A federal judge from the Southern District of Ohio denied the bid of a male student athlete, who after being suspended from the University of Cincinnati (UC) for his involvement in the alleged rape of a female student, sought unsuccessfully to obtain a temporary restraining order that would have allowed him to retain his eligibility and compete on the University’s football team.
On or about March 2, 2015, the female student in question submitted a complaint to the University’s Title IX office, reporting that she was sexually assaulted by a UC football player. The plaintiff was contacted about the Title IX complaint on or about May 14, 2015. He voluntarily met with Jyl Shaffer, the Title IX coordinator, on or about June 10, 2015. He also appeared on August 26, 2015 before the University’s Administrative Review Committee (ARC) panel to discuss the matter. The plaintiff alleged a number of significant procedural problems that occurred at the hearing, including but not limited to, the failure of the university to provide the plaintiff with the presumption of innocence, and the use of biased decision-makers.
Following the hearing, the ARC panel recommended that the plaintiff was responsible for violating the Student Code of Conduct, specifically Physical Abuse or Harm. On or about September 1, 2015, the plaintiff was notified by the Dean of Students that the ARC panel’s recommendation was accepted and that the plaintiff was suspended from the University for a period of one year.
The plaintiff appealed the decision, but was denied, leading to the request for a TRO. In seeking the injunction, he alleged a “violation of his Constitutional due process rights and rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.”
In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the court noted four factors: “(1) whether the moving party has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction. The four considerations are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997). Although no one factor is controlling, a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal. Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).”
Regarding the first factor, the court found that the plaintiff “has not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits of his due process claims. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the University failed to provide students with the presumption of innocence.”
Turning to the irreparable harm factor, the court favored the plaintiff, noting that he has alleged “the deprivation of a Constitutional right. Moreover, the plaintiff is in his final year of eligibility for playing football at the University. He is unable to attend classes and will be unable to graduate as planned this year. Other courts have held that suspension from school can cause irreparable harm, as can the loss of opportunity to participate in sports on a continuous and uninterrupted basis. See, e.g., Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, 2000 WL 297167, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (noting that suspension of student constitutes irreparable harm); Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, 1996 WL 680000, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (noting that because elite collegiate athletes have only a limited span of competitiveness, losing a year of competition would irreparably inhibit their development as athletes).”
The next two factors — “harm to others” and “public interest” — weigh in favor of the defendants, according to the court.
“Moreover, granting a temporary restraining order would likely disturb the University’s ability to enforce its disciplinary procedures, which would not be in the public interest. Id. Moreover, without a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights and thus injunctive relief is not in the public interest.”
John Doe v. University of Cincinnati, et al.; S.D. Ohio; Case No. 1:15-cv-600, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132864; 9/30/15
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Joshua A Engel, LEAD ATTORNEY, Engel & Martin, LLC, Mason, OH; Michael Kurt Allen, LEAD ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, OH. (for defendants) Rosemary Doreen Canton, LEAD ATTORNEY, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister – 1, Cincinnati, OH; Evan T Priestle, Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, Cincinnati, OH.
