A Connecticut appeals court judge has declined to disturb the ruling of a lower court and jury, which held a fitness club responsible for unsafe conditions on a basketball court, causing the debilitating injury of a plaintiff.
The appeals court also affirmed most of the $4.4 million in damages that a jury awarded to the plaintiff, reducing the award for future medical costs by only $109,000 after determining there was inadequate evidence to support the jury’s initial monetary award.
Renee Rodriguez was playing basketball with a friend at an L.A. Fitness Club on the morning of March 10, 2008, when he slipped and fell after chasing a rebound. It was later determined that he slipped because of standing water on the floor, which was caused by a leak from the ceiling.
Rodriguez sued for negligence, alleging that the defendant, or its employees “allowed or permitted the floor of the gymnasium to be and remain in a slippery, unsafe, and dangerous condition, failed to warn the plaintiff of that dangerous condition, failed to remedy or repair said conditions when the same was reasonably necessary under the conditions, and failed to make proper and reasonable inspection of the floor area when a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the dangerous condition.”
The trial court found and the jury agreed that “there was sufficient record evidence that the club had constructive notice of the specific defect, that is, accumulated water that caused the patron’s fall and injury. Further, the evidence supported the finding that the club failed to inspect the basketball court within a reasonable time to discover and remove that defect.”
A jury awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in economic damages and $4 million in non-economic damages.
The defendant appealed the verdict and monetary award.
The appeals court noted that it should not disturb such a finding “unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.”
The appeals court went on to dispute any contention that there might be some sort of assumption of risk at work, noting that “it is common knowledge that persons playing basketball will be keeping their eyes mostly on the ball, the basket, and each other, and not looking at the floor they are playing on. It is also common knowledge that, as part of the game, they will run, jump, swerve, and stop suddenly, making themselves prone to falling on any slippery or foreign substance on the court.”
It went on to affirm the jury’s verdict, relying heavily on evidence that supported constructive notice. Specifically, “a personal trainer at the club testified that about two weeks prior to March 10, 2008, his nephew was playing basketball on the court and slipped and fell on an accumulation of dripping water in the same spot.” He testified that he reported that fall to the front desk. “Evidence of prior similar conditions is admissible, and ‘would often be relevant to prove the existence of the defect relied upon, its nature, and the time when it should have been observed . . .’ Ormsby v. Frankel, 54 Conn.App. 98, 103, 734 A.2d 575 (1999), quoting from Pajor v. Wallingford, 47 Conn.App. 365, 372 n.3, 704 A.2d 247 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 917, 714 A.2d 7 (1998).”
Turning to whether the award of damages was “excessive,” the court first examined the economic damages.
“Given the severity, permanence, and progressive nature of plaintiff’s injuries, and the fact that his expenses for the first two to three years (including the contemplated right ankle fusion) came to more than $145,000, it was not speculation for the jury to estimate his future medical, surgical, and physical therapy expenses over his remaining life expectancy of 42 years,” wrote the court. “But the court does find $254,938.57 to be an excessive estimate of future medical costs, lacking any reasonable support in the evidence,” thus reducing the award by a little over $100,000.
In considering the non-economic damages, the court detailed the severity of the injury and the impact it will have on the plaintiff.
“He cannot go up and down stairs without turning sideways; he has pain when walking, and when not walking; he walks with a permanent limp,” wrote the court. “At 35 years of age, he has the ankle of a person in his 60s or 70s. He can no longer perform the activities he enjoyed greatly before the accident: running, walking, playing outside with his children; playing basketball, lifting weights, salsa dancing (at which he excelled) or mowing the lawn or doing yard work. He sometimes has to use a brace for walking. He must ice his ankle at the end of the day to reduce swelling and his ankle is extremely sensitive like a funny bone or cold air on a toothache, according to Dr. Levine. In sum, Mr. Rodriguez has suffered a painful, progressive, life-altering injury. He has reasonable fears that he will need more surgery, that he will become more disabled, and that at some point he will become unable to work. Statistically, he will have to live with these afflictions for another 42 years.
“The jury’s award was very generous, certainly at the very high range of just compensation, but the size of a damage award alone is not grounds for setting it aside or ordering a remittitur. In accordance with the law of Connecticut the court has construed the evidence most favorably to sustaining the verdict and has considered the great deference to be given to the collective unanimous decision of a jury. After considerable deliberation and review of the evidence, the court cannot conclude that the award so shocks the sense of justice of this court as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption. This is a unique case that combines a very seriously disabling and progressive injury with an otherwise bright and lengthy future now dashed by the prospect of incurable pain, lost function, and continuing degeneration not only of the injured limb but over time of other related joints of the plaintiff’s body.”
Renee Rodriguez v. L.A. Fitness International, LLC et al.; Super Ct. Conn., Stamford-Norwalk; CV096001289S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3139; 12/12/11.
