly survive a summary judgment motion based on negligence. Should not society want more from university staff? When is potentially negligent behavior to be praised by a court of law?
The notion that Bradberry was participating in a “voluntary” workout is disingenuous. Athletes who opt out pay a large price. Perhaps those playing football for Indiana should use their NIL-largese to purchase insurance to protect themselves from the possible negligence of “well qualified, highly experienced” coaches.
