A New Jersey state appeals court has reversed a lower court and found that the allegations made by several former football players or coaches that a football camp intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with another football camp should have survived the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs claimed that Football University, a national company specializing in training for elementary and high school football players, hired them in 2009 and 2010 as independent contractors to work as football instructors. They further alleged that they were independent contractors and had “not signed a contract with this company.”
When disputes arose regarding payment for camps already conducted, and the prospects for working additional camps in 2011, the plaintiffs learned that some of the principals of Football University had formed a new company, Football Tech, which would conduct a similar business beginning in 2011, according to the court. The plaintiffs signed contracts with Football Tech to conduct camps over the next two years, and, in early 2011, they began to do so.
However, on February 1, 2011, Football University sued Football Tech and sought to enjoin it from operating. In that litigation, Football University moved for a temporary restraining order prohibiting former Football University coaches from working at Football Tech’s camps, which were about to commence. The plaintiffs alleged that Football University’s complaint was based, at least in part, upon the material misrepresentation that the plaintiffs were under contract with it. But the plaintiffs alleged that they had never signed contracts with Football University and were not subject to any restrictive covenants.
The litigation between the camps was ultimately settled. As part of the agreement, the plaintiffs were told by the principals of Football Tech that Football Tech would not be able to employ them for a period of one year from April 2011 to April 2012.
The plaintiffs sued, alleging intentional interference with their contractual relationship with Football Tech and intentional interference with their economic advantage.
On March 12, 2012, a trial court dismissed their complaint, pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs appealed.
Central to the appeal was the narrow standard required for a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, “as laid down by our Supreme Court in Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 563 A.2d 31 (1989).”
The court noted that “the plaintiffs’ essential allegation is that Football University constructed its claim against Football Tech, at least in substantial part, on the intentionally false representation that the plaintiffs were under contract with it and could not be utilized by Football Tech as a result.
“Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs were simply victims of happenstance because Football Tech went out of business. On the contrary, the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaints assert a direct causal link between Football University’s alleged material misrepresentations and Football Tech’s demise.
“In Printing Mart, the Court considered a claim for damages for intentional interference with prospective economic relations, noting that ‘intentional interference with prospective economic relations’ is used interchangeably…with such expressions as ‘tortious interference with prospective economic advantage’ or ‘economic benefit,’ ‘intentional interference with a prospective contractual relationship,’ and the like. Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 744. ‘An action for tortious interference with a prospective business relation protects the right ‘to pursue one’s business, calling or occupation free from undue influence or molestation….What is actionable is ‘[t]he luring away, by devious, improper and unrighteous means, of the customer of another.’ Id. at 750 (quoting Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 586, 175 A. 62 (E. & A. 1934)).
“A complaint of tortious interference must allege facts that show some protectable right — a prospective economic or contractual relationship. Although the right need not equate with that found in an enforceable contract, there must be allegations of fact giving rise to some reasonable expectation of economic advantage. A complaint must demonstrate that a plaintiff was in ‘pursuit’ of business. Second, the complaint must allege facts claiming that the interference was done intentionally and with malice. For purposes of this tort, ‘[t]he term malice is not used in the literal sense requiring ill will toward the plaintiff.’ Rather, malice is defined to mean that the harm was inflicted intentionally and without justification or excuse. Third, the complaint must allege facts leading to the conclusion that the interference caused the loss of the prospective gain. A plaintiff must show that if there had been no interference, there was a reasonable probability that the victim of the interference would have received the anticipated economic benefits. Fourth, the complaint must allege that the injury caused damage. [Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 751-52.
“We are satisfied that the plaintiffs’ complaints establish the essential facts supporting their cause of action. They were clearly in pursuit of business with Football Tech. They alleged in their complaints that Football University made material misrepresentations, intentionally and with malice, i.e., without justification or excuse. The complaints also allege that but for the interference, a reasonable probability existed that they would have realized their anticipated earnings from Football Tech. Finally, the plaintiffs allege that Football University’s conduct was the cause of their damage. Accordingly, the complaints alleged the ‘essential facts’ necessary to support a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The complaints should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.”
Donald Soldinger, et al. v. Football University, LLC; Super. Ct. N.J., App. Div.; DOCKET NO. A-2177-12T4; 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1201; 5/27/14
Attorneys of Record: (for appellants) Gary M. Price. (for respondent) Ronald T. Nagle.
